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SOUTHERN   BRANCH 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
LIBRARY 

LOS  ANGELES.  CAUF, 


THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AS  REGARDS  INTERVENTION 


LC 


7199: 


STUDIES  IN  HISTORY,  ECONOMICS  AND  PUBLIC  LAW 

EDITED   BY  THE   FACULTY  OF   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
OF  COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY 

Volume  XCIII]  [Number  2 

Whole  Number  211 


THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AS  REGARDS  INTERVENTION 


CHARLES  E.  MARTIN,  Ph.D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  Government,  University  of 
California,  Southern  Branch 


COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY 

LONGM.'\NS,  GREEN  &  CO.,  AGENTS 
London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son,  Ltd. 

1921 


3A  '^  ^  I 


Copyright,  1921 

BY 

CHARLES  E.  MARTIN 


44-? 


MY  FATHER  AND  MOTHER 

WHOSE   CARE  AND  DEVOTION 

NO   TRIBUTE   OF   MINE 

CAN   EVER   REPAY 


PREFACE 

Chief-Justice  Marshall,  in  a  famous  decisian,  significantly 
declared :  "  No  principle  is  more  universally  acknowledged 
than  the  perfect  equality  of  nations.  Russia  and  Geneva 
have  equal  rights."  International  law  has  no  more  funda- 
mental principle,  and  this  view  is  sustained  by  such  author- 
ities as  Grotius  and  Vattel. 

The  moitive  which  inspired  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence was  the  desire  for  freedom  from  foreign  political  and 
commercial  control,  and  for  individual  freedom.  It  was 
declared  that  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  were 
the  "  inalienable  rights "  oif  individual  men.  As  these 
rights  were  to  be  guaranteed  to  men  as  individuals,  so 
could  they  be  claimed  for  states  as  independent  units  in  the 
society  of  nations. 

The  principles  which  gave  to  our  early  statesmen  the  in- 
spiration of  domestic  policy  soon  found  expression  in  our 
foreign  relations.  The  most  fundamental  one  was  that  of 
"  non-intervention."  As  our  foremost  principle  of  foreign 
policy,  it  bears  a  close  relation  to  the  rights  of  the  individual 
as  a  basis  for  relations  within  the  state,  and  to  the  principle 
of  the  equality  of  nations  as  the  foundation  of  sound  in- 
ternational intercourse.  In  effect,  the  principle  of  non-in- 
tervention prevented  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
other  nations,  and  reserved  to  each  state  the  right  to  choose 
its  own  fonii  of  government  and  to  control  its  political 
destiny.  Moreover,  it  required  abstention  from  the  political 
arrangements  of  other  governments,  and  more  especially  of 
Europe. 

293]  7 


8  PREFACE  [294 

It  has  been  my  purpose  to  set  forth  the  history  and  de- 
velopmait  of  this,  the  cardinal  principle  of  our  foreign 
policy,  which  is  so  typical  of  our  political  ideals  and  institu- 
tions. This  eanibraces  not  only  a  discussion  of  its  origin 
and  adoption  by  our  statesmen  as  a  definite  principle  of 
foreign  policy,  but  also  the  extension  of  that  principle  so  as 
to  apply  to  the  independent  states  of  America  in  a  special 
sense.  This  phase  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention,  com- 
monly called  the  "  Monroe  Doctrine,"  was  designed  to  pre- 
serve the  Western  hemisphere  from  the  territorial  and  poli- 
tical control  of  foreign  powers. 

Moreover,  it  has  been  my  purpose  to  discuss  and  explain 
departures  froto  the  principle  of  non-intervention  by  the 
United  States.  The  capital  instances  of  departure  were  in 
Cuba  and  in  Panama.  Our  inten^entions  in  these  cases 
sustained  a  direct  relation  to  the  establishment  of  Cuba  and 
Panama  as  independent  states.  They  also  led  to  arrange- 
ments under  which  the  United  States  guarantees  their  in- 
dependence. These  interventions  rest  upon  the  ground 
that  the  principle  of  non-intervention  is  subject  to  excep- 
tions, and  that  each  case  must  rest  upon  its  own  merits. 

I  have,  therefore,  linnited  my  discussions  of  departures 
from  the  principle  of  non-mtervention  to  the  cases  of  Cuba 
and  Panama,  and  shall  reserve  for  the  future  publication  a 
discussion  of  special  situations  which  have  come  to  prevail 
in  Santo  Domingo,  Nicaragua  and  Haiti,  and  which  invoh'e 
a  degree  of  supervision  w^hich  non-American  powers  would 
be  forbidden  to  exercise  in  these  countries.  Unlike  the  in- 
terventions in  Cuba  and  Panama,  our  interventions  in  these 
states  have  not  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  their  in- 
dependence. These  steps  have  been  taken,  first,  to  arrange 
for  the  settlement  of  claims  of  citizens  of  foreign  states, 
thus  preventing  intervention  for  this  purpose  by  other 
powers;  and,  secondly,  to  restore  and  preserv^e  order  and 
political  stability. 


205]  PREFACE  9 

Such  measures  of  control  have  been  exercised  in  Santo 
Domingo  since  1905,  when  a  rnodiis  vivendi  was  concluded 
by  President  Roosevelt  which  provided  for  the  collection 
of  Dominican  customs  by  an  American  citizen  designated  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  for  the  payment  of 
the  government's  obligations.  This  supervision  was  con- 
tinued under  the  treaty  concluded  with  Santo  Domingo  in 
1907.  In  1 91 3,  commissioners  were  sent  to  supervise  the 
Dominican  elections  in  the  capacity  of  "  friendly  observers." 
In  June,  191 6,  American  forces  were  landed  to  restore 
order  under  the  supervision  of  the  United  States. 

Events  leading  to  intervention  in  Nicaragua  occurred  in 
1909,  when  the  American  government  refused  to  recognize 
further  the  Zelaya  government.  In  191 2,  marines  were 
landed  to  restore  order,  and  in  1914,  a  treaty  was  signed 
with  Nicaragua,  giving  the  United  States  exclusive  right  to 
build  a  canal  along  the  Nicaragua  route,  together  with  leases 
of  sites  for  naval  stations  and  a  naval  base.  For  these  con- 
cessions, the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  $3,000,000. 

This  tendency  of  departure  has  been  manifested  in  Haiti. 
Certain  European  governments  demanded  a  settlement  of 
claims.  Revolutionary  disturbances  followed,  and  in  19151 
American  forces  were  landed.  In  1916,  a  treaty  was  ap- 
proved by  the  Senate,  under  which  the  United  States  agreed 
to  supervise  the  collection  and  administration  of  customs 
and  the  training  of  a  native  constabulary.  Haiti  agreed  to 
enter  into  no  engagements  which  would  impair  her  indepen- 
dence. 

These  sj>ecial  situations,  whether  conventional  or  de  facta 
in  character,  are  manifestations  of  a  tendency  the  per- 
manency of  which  remains  to  be  tested.  It  is  my  purpose 
hereafter  to  treat  the  more  recent  interventions,  some  of 
which  are  now  pending.  While  it  is  a  matter  of  prediction 
as  to  the  direction  which  these  departures  will  take,  it  is  un- 


10  PREFACE  [296 

likely  that  the  development  will  ig-nore  altogether  the  pur- 
poses and  limits  of  the  principle  which  has  so  distinguished 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 

I  am  indebted  to  Professor  Edward  Elliott  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  California,  who  first  directed  my  interests  into  the 
field  O'f  international  law;  and  to  Professor  John  Bassett 
Moore  of  Columbia  University,  for  guidance  and  counsel 
in  all  phases  of  my  work. 

Charles  E.  Martin 

Berkeley,  California,  August,  1920. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 

The  Formation  and  Development  of  the  Policy  of 
Non-Intervention 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Origin  and  Adoption  of  the  American  Policy  of  Non- 
Intervention 

Page 

Introduction  19 

Ancient  and  European  backgrounds  as  a  means  for  understand- 
ing American  policies.  ...  . 19 

"State  interest,"  allianceij_and  the  balance  of  power  in  the 

Greek  city-states  and  in  Rome 19 

Medieval  influences      20 

The  rise  of  the  nations 21 

Intervention  in  Modern  Europe .    -  22 

The  doctrine  of  non-intervention 2ym — 

Intervention  during  the  Revolutionary  period 23 

Status  of  European    diplomacy  at    the  outset  of    the  war  for 

American  Independence 23 

International  questions  resulting  from  the  Revolution    ....  24 

Revolutionary  diplomacy 24 

The  desire  for  diplomatic  relations  with  neutral  states    .    •  24 

Wharton's  division  of  "  schools  "  of  diplomacy,   ....  25 

The  resolution  of  Congress  26 

Diplomatic  agencies  during  the  Revolution 26 

Objectives  of  American  diplomacy 26 

The  question  of  recognition  27 

The  attitude  of  neutral  European  countries 27 

Relations  with  France 28 

French  sympathy, aifa  interest  in  the  Revolution 28 

The  mission  of  Franklin,  Deane  and  Lee 29 

Instructions  of  the  secret  committee  to  the  mission.   .  29 
297]                                                                                                II 


12  CONTENTS  [298 

PAGE 

Agreement  of   the  commissioners  not  to  conclude  a 

separate  peace 36 

The  change  in  Revolutionary  fortunes 31 

The  audience  with  Vergennes  31 

Note  of  Louis  XVI  to  Charles  III 32 

The  French  treaties  of  1778 32 

Treaty  of  amity  and  commerce 32 

Treaty  of  alliance 33 

Ratification .   .       .  35 

Intervention  during  the  post-Revolutionary  period 35 

The  adoption  of    the    Constitution    and    the    outbreak  of    the 

French  Revolution;  the  election  of  Washington        36 

Washington's  attitude  toward  the  French  Revolution 37 

The  outbreak  of  war  in  1793 37 

The  appointment  of  Genet  as  Minister  to  the  United  States.    .  38 
Questions  submitted  by  Washington  to  his  Cabinet  as  to  the 
reception  of  Genet,  and  the  renunciation  or  suspension  of  the 

French  treaties 39 

The  Cabinet  meeting  of  April  19,  1793 40 

The  Jefferson-Hamilton  controversy 41 

The  views  of  Jefferson 41—— 

The  views  of  Hamilton 42_>- 

The  arrival  of  Genet  as  French  minister 46 

His  commissioning  of  privateers, 46 

Jefferson's  views  of  neutral  rights  and  duties 47 

Genet's  recall;  his  defense 48 

Neutrality  as  related  to  non-intervention 49 

Neutrality  proclamation  of  April  22,  1793 SQ-^rr 

The  Napoleonic  wars  ....       51 

The  protection  of  neutral  rights 51 

French  decrees  and  complaints    •       52 

The  mission  of  C.  C.  Pinckney 55 

The  course  of  President  John  Adams;  the  mission  of  Marshall, 

Pinckney  and  Dana 56 

The  X,  Y,  Z  affair 56 

Measures  approaching  war 57 

Mission  of  Ellsworth,  Davie  and  Murray 57 

Non-intervention  as  a  principle  of  American  political  philosophy.  .  SQ-mr 

Difference  in  geographical  conditions  59  ^»^ 

Difference  in  government 60^ 

The  views  of  Locke;  the  right  of  revolution  and  the  natural 

rights  of  man 61   ~ 

The  views  of  Congress 62 


299]  *     CONTENTS  13 

PAGB 

The  attitude  of  John  Adams. 63, 

The  Farewell  Address  of  President  Washington 65 

Summary:    non-intervention  during  the  Revolutionary  and  post- 
Revolutionary  periods 66 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Extension  of  the  Policy  of  Non-intervention 

Limitations  of  the  early  declarations  of  policy 69 

The  question  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  rela- 
tions of  European  powers  with  other  American  states 69 

Steps  taken  by  the  United  States  leading  to  security  in  territory 

and  navigation 69 

The  revolutions  in  Spanish  America  71 

Recognition  by  the  United  States;  Mr.  Adams'  recognition  theory,  73 
The  policy  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  European  interven- 
tion in  independent  American  states             .  73 

European  backgrounds  of  the  American  policy yy 

The  Holy  Alliance jy 

The  alliance  of  November  20,  1815 78 

The  Conference  of  Troppau 80 

The  Conference  of  Laibach 81 

The  Congress  of  Verona 81 

The  application  of  the  principle  of  intervention  as  recog- 
nized by  the  Holy  Alliance  to  the  Americas;  concern  of 

the  United  States 82 

Mr.  Canning's  proposals  to  Mr.  Rush 85 

The  views  of  President  Monroe 85 

The  views  of  Jefiferson  and  Madison 86 

Discussion  with  Russia  over  colonization  and  the  question 

of  recognition 86 

The  definite  extension  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention  to  the 

independent  states  of  America 87 

Cabinet  deliberations 87 

The  question  of  a  joint  declaration 87 

The  question  of  an  answer  to  Russia.     .  .  .  gi 

The  compromise  of  the  Cabinet  as  to  the    form  and 

character  of  the  message    .    .  93 

The  Monroe  message  of  December  2,  1823 94  •■ 

The  principle  of  non-intervention 94 

The  non-colonization  principle .  96 

The  Panama  Congress 97 


14  CONTENTS  [300 

Factors  leading  to  the  extension  of  the  principle  of  non-interven- 
tion to  the  independent  states  of  America g8  "^ 

The  United  States  as  the  champion  of  the  principle  of  non-inter- 
vention; cases  involving  the  application  of  the  principle  99-- 
Attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  continued  non-recog- 
nition by  Spain  of  the  revolted  Spanish  colonies gg 

Cases  arising  in  relation  to  Mexico 100 

Representations  made  by  Minister  Poinsett    .....  100 

Proposed  European  interventions,  1858-1860      102 

President  Buchanan's  proposal  of  American  intervention.  105 

French  intervention  in  Mexico,  1861-1867 107 

Cases  arising  in  relation  to  Venezuela 109 

Question  of  American  interposition 109 

Proposed  joint  intervention,  1871 no 

The  Venezuela  boundary  dispute. in 

English,  German  and  Italian  reprisals  against  Venezuela, 

1902-1903 115 

Cases  arising  in  relation  to  Brazil 118 

Question  of  American  alliance  and  intervention 118 

The  Brazilian  naval  revolt,  1893-1894 119 

Cases  arising  in  relation  to  the  Argentine  republic  ...  123 

Question  of  American  intervention 123 

The  Falkland  Islands  afifair 124 

Question  of  American  interposition 126 

Cases  arising  in  relation  to  Chile 127 

The  Egan  asylum  case 127 

The  Chile-Peruvian  war 129 

Significance  of  the  cases  involving  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  non-intervention  in  its  establishment  as  a  definite 

policy 135/ 


PART  II 

Departures  from  the  Principle  of  Non-Intervention 
BY  THE  United  States 

CHAPTER  III 

Intervention  in  Cuba 

Early  Cuban  relations 139 

Views  of  early  statesmen 139 

Opposition  to  European  aims  and  proposals 140 


30l]  CONTENTS  I 


D 


PACK 


Steps  proposed  to  safeguard  American  interests 142 

The  "Ten  Years'  War,"  1868-1878 144 

Policy  of  President  Grant  and  Secretary  of  State  Fish    ....  144 
Colombian  proposal  of  general  interposition  by  the   states  of 

America ...                   145 

Instruction  No.  266;  justification  of  the  right  to  intervene,  and 

the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  act 146 

Its  communication  to  the  European  powers;  their  replies  .    .    •  147 

The  insurrection  of  1895,  and  steps  leading  to  intervention  ....  149 

Intervention .    .        .    .  154 

The  McKinley  message  of  April  11,  1898;  grounds  of  interven- 
tion   154 

The  resolution  of  intervention 156 

The  outbreak  of  hostilities 158 

CHAPTER  IV 
Intervention  in  the  Revolution  at  Panama,  1903 

The  treaty  of  1846  between  the  United  States  and  New  Granada.  .  162 

Guarantee  of  neutrality  and  sovereignty 163 

Guarantee  of  free  and  open  transit 165 

The  recognition  of  Panama 167 

The  Hay-Bunau-Varilla  treaty 167 

The  Reyes- Hay  controversy 168 

President  Roosevelt's  special  message  to  Congress,  January  4,  1904.  170 


PART  I 

THE  FORMATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
THE  POLICY  OF  NON-INTERVENTION 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Origin  and  Adoption  of  the  American 
Policy  of  Non-intervention 

The  aittempt  to  find  in  Ancient  and  European  systems 
the  sources  and  inspiration  of  American  foreign  policy  is 
doomed  to  failure.  Not  only  is  identity  lacking,  but  fancied 
analogies  tend  only  to  mislead.  European  and  American 
policies  differ,  both  historically  and  theoretically.  At  the 
outset,  it  is  Avell  to  indicate  the  scope  of  the  subject  and  to 
insist  upon  the  fact  that  European  practice  cannot  be  made 
to  approach  American  practice,  and  vice  versa.  Neverthe- 
less, knowledge  of  a  system  entirely  different  from  our  own 
aids  materially  in  gaining  an  adequate  understanding  of 
the  American  system,  by  comparison  and  contrast,  if  not 
by  identity  and  analogy.  Moreover,  American  interna- 
tional practice  during  and  after  the  American  Revolution 
has  had  at  leasit  an  indirect  relation  to  European  practice. 
A  brief  review  of  the  factors  entering  into  the  formulation 
of  American  policy  will  contribute  to  a  more  comprehen- 
sive treatment  of  the  subject. 

The  theories  of  state-interest  and  the  right  of  self-pres- 
ervation, from  which  is  deduced  the  principle  of  interven- 
tion, are  by  no  means  peculiar  to  Modern  Europe.  The 
Greek  and  Roman  legal  and  political  theorists  eloquently 
championed  these  ideas.  The  feeling  of  the  time  is  best 
expressed  by  Aristotle  who  contended  t^at  the  state  is  a 
self-sufficient  body,  and  that  the  desires  of  the  individual 
should  be  subordinated  to  the  interests  of  the  state.  The 
305]  19 


20  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [306 

true  interests  of  the  individual,  indeed,  were  identical 
with  ithe  interests  of  the  slate,  because  the  state  could 
desire  only  the  best  for  its  citizens.  With  the  conception  of 
the  primacy  of  the  state  well  established,  it  was  not  difficult 
to  extend  the  poHcy  of  seeking  the  interests  of  the  state  to 
its  international  relations,  and  to  cause  the  will  of  the  state 
to  prevail  over  exterior,  as  well  as  interior,  forces.  Certain 
conceptions  of  the  Roman  law  have  been  incorporated  into 
international  law ;  and  certain  others,  while  not  so  incor- 
porated, have  influenced  the  conduct  of  nations  profoundly. 
The  conception  of  state-interest,  which  treats  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  position  and  prosperity  of  the  state  as  superior 
to  all  other  considerations,  was  expressed  in  alliances,  de- 
signed to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  Mediterranean,  or  to 
check  the  inordinate  power  of  ambitious  states.  The  adop- 
tion of  the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power,  also,  led  to 
the  formation  of  alliances  for  its  preservation.  When  the 
balance  of  power  was  destroyed,  crippled,  or  perhaps  threat- 
ened, it  was  the  duty  of  the  alliance  to  act.  This  action, 
based  on  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  inevitably  resulted  in  in- 
tervention in  the  affairs  of  another  state  or  group  of  states. 
We  have,  then,  the  Greek  and  Roman  system  ante-dating 
the  Modem  European  system,  and  differing  little  from  it. 
The  idea  of  state-interest  extended  to  a  group  of  states,  by 
means  of  alliances  designed  to  preserve  the  balance  of 
power,  furnishes  the  key,  generally,  to  the  history  of  the 
principle  of  interv^ention.  Intervention  to  preserve  rights 
of  succession,  and  inten^ention  by  one  state  alone,  consti- 
tute exceptions  to  the  rule.  The  practice  of  intervention 
continued  in  the  Ancient  world  until  the  principle  of  the 
balance  of  power  yielded  to  the  expansion  of  the  Roman 
Empire. 

Roman  Imperialism,  while  superseding  the  principle  of 
the  balance  of  power,  ser\'-ed  to  make  possible  at  a  later 


207]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  2L 

time  the  comity  of  nations  by  acquainting  the  colonies  com- 
prised in  the  imperial  domain,  subsequently  to  become  states, 
with  the  aims  and  civilization  of  the  Roman  world.  A 
family  of  nations,  governed  in  their  exterior  relations  by 
a  body  of  rules  called  international  law,  could  not  be  estab- 
lished, based  merely  on  the  practice  of  the  Mediterranean 
area.  Christianity  was  a  leavening  force,  placing  emphasis 
on  interests  other  than  those  merely  national  in  character, 
and  especially  on  the  belief  in  a  universal  brotherhood. 
The  Crusades  did  much  to  bring  the  Western  nations  to- 
gether. Thus,  a  "  community  of  interests "  among  the 
nations  was  getting  a  firm  hold.  The  Reformation,  caus- 
ing alliances  to  be  formed  ostensibly  on  grounds  of  faith  as 
opposed  to  grounds  of  race,  but  actually  on  grounds  of  con- 
quest and  expansion,  played  an  important  part.  But  it  re- 
mained for  the  discovery  of  the  New  World  to  quicken  the 
European  nations  with  an  appreciation  of  their  international 
responsibilities  and  opportunities.  The  desire  for  colonies 
and  for  the  conquest  of  inferior  peoples,  while  bringing  the 
.nations  into  conflict,  had  a  distinctly  sobering  influence  on 
them;  for  extended  colonial  expansion  has  for  its  counter- 
part increased  complexity  in  foreign  relations. 

Following  the  bringing  of  the  states  into  closer  relations, 
■certain  influences  operated  to  reestablish  and  preserve  the 
balance  of  power  and  alliances.  The  most  potent  of  these 
influences  was  the  rise  of  the  nations.  The  break-up  of 
the  Roman  empire  and  of  the  empire  of  Charlemagne,  and 
the  subsequent  rise  of  France  and  England  as  nations,  set- 
tled the  fact  that  European  political  development  should 
be  national  in  character.  The  interests  of  the  Papacy  were 
best  served,  not  by  European  political  unity,  but  by  national 
political  unity.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire  by  its  failure 
only  ha.stened  the  development  of  the  nations.  Nicolo 
Machiavelli.  writing  in  the  fifteenth  century,  advocated  the 


22  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [308 

doctrines  or  *'  reasons  of  state  "  and  political  expediency. 
This  was  the  first  concrete  expression  of  the  later  theory  of 
the  balance  of  power.  The  Italian  states  made  use  of  the 
principle  when  Naples,  the  Pope,  Tuscany,  Venice  and  Milan 
attempted  to  maintain  a  balance  of  power  between  them. 
The  growth  of  commerce  and  the  dominance  of  Spain  in 
the  sixteenth  century  further  demonstrated  the  necessity  of 
some  sort  of  equilibrum  among  the  states  of  Europe. 
Strong  absolutism  in  France,  and  the  Bourbon  and  Haps- 
burg  dynastic  rivalry  were  disturbing  elements.  It  re- 
mained for  the  Thirty  Years '  War  and  the  Peace  of  West- 
phalia definitely  to  establish  the  balance  of  power  and  the 
status  quo  in  Europe. 

The  Peace  of  Westphalia  did  not  remove  from  European 
politics  the  danger  of  an  ambitious  state.  The  power  of 
Spain  had  declined  and  was  no  longer  to  be  feared.  Louis 
XIV,  desiring  to  humiliate  the  Hapsburgs  and  to  give  to 
France  the  leadership  of  the  Roman  states,  greatly  disturbed 
the  peace  of  Europe.  His  doctrine  of  natural  boundaries 
and  frontiers  could  only  lead  to  intervention.  The  treaty 
of  Aix-Ia-Chapelle  in  1668  served  further  to  establish  the 
balance  of  power.  Intervention  for  rights  of  succession 
is  well  illustrated  in  the  eighteenth  century^.  The  War  of 
the  Spanish  Succession,  in  which  France  was  opposed  by  the 
intervention  of  the  Grand  Alliance,  was  settled  by  the  Peace 
of  Utrecht  in  1713.  By  this  peace  France  was  reduced  to 
her  original  position  as  an  ordinary  European  power.  The 
war  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  while  giving  the  Hohenzol- 
ierns  a  victory  over  the  Hapsburgs,  did  not  settle  the  points 
at  issue,  and  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  proved  to  be  only 
a  truce.  The  Seven  Years'  War,  however,  had  definite 
results.  English  dominance  in  'North  America  was  estab- 
lished, and  France  and  Sj>ain  were  humilated.  The  treaty 
of  Paris  in  1763  settled  the  controversy  between.  England, 


309]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  23 

France,  Spain  and  Portugal.  The  treaty  of  Hubertsburg 
brought  the  war  to  an  end  between  Austria,  Prussia  and 
Saxony.  The  treaties  did  little  to  encourage  a  "  lasting 
peace."  The  principle  of  partition  was  applied  to  Poland  by 
the  partitions  of  1772,  1793,  and  1795.  Intervention,  then, 
was  a  definite  principle  in  the  European  political  system. 

Opposed  to  the  theory  of  intervention  was  the  doctrine  of 
non-intervention.  It  did  not,  however,  gain  much  approval, 
except  among  the  smaller  states.  It  is  obvious  how  dif- 
ficult it  was  for  such  a  principle  to  fiouriih  in  Europe.  Na 
sovereign  state  would  agree  not  to  intervene  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another  state,  when  such  abstinence  might  seem 
directly  to  involve  its  own  existence;  and  non-intervention 
might  have  meant  the  ruin  even  of  a  large  European  state, 
so  long  as  the  system  of  alliances  continued.  The  adop- 
tion of  non-intervention  as  a  deliberate  and  consistent  policy 
was  reserved  to  the  United  States;  the  wisdom  of  which 
became  ver)'  real  after  an  instructive  exi:)erience  with  a 
European  alliance  and  a  narrow  escape  from  being  drawn 
into  the  European  conflict  during  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  Napoleonic  wars. 

The  status  of  Euroi)ean  diplomacy  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  for  American  Independence  was  practically  the  same 
as  at  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War.  England  had  svio 
ceeded  in  establishing  a  position  of  maritime  and  colonial 
supremacy  against  the  opposition  of  France  and  Spain. 
The  American  colonists  had  fought  valiantly  on  the  side  of 
England.  But  England  did  not  make  proper  use  of  her 
victory.  The  colonists  wanted  individual,  governmental 
and  commercial  freedom,  together  with  the  destruction  of 
the  then  universal  system  of  commercial  monopoly.  They 
finally  became  convinced  that  revolt  was  the  only  way  to 
secure  their  natural  rights,  and  they  were  willing  to  take 
this  step,  together  with  an  assumption  of  its  responsibilities. 


24  THE  UNITED  ST/fTES /IND  INTERVENTION        [310 

The  European  powers  were  little  in  sympathy  with  Eng- 
land, but  were  not  prepared  to  give  the  colonists  any  active 
and  open  support.  The  important  thing  to  notice  is  that 
Europe  was  still  governed  by  the  principles  of  the  balance 
of  power,  alliances  and  intervention;  while  the  Americans, 
conscious  of  the  evils  of  the  European  system,  were  to  fol- 
low a  new  course,  in  which  the  principles  controlling  Europe 
were  to  have  only  a  negative  influence. 

It  is  not  strange  that  the  question  of  intervention  or  non- 
intervention as  a  national  policy  should  have  arisen  during 
the  Revolutionary  period.  The  Revolution,  if  successful, 
meant  the  creation  of  a  new  state  with  all  the  usual  conse- 
quences, including  the  establishment  of  foreign  relations. 
Questions  of  treaties,  exchange  of  diplomatic  representa- 
tives, alliances  and  intervention  would  naturally  arise;  and 
ihere  would  be  a  serious  responsibility  to  assume  in  commit- 
ting the  government  to  a  definite  policy,  the  subsequent 
abandonment  of  which,  whether  forced  or  voluntary,  might 
result  in  humiliation.  The  history  of  American  foreign 
policy  at  this  time  is  limited  to  the  definition  of  our  relations 
with  the  states  of  Europe.  The  extension  of  that  policy, 
comprehending  the  other  independent  states  of  America  and 
the  relation  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  states  of 
Europe  to  them,  was  reserved  for  a  subsequent  and  different 
occasion. 

"^""The  new  government,  soon  after  entering  upon  the  war 
with  England,  sought  admission  to  the  family  of  nations  by 
attempting  to  enter  into  diplomatic  relations  with  the  neutral 
states.  In  this  it  encountered  serious  obstacles.  Indepen- 
dent states  at  war  find  diplomacy  difficult;  but  a  revolution- 
ary government  is  more  seriously  embarrassed.  At  the  out- 
set American  statesmen  for  the  most  part  not  only  lacked 
experience  in  international  relations,  but,  what  is  even  more 


311]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  25 

important,  they  lacked  the  means  and  opportunity  to 
conduct  such  relations  effectively. 

According  to  Wharton,  there  were  two  schools  of  thought 
in  Congress — -those  who  favored  and  those  who  opposed  the 
exercise  of  a  highly  centralized  executive  authority.  The 
conflict  between  these  schools  continued  until  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution,  and  persisted  subsequently  in  dealing  with 
questions  of  construction  and  interpretation.  Both  schools 
attempted  to  extend  their  ideas  of  internal  administration 
to  diplomacy.  The  first,  represented  by  Saniuel  Adams, 
John  Adams  and  Richard  Henry  Lee.  did  m,uch  to  spread 
propaganda  against  Great  Britain,  but  did  not  equal  the 
other  school  in  constructive  statesmanship  during  the  pro- 
gress of  the  Revolution  and  afterward.^  Such  influence  in 
Congress  prevented  efficiency,  not  only  in  diplomacy  but  in 
war  and  finance  as  well.  Dr.  Franklin  was  the  ablest  and 
shrewdest  diplomatist  of  the  Revolutionary  era,  as  will  be 
shown  in  considering  the  negotiation  of  the  French  treaties. 
Morris,  Livingston  and  Jay  were  constructive  diplomatists, 
whife  the  work  of  Jefferson  and  Hamilton  at  home  was 
doubtless  equal  to  the  work  of  Franklin  in  France.  It  is 
an  easy  matter  to  magnify  the  importance  of  Wharton's  dis- 
tinction, and  to  attempt  to  explain  tendencie.N  by  it  for 
which  it  can  in  no  degree  be  held  responsible. 

The  success  which  our  Revolutionary  diplomatists  even- 
tually achieved  must  be  credited  to  their  own  ability  rather 
than  to  any  guidance  or  aid  from  Congress.  The  organiza- 
tion of  the  department  of  foreign  affairs  was  a:iything  but 
satisfactory.  In  both  the  determination  and  the  administra- 
tion of  foreign  policies,  experience  seemed  to  be  the  only 
teacher  of  Congress.  The  first  diplomatic  organ  during  the 
Revolution  was  established  by  resolution  of  Congress: 

^  Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondcvce  of  the  American  Re-volution, 
rol.  j,  p.  2S3- 


26  THE  UNI  TED  ST  A  TES  A  ND  IN  TERVENTION       [312 

November  29,  1775. 

Resolved,  That  a  committee  of  five  be  appointed  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  corresponding  with  our  friends  in  Great  Britain, 
Ireland  and  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  that  they  lay  their 
correspondence  before  Congress  when  directed. 

Resolved,  That  this  Congress  will  make  provision  to  defray 
all  such  expenses  as  may  arise  by  carrying  on  such  a  corres- 
pondence, and  for  the  payment  of  such  agents  as  they  may 
send  on  this  service.^ 

The  members  chosen  for  this  work  were  Mr.  Harrison, 
Dr.  Franklin,  Mr.  Johnson,  Mr.  Dickinson  and  Mr  Jay. 
The  selection  of  Dr.  Franklin  and  Mr.  Jay  was  not  sanc- 
tioned by  John  Adams,  Samuel  Adams  and  Arthur  Lee.* 
This  resolution  is  doubly  important  because  it  was  the  first 
step  taken  to  organize  a  department  of  foreign  affairs  and. 
the  first  effort  to  get  in  touch  with  European  countries. 
The  committee  of  foreign  affairs  was  established  in  April, 
1777,  taking  over  the  work  of  the  committee  of  secret  cor- 
respondence.^ The  constant  changing  of  the  personnel  of  the 
committee  and  the  lack  of  a  permanent  executive  officer  im- 
periled the  work  of  the  committee  from  the  start.  The 
President  of  Congress  directed  the  diplomatic  correspon- 
dence when  no  committee  existed  for  the  purpose.  On 
August  ID.  1 78 1,  Robert  R.  Livingston  was  appointed 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Congress,  however,  en- 
trusted him  with  little  discretionary  authority. 

The  conflict  in  Congress  over  the  question  of  administra- 
tion led  to  the  practice  of  what  Wharton  calls  "  militia  " 
diplomacy.  The  Congress  paid  little  regard  to  the  rules  of 
diplomacy,  w^hile  some,  like  John  Adams,  chafed  under 
them.     Determined  to  establish  diplomatic  relations  with, 

1  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  61. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  554- 
'Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  456. 


313]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  27 

'European  g-overnments,  Congress  insisted  upon  sending 
ministers  to  all  foreign  courts  without  inquiring  as  to 
whether  they  would  be  received.  The  chief  object  of  these 
missions  was  to  borrow  money.  Dr.  Franklin  regarded 
them  as  indiscreet.  In  a  letter  to  Arthur  Lee,  March  21, 
1777,  he  very  clearly  stated  his  judgment  of  the  ultra-en- 
thusiasm of  Congress  in  hastening  foreign  intercourse:  "  I 
have  never  yet  changed  the  opinion  I  gave  in  Congress,  that 
a  virgin  state  should  preserve  the  virgin  character,  and  not 
go  about  suitoring  for  alliances,  but  wait  with  decent  dignity 
the  applications  of  others.  I  was  overruled;  perhaps  for 
the  best."  ' 

The  quest  of  recognition  at  some  of  the  European  court-;, 
resulted  unfortunately  for  the  revolted  colonies.  Contrary 
to  Franklin's  advice,  Congress  commissioned  Arthur  I>ee  to 
Madrid  and  to  Berlin,  William  Lee  to  Vienna,  Dana  to  St. 
Petersburg,  Adams  to  The  Hague,  and  Izard  to  Florence; 
all  with  instructions  to  secure  both  recognition  and  subsidy. 
None  of  these  representatives  was  officially  received.  The 
prestige  of  the  United  States  was  wounded,  both  by  the 
practice  of  sending  unwelcome  representa.tives,  and  by  the 
manner  of  the  appeals.  Congress  did  not  seem  to  take  into 
account  the  likelihood  that  the  recognition  of  the  United 
States  by  neutral  powers  would  be  considered  by  Great 
Britain  as  an  act  of  inter\^eiition. 

Spain  did  not  care  to  risk  the  consequences  of  recogniz- 
ing the  independence  of  the  United  States.  Frederick  the 
Great  of  Prussia  was  by  no  means  opposed  to  the  American 
revolt,  but  commercial  and  neutral  interests  prevented  him 
from  accordinsc  recosfnition.  Russia  was  at  this  time 
championing  neutral  rights,  and  hence  cotild  not  afford  to 
abandon  her  neutral  position.  The  Netherlands  had  no  inr 
clination  to  become  involved  in  the  American  war,  until 

'  Franklm.  Works.  voL  vi,  p   83. 


28  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [314 

complications  with  England  made  it  imperative.  The 
French  alliance  was  the  only  one  secured  during  the  Revo- 
lution. While  it  proved  of  value  in  winning  the  war  for 
independence,  it  was  at  the  same  time  an  alliance  which  some 
of  our  ablest  statesmen  later  sought  to  avoid,  and  which, 
without  proper  leadership,  would  have  led  to  disastrous 
consequences. 

The  American-French  relations  during  the  Revolution 
directly  involved  the  question  of  American  interference  in 
European  affairs.  Encouraged  by  representations  from 
the  French  court,  Franklin  favored  seeking  an  alliance  with 
France,  but  with  no  other  power.  The  reasons  for  French 
sympathy  with  the  Revolution  were  older  than  the  Revolu- 
tion itself.  They  dated  back  to  the  treaty  of  Paris  of  1763. 
The  Seven  Years'  War  brought  nothing  but  humiliation 
io  France.  That  country-  had  lost  its  position  in  the 
New  World.  With  her  navy  destroyed,  her  army  de- 
feated, and  her  coniTiierce  badly  crippled,  France  at- 
tempted to  repair  her  fortunes  and  to  restore  her  former 
prestige.  If  an  alliance  with  the  revolted  American  colonies 
would  produce  this  result,  she  would  not  hesitate  to  enter 
into  negotiations.  Louis  XV  favored  the  encouragement 
of  discontent  in  the  British  colonies.  The  accession  of 
Louis  XVI  to  the  throne  was  followed  by  the  appointment 
of  Vergennes  as  foreign  minister.  Vergennes  was  not  senti- 
mentally interested  in  the  Revolution.  He  watched  the 
American  situation  carefully  with  the  idea  of  French  inter- 
vention in  mind.  Bonvouloir  was  sent  to  America  on  a 
secret  mission  to  secure  information  and  tO'  indicate  to  the 
American  leaders  that  they  might  secure  aid  from  France, 
should  war  follow.  Bonvouloir  was  received  by  the  secret 
committee,  but  refused  to  commit  France  to  any  definite 
policy  of  alliance  or  intervention.  He  stated  that  France 
"  wished  them  well  "  and  might  possibly  participate  in  the 


^I^J  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  29 

war/  His  impressions  were  conveyed  to  Vergennes,  who  at 
once  gave  himself  to  a  serious  study  as  to  how  far  France 
should  actively  aid  the  Colonies. 

On  October  2,  1776,  the  secret  committee  received  from 
Congress  a  draft  of  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  alliance  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States,  together  with  the  ap- 
pointment of  Dr.  Franklin,  Thomas  Jefferson  and  Silas  Deane 
as  commissioners  to  negotiate  the  treaty.  The  committee 
transmitted  this  information  to  Silas  Deane.  In  the  absence 
or  disability  of  any  one  or  two  of  the  commissioners,  the 
other  was  given  full  power  to  act.  The  committee  advised 
Deane.  however,  to  await  the  arrival  of  Franklin  and  Jef- 
ferson before  communicating  the  commission  to  the  French 
ministr}\"  On  December  4,  Franklin  informed  Deane  of  his 
arrival,  of  the  appointment  of  the  commissioners,  and  of 
the  selection  of  Arthur  Lee,  then  at  London,  in  place  of 
Jefferson  who  had  declii'ied  to  serve.*  Deane  at  once  com- 
municated the  arrival  of  Franklin  to  Vergennes.* 

Congress  now  gave  its  attention  in  earnest  to  the  proposed 
French  alliance.  The  secret  committee  warned  the 
American  commissioners  at  Paris  of  the  means  England  was 
taking  to  prevent  foreign  aid,  especially  French,  from  being 
given  America.  Prospects  of  accommodation,  the  comr 
mittee  declared,  would  effectually  prevent  foreign  interfer- 
ence.* It  was,  therefore,  the  most  decisive  note  yet  received 
by  the  American  commissioners  when  the  secret  committee 
declared  that  "all  views  of  accommodation  with  Great 
Britain  but  on  principles  of  peace  as  independent  states  and 

'Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution, 
vol.  i,  p.  334. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  162. 
'Franklin,  Works,  by  Bigelow,  vol.  vi,  p.  35. 

•Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspottdence  of  the  American  RezotutioH, 
vol.  ii,  p.  223. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  227. 


30  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [316 

in  a  manner  perfectly  consistent  with  the  treaties  our  com- 
missioners may  make  with  foreign  states"  were  "  totally  at 
an  end  sance  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  em- 
bassy to  the  court  of  France."  ^  On  December  30,  1776, 
Congress  again  urged  the  commissioners  to  hasten  with 
their  tenders  of  alliance.^ 

The  secret  committee's  correspondence  became  largely 
memoranda  of  the  military  and  financial  situations  for  the 
intelligence  of  the  commissioners.  No  further  suggestions 
could  help  themi.  There  was  no  longer  any  question  as 
to  the  American  policy  of  seeking  foreign  aid.  The  problem 
now  was  to  complete  the  negotiations.  So  intense  were  the 
commissioners  in  their  desire  to  prove  America  a  faithful 
party  to  the  proposed  stipulations,  that  they  agreed  to  the 
following  personal  pledge : 

We,  the  commissioners  plenipotentiar}'  from  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  are  unanimously  of  the  opinion 
that  if  France  or  Spain  shall  conclude  a  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce  with  our  states,  and  enter  into  a  war  with  Great 
Britain  in  consequence  of  that,  or  of  open  aid  given  to  our 
states,  it  will  be  very  right  and  proper  for  us,  or  in  the  absence 
of  the  others  for  anyone  of  us,  to  stipulate  and  agree  that  the 
United  States  shall  not  separately  conclude  a  peace,  nor  aid 
Great  Britain  against  France  or  Spain,  nor  intennit  their  best 
exertions  against  Great  Britain  during  the  continuance  of  such 
war,  provided  always  that  France  and  Spain  do  on  their  part 
enter  into  a  similar  stipulation  with  our  states.' 

This  pledge  was  an  entering  wedge  toward  a  strong 
jx>licy  of  alliance  in  that  the  right  of  making  a  separate  peace 
was  to  be  abandoned  in  case  of  reciprocal  agreements  with 

^  ^^'harton,  of>.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  229. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  241. 
^  Ihid^  vol.  ii,  p.  26a 


317]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  31 

France  and  Spain.  The  publication  of  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation and  the  various  state  constitutions  in  French 
did  much  to  increase  confidence  in  the  political  sagacity  of 
the  Americans/  The  commissioners  under  the  leadership 
of  Franklin  did  not  lose  courage,  but  informed  the  secret 
committee  that  while  France  would  not  treat  with  them  as 
regards  independence  while  at  peace  with  Great  Britain, 
yet  American  commerce  was  receiving  the  treatment  ac- 
corded the  most  favored  nation,  and  nothing  could  be 
gained  by  unreasonable  haste. ^  On  September  8,  1777,  the 
American  commissioners  again  communicated  the  status  of 
negotiations  to  the  secret  committee.^  France  still  profes- 
sed to  England  that  she  would  observe  all  treaties.  Prizes 
brought  into  French  ports  were  restored,  persons  found  fit- 
ting out  armed  vessels  against  England  within  French  juris- 
diction were  imprisoned,  and  the  exportation  of  warlike 
stores  were  prohibited.  Privately  the  French  court  pro- 
fessed friendship,  winked  at  the  furnishing  of  supplies  t3 
America,  and  at  the  same  time  was  preparing  for  war.  It 
was  playing  a  double  part,  thought  the  commissioners,  the 
question  which  part  would  ultimately  predonuinate  being  un- 
settled. 

On  December  8,  1777,  the  same  day  Congress  resolved  to 
recall  Silas  Deane,*  the  American  envoys  addressed  a  com- 
munication to  Vergennes  which  soon  proved  to  be  effective.^ 
An  audience  was  granted  by  Vergennes  on  December  12.* 
On  December  17,  Monsieur  Gerard  called  upon  the  American 
representatives  by  order  01  the  king,  and  informed  them 

^  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  287. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  324. 
*Ihid.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  388,  389. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  444. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  444-445. 
*Ibid.,  voL  ii,  p.  453, 


32  '/V//f  UNITED  STATES  ASD  INTERyESTlOS        [31/^ 

that  His  Majesty  had  decided  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  amity 
and  comimerce.  He  said  that  the  king  desired  a  perpetual 
amity,  and  would  Ijoth  acknowledge  and  support  American, 
independence  by  every  means  in  his  power,  even  to  the  ex- 
tent of  going-  to  war,  which  then  seemed  likely/  He  would 
not  even  insist  upon  America  not  making  a  separate  peace 
at  her  convenience,  but  he  must  require  that  in  any  peace 
made  with  England,  the  United  States  should  not  surrender 
their  independence  and  return  to  British  rule.^  A  courier 
was  to  be  sent  to  Madrid  to  secure  the  concurrence  of  Spain. 
Ihere  were  legitimate  reasons  for  Spanish  delay. 

Perhaps  the  clearest  expression  of  the  French  attitude  to- 
ward the  alliance  is  shown  in  the  note  of  Louis  XVI  of 
France  to  Charles  HI  of  Spain,  January  8,  1788."  It  is 
evident  that  the  French  in  the  formation  of  their  alliances 
were  not  prompted  by  purely  altruistic  motives.  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  Bourbon 
"system  of  alliance"  would  be  best  maintained  by  an 
alliance  between  himself,  His  Most  Catholic  Majesty,  and 
the  United  States.  The  defeat  of  Burgoyne  and  the  dis- 
couraging position  of  Howe  had  entirely  changed  things. 
It  was  the  policy  of  England,  thought  the  king,  to  pacify 
America,  and  then  to  fall  on  France  with  her  maritime  force, 
and  the  time  was  at  hand  to  act,  if  reunion  with  the  mother 
country  was  to  be  prevented. 

Negotiations  were  hurried,  and  after  certain  communica- 
tions between  the  commissioners  and  Gerard,  treaties  of 
amity  and  commerce,  and  of  alliance,  were  concluded  at 
Paris,  February  6,  1778.  The  treaty  of  amity  and  com- 
merce followed  closely  the  projected  Congressional  plan.* 

'^  Wliarton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  452. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  453. 
*  J  bid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  467. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  490. 


^jcj]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  33 

The  treaty  established  '"■  firm,  inviolable  and  universal  peace, 
and  a  true  and  sincere  friendship  between  the  Most  Christ- 
ian King,  his  heirs  and  successors,  and  the  United  States 
of  America."  ^  It  was  agreed  reciprocally  to  extend  *'  most 
favored  nation  "  privileges  in  commerce  and  navigation, 
to  prevent  discriminator^'  duties  both  in  the  United  States 
and  in  France,  and  to  extend  reciprocal  protection  to  the 
vessels  of  both  countries.  The  remainder  of  the  convention 
treated  mainly  of  fisheries,  contraband  goods,  treatment  of 
prisoners  of  war.  consuls,  and  of  vessels,  trade  and  naviga- 
tion. 

But  the  crowning  achievement  of  the  commissioners  was 
the  treaty  of  alliance,  which  has  been  aptly  tenned  ''  the 
most  important  diplomatic  event  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion." '  By  the  first  article  an  alliance  was  formed  against 
Great  Britain.  In  the  event  of  war  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  before  the  close  of  the  Revolution,  the  United 
States  and  France  agreed  to  "  make  it  a  common  cause  and 
aid  each  other  mutually  with  their  good  offices,  their 
councils  and  forces,  according  to  the  exigence  of  conjunc- 
tures, as  becomes  good  and  faithful  allies."  By  article  II 
the  avowed  purpose  of  the  defensive  alliance  was  to  *'  main- 
tain effectually  the  liberty,  sovereignty  and  independence 
absolute  and  unlimited,  of  the  United  States,  as  well  in  mat- 
ters of  government  as  of  commerce.'*  There  were  certain 
imjKtrtant  agreements  as  to  operations.  Each  party  should, 
acting  for  itself,  do  every^thing  possible  against  the  common 
enemy.  In  case  concurrent  action  was  necessary,  the  de- 
tails of  the  case  should  be  settled  by  a  special  convention. 
Any  reduction  of  the  British  power  in  North  America  or  in 
the  Bermudas,  should  result  in  an  enlargement  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  United  States.     France  renounced  all  claim  to 

^  Malloy.  Treaties  and  Conventions,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  469. 
'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Principles  of  Americcin  Diplomacy,  p.  14. 


34  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [320 

any  territory  in  North  America  ot  thie  Bermudas  that  had 
formerly  been  ceded  to  Britain,  The  islands  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  were,  in  case  of  success,  reserved  to  France. 

In  Article  VIII  the  contracting  parties  agreed  not  to 
conclude  a  truce  or  peace  without  the  consent  of  the  other, 
and  engaged  not  to  lay  down  their  arms  until  American  in- 
dependence had  been  guaranteed  by  treaties.  No  claim  of 
compensation  could  be  made  by  one  ally  against  the  other, 
and  a  general  invitation  was  extended  to  other  nations  to 
make  common  cause  against  Great  Britain.  The  United 
States  guaranteed  to  France  the  possessions  held  hy  the  lat- 
ter in  America,  and  any  others  which  might  be  gained  by 
the  treaty  of  peace;  France  guaranteed  the  liberty,  sover- 
eignty and  independence  of  the  United  States,  and  the  ter- 
ritories taken  in  the  war.  This  reciprocal  guarantee  was  to 
take  effect  the  moment  war  occurred  betweeii  France  and 
England,  if  such  should  happen;  if  not,  at  the  close  of  the 
war  between  the  United  States  and  England.  A  separate 
act  was  made,  reserving  to  the  king  of  Spain  the  right  to 
agree  to  both  treaties.^ 

Franklin  and  Deane  informed  Congress  of  their  success 
on  February  8,  1778.  On  February  16,  the  three  envoys 
transmitted  the  treaties  to  the  committee  of  foreign  affairs, 
remarking  that  "  this  is  an  event  which  will  give  our  states 
'^uch  an  appearance  of  stability  as  must  strengthen  our 
credit,  encourage  other  powers  in  Europe  to  ally  themselves 
with  us.  weaken  the  hopes  of  our  internal  as  well  as  our  ex- 
ternal enemies,  fortify  our  friends  and  be  in  many  other 
respects  so  advantageous  to  us  that  we  congratulate  you 
itpon  it  most  heartily."  ^  The  best  hope  for  the  future  of 
America,  thought  Congress  and  the  commissioners,  lay  in 

*  Malloy.  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  482. 

-  Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Rcz'olution, 
Tol.  ii,  p.  495. 


32 1  ]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  35 

the  formation  of  foreign  alliances.  On  May  4,  1778,  Con- 
gress ratified  the  treaty  which  later  brought  the  United 
States  face  to  face  with  the  question  of  interference  in 
European  affairs,  and  the  treaty  which  brought  to  the  front 
the  question  of  intervention  or  non-intervention  as  an 
American  policy.  It  was  destined  to  test  the  statesmanship 
of  Washington,  Jefferson  and  Hamilton,  and  to  be  ab- 
rogated by  an  act  of  Congress  in  support  of  the  policy 
adopted  because  of  treaty  complications  with  France. 

It  may  be  said  that  France  fully  performed  the  obligations 
of  the  alliance.  The  unofficial  aid  privately  given  before 
the  alliance  was  only  a  mere  suggestion  of  the  aid  subse- 
quently given.  Large  sums  of  money  were  constantly 
loaned.  Supplies  were  obtained  in  France.  The  Marquis 
de  Lafa}'ette  and  other  French  officers  and  men  rendered 
distinguished  military  service.  And  France  paid  the  price 
for  her  alliance. — an  act  of  inten-ention  which  led  to  war 
\vith  Great  Britain. 

While  the  Revolution  atid  the  French  alliance  achieved 
the  independence  of  the  United  States,  the  policy  of  the 
country-  as  regards  interference  in  European  affairs  was 
as  yet  to  be  finally  detennined.  It  is  true  that  non-inter- 
vention was  theoretically  the  policy  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  from  the  first  discerning  statesmen  regarded 
America  as  a  nation  apart,  with  a  different  role  to  play  in 
the  world's  affairs.  Attention  will  be  given  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  non-intervention  principle  as  a  theory,  but 
it  is  important  at  this  juncture  to  examine  the  events  leading 
up  to  the  discussion  of  the  intervention  question  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  policy  of  non-intervention 
was  adopted.  Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  principle  in 
the  American  foreign  policy,  it  is  essential  to  understand 
how  it  was  tested  and  formally  proclaimed  in  the  post-Revo- 
lutionarv-  period. 


36  THE  UNITED  STATES  ASD  INTERVENTION       [322 

During  the  critical  period  immediately  succeeding  the  Re- 
vokition,  the  government  of  the  Confederation  had  per- 
plexities enough,  without  concerning  itself  with  ihe  ques- 
tion of  a  permanent  policy  as  regards  intervention;  but  this 
question  was  not  to  be  long  postponed.  The  year  1789  was 
a  memorable  one.  The  Constitution  became  operative. 
Washington  assumed  his  duties  as  President.  Jefferson  was 
relieved  of  his  duties  as  minister  to  France  and  William 
Short  was  named  in  his  stead. ^  In  the  same  year  the 
French  Revolution  broke  out — a  movement  which  evoked 
much  American  s}Tnpathy ;  and  it  was  to  be  in  the  French 
Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic  wars  that  the  test  of  the 
strength  of  the  non-intervention  principle  was  to  be  made. 
The  political  theories  of  Locke  and  Rousseau  as  regards 
natural  rights  and  especially  as  regards  the  right  of  revolu- 
tion, had  a  deep  effect  in  America  and  in  France.  It  is 
difficult  to  detennine  just  what  part  American  sympathy 
played  at  this  critical  juncture  when  our  non-intervention 
and  neutrality  policies  were  at  stake.  A  celebration  was 
held  in  New  York  on  December  27,  1792.  and  a  "  Civic 
Feast  "  occurred  in  Boston  January  2"/,  1793.  Many  popu- 
lar demonstrations  were  held.  The  term  "Citizen"  be- 
came widely  adopted.  Jefferson,  in  writing  to  Monroe, 
May  5,  1793,  said  that  the  war  between  France  and  England 
was  rekindling  the  spirit  of  1776."     He  declared: 

A  French  frigate  took  a  British  prize  off  the  capes  of  Delaware 
the  other  day  and  sent  her  up  here.  Upon  her  coming  into 
sight  thousands  and  thousands  of  the  yeomanry  of  the  city 
crowded  and  covered  the  wharves.  Never  before  was  such  a 
crowd  seen  there,  and  when  the  British  colors  were  seen  re- 
versed, and  the  French  flag  flying  above  them  they  burst  into 
peals  of  exultation.  I  wish  we  may  be  able  to  repress  the 
spirit  of  the  people  within  the  limits  of  a  fair  neutrality. 

'Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  %-oI.  t,  p.  58. 
'Jefferson,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  vi,  p.  236. 


323]  ORIGIN  ASD  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  37 

The  enthusiasm  of  the  f>eople,  however,  did  not  extend  to 
the  government  of  the  United  States.  If  the  former  had 
been  the  true  test  of  the  American  attitude,  France  had  good 
reasons  to  expect  substantial  aid  from  her  ally.  It  was 
fortunate  at  this  time  that  Washington,  Jefferson  and  Ham- 
ilton were  in  control  of  the  government.  In  his  first  in- 
augural speech  and  first  annual  address  to  Congress, 
Washington  did  not  place  much  emphasis  on  the  subject  of 
foreign  relations.  He  did,  however,  advocate  provision  for 
the  national  defence  and  the  extension  of  foreign  inter- 
course.^ In  his  second  annual  address,  December  8,  1790, 
he  reminded  Q)ngress  that  the  situation  in  Europe  should 
invite  America  to  greater  circumspection  in  maintaining 
peace;  that  the  tendency  of  a  war  could  not  be  overlooked 
and  should  be  met  by  preparation  for  war."  He  prophesied 
commercial  troubles,  aiid  recommended  action  to  guard 
against  T!t.  Washington's  private  correspondence  with  La- 
fayette (July  28,  1 791)  reveals -a  wholesome  attitude  to- 
ward Europe,  but  also  a  desire  to  remain  at  peace  with  the 
world."  He  cleverly  observed  that  the  guarantee  of  peace 
caused  the  people  to  appreciate  and  uphold  the  government. 
Consistently  with  his  avowed  ix>licy,  he  made  no  statements 
favoring  or  justifying  the  liberal  movement  in  France  ex- 
cept to  Lafayette  and  on  the  event  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  constitution  by  the  French  king.*  These  statements 
were  characterized  by  a  quiet  dignity. 

The  President,  when  war  approached  in  1793,  was  alert 
to  the  danger  which  might  threaten  America.  On  April 
12,  1793,  he  wrote  Secretarv-  of  State  Jefferson  that  "  War 
having   actually    commenced    between    France    and    Great 

'  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i.  pp.  65.  66. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  &. 

'  Washington,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  xii,  p.  59. 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  PresiJei:ts.  vol.  i,  pp.  116-117. 


38  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [324 

Britain,  it  behooves  the  government  of  this  country  to  use 
every  means  in  its  power  to  prevent  the  citizens  thereof  from 
embroiling  us  with  either  of  those  powders,  by  endeavoring 
to  maintain  a  strict  neutrality."  ^  In  addition  he  ordered 
Jefferson  to  give  the  subject  "  mature  consideration,"'  in 
order  that  appropriate  action  might  be  takeii. 

The  news  of  the  war  was  not  the  only  event  complicat- 
ing the  situatioti.  The  advice  came  that  M.  Edmond  C. 
Genet  had  been  appointed  minister  to  the  United  States,  re; 
presenting  the  new  French  republic,  and  that  he  was  on  his 
way  to  take  up  his  duties.  Minister  Morris,  in  a  note  dated 
March  7,  1793,  informed  the  government  that  Monsieur 
Genet  took  out  with  him  three  hundred  blank  commissioiis. 
to  distribute  to  such  as  would  fit  out  cruisers  in  American 
ports  to  prey  on  British  commerce."  Morris  regarded  this 
procedure  as  pernicious  morally  as  well  as  leading  to 
dangerous  consequences.  His  note  to  Thomas  Pinckney. 
American  minister  to  Great  Britain,  on  March  2,  was  more 
specific.^  He  was  certain  that  the  Executive  Council  had 
furnished  Genet  with  the  three  hundred  commissions,  and 
was  equally  certain  that  France  would  benefit  more  as  a 
nation  from  American  neutrality  than  from  an  alliance. 
Feeling  strongly  on  the  subject,  he  suggested  a  proclamation 
of  neutrality,  and  a  denial  of  protection  to  all  contravening 
it.  leaving  them  at  the  mercy  of  the  party  taking  them. 

The  Washington  cabinet  was  immediately  summoned. 
On  April  18.  the  President  sent  a  circular  letter  to  the 
cabinet  members,  informing  them  of  the  delicate  situation 
in  which  the  United  States  was  placed.  In  forming  a 
general  plan  for  executive  action,  he  submitted  the  foUo^-ing 
questions  for  their  consideration  : 

*  Washington.  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  xii.  p.  278. 
*Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel..  vol.  i,  p.  3=4. 
^Ihid.,  vol.  i.  p.  396. 


325]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  3Q 

1.  Shall  a  proclamation  issue  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
interference  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  the  war 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  etc.  ?  Shall  it  contain  a 
declaration  of  neutrality  or  not  ?     What  shall  it  contain  ? 

2.  Shall  a  minister  from  the  Republic  of  France  be  received  ? 

3.  If  received,  shall  it  be  absolutely  or  with  qualifications ; 
and  if  with  qualifications,  of  what  kind? 

4.  Are  the  United  States  obliged  by  good  faith  to  consider 
the  treaties  heretofore  made  with  France  as  applying  to  the 
present  situation  of  the  parties?  May  they  either  renounce 
them  or  hold  them  suspended  until  the  government  of  France 
shall  be  established? 

5.  If  they  have  tlie  right,  is  it  expedient  to  do  either,  and 
■which  ? 

6.  If  they  have  an  option,  would  it  be  a  breach  of  neutrality 
to  consider  the  treaties  still  in  operation? 

7.  If  the  treaties  are  to  be  regarded  as  now  in  operation,  is 
the  guarantee  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  applicable  to  a  defensive 
war  only,  or  to  war  either  offensive  or  defensive? 

8.  Does  the  war  in  France  appear  to  be  offensive  or  defensive 
on  her  part  ?     Or  of  a  mixed  and  equivocal  character  ? 

9.  If  of  a  mixed  and  equivocal  character,  does  the  guaran- 
tee in  any  event  apply  to  such  a  war  ? 

10.  What  is  the  effect  of  a  guarantee  such  as  that  to  be 
found  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  between  the  United  States  and 
France? 

11.  Does  any  article  in  either  of  the  treaties  prevent  ships 
of  war,  other  than  privateers,  of  the  powers  opposed  to  France 
from  coming  into  the  ports  of  tlie  United  States  to  act  as  con- 
voys to  their  own  merchantmen  ?  Or  does  it  lay  any  other  re- 
straint upon  them  more  than  would  apply  to  the  ships  of  war 
of  France? 

12.  Should  the  future  regent  of  France  send  a  minister  to 
the  United  States,  ought  he  to  be  received  ? 

13.  Is  it  necessary  or  advisable  to  call  together  the  two  houses 
of  Congress,  with  a  view  to  the  present  posture  of  European 


40  THE  UNITED  STATES  A\D  INTERVESTION        [326 

aifairs?     If  it  is,  what  should  be  the  particular  object  of  such, 
a  call  ?^ 

The  foregoing  questions,  discussed  in  Cabinet  meeting 
April  19,  1793.  indicate  Washington's  broad  grasp  of  the 
general  situation.  The  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  was  expres- 
sed concerning  the  tirst  two  questions  only.  As  to  ques- 
tion I,  it  was  "  Agreed  by  all  that  a  proclamation  shall  issue, 
forbidding  our  citizens  to  take  part  in  any  hostilities  on  the 
seas  with  or  against  any  of  the  belligerent  powers,  and  warn- 
ing them  against  carrying  to  any  such  powers  any  of  chese 
articles  deemed  contraband  according  to  the  modem  usage 
of  nations,  and  enjoining  them  from  aJl  acts  and  proceed- 
ings inconsistent  with  the  duties  of  a  friendly  nation  to- 
wards those  at  war."  ^  As  to  question  II,  it  was  "  Agreed 
unanimously  that  he  shall  be  received."  As  to  question  III, 
it  was  decided  that  "  This  and  the  subsequent  questions  are 
to  be  postponed  to  another  day." 

Following  the  meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  Jefferson  on  April 
28,  1793.  delivered  to  the  President  his  opinion  on  the 
general  question:  Whether  the  United  States  ought  to  de- 
clare their  treaties  with  France  void,  or  suspended.  This 
opinion  contained  answers  to  questions  II  to  VI,  inclusive. 
He  held  that  questions  VII-X,  being  on  the  guarantee, 
could  not  be  adequately  answered  apart  from  a  situation  to 
which  they  applied.^  On  the  twelfth  question  (as  to  the. 
reception  of  a  minister  sent  by  the  future  regent  of  France) 
he  was  of  the  opinion  that  if  the  nation  of  France  should 
ever  reestablish  such  an  office  as  regent,  a  minister  should 
be  received,  but  not  from  a  re^gent  set  up  by  any  other 
authority.* 

'Washington,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  xij,  p.  280. 
'Jefferson,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  vi,  p.  217. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi.  p.  218. 
*Ibui.,  vol.  vi,  p.  219. 


327]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  41 

The  questions  submitted  by  Washington  involved  hi.s  two 
ablest  Cabinet  members  in  a  notable  controversy,  which 
resulted  in  the  formulation  and  adoption  of  our  American 
policy  of  non-intervention  in  the  political  affairs  of  another 
nation.  Jefferson's  ver>'  able  argument  was  marked  some- 
what by  his  democratic  tendencies.  He  held  that  all  acts  by 
public  agents  under  the  authority  of  the  nation,  were  acts 
of  the  nation,  and  could  not  be  annulled  or  affected  by  any 
change  in  the  form  of  government,  or  of  the  persoas 
administering  it.  The  treaties  in  question,  therefore,  were 
treaties  between  the  L'nited  States  and  France  and  not  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Louis  Capet;  and  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  both  nations  had  since  changed  their  form  of 
government,  both  had  remained  in  existence  and  their  treat- 
ies had  not  been  annulled  thereby.^  Jefferson  drew  an 
analogy  between  contracts  between  nations  and  contracts 
between  individuals,  maintaining  that  non-performance  was 
not  immoral  if  performance  was  impossible,  and  that,  if 
perfonnance  should  become  sclf-dcstru-cthe  to  the  party, 
the  law  of  self-preservation  overruled  the  law  of  obligation 
to  others.  He  conceded  that  no  nation  had  a  right  either 
to  suspend  or  to  annul  its  obligations  merely  because  they 
were  either  useless  or  disagreeable;  but  in  case  they  were 
dangerous,  it  was,  he  affirmed,  a  matter  of  the  degree  of  the 
danger;  and  by  a  close  chain  of  reasoning,  he  held  that  the 
degree  of  danger  in  this  case  did  not  justify  annulment.'' 
Jefferson  concluded  that  the  treaties  were  still  binding, 
without  regard  to  changes  in  government ;  that  the  clause  of 
guarantee  only  suggested  danger,  and  that  only  remotely; 
that  extreme  danger,  and  neither  uselessness  nor  disagree- 
ableness,  was  the  test  of  the  right  of  annulment  or  suspen- 
sion; that  the  question  of  receiving  a  minister  did  not  ccm- 

^  Jefferson,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  vi,  p.  217. 
'Ibid.,  voL  vi,  p.  220. 


42  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [328 

cem  tlie  treaty  c>bligation;  that  the  United  States  held  at 
all  times  the  right  of  suspension  or  annulment  where  the 
question  of  self -preservation  was  in\'olvecl;  and  finally,  that 
allowing  the  treaties  to  remain  in  operation  did  not  amount 
to  a  breach  of  neutralit>',  while  their  abrogation  would 
amount  to  such  a  breach,  giving  France  just  cause  for  war/ 

While  Jefferson's  treatment  of  the  case  was  scientfic 
and  liberal,  Hamilton  took  what  he  thought  to  be  a  more 
expedient  view.  He  was  imaginative  enough,  however,  to 
anticipate  a  situation.  In  answering  question  HI  (whether 
the  minister  should  be  accorded  an  absolute  or  qualified  re- 
ception, and  if  with  qualifications,  what  kind),  Hamilton 
"held  that  the  United  States  should  previously  declare  to  the 
French  minister  before  his  reception  that  the  American 
government,  ;desiring  to  maintain  cordial  relations  andi 
friendly  intercourse  with  France,  would  accept  his  creden- 
tials and  receive  him  as  minister;  yet,  on  account  of  the 
relations  originally  contracted  between  the  two  countries 
and  the  present  state  of  affairs  in  France,  the  United  States 
reserved  the  question  of  the  temporary  and  provisional  sus- 
pension of  the  treaties  to  future  decision  :  and  that  the  French 
minister  should  be  apprised  of  the  reservation. " 

Hamilton  relied  upon  a  brief  recital  of  the  facts  of  the 
situation  in  France  to  strengthen  his  contention.  The  treat- 
ies were  between  the  United  States  and  the  king  of  France, 
his  heirs  and  successors.  A  new  constitution  accepted  by 
the  king  had  not  changed  the  status  of  things.  The  seizure 
of  the  king  and  the  declared  suspension  of  the  royal  govern- 
ment was  effected  by  a  body  unauthorized  to  destroy  any 
other  constituted  authority.  No  convincing  evidence  had 
been  produced  against  the  king.  Not  mentioning  other  ir- 
regularities, the  king  had  been  put  to  death,  bringing  up 

^Jefferson,  Writings,  by  Ford.  vol.  vi,  p.  231. 
*  Hamilton,  Works,  by  Lodge,  vol.  iv,  p.  370. 


329]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  43 

the  question  whether  or  not  it  was  an  act  of  national 
justice.  That  the  new  gox-emment  was  irregular  and  had 
not  established  itself  was  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  all 
Europe  regarded  it  as  an  act  demanding  armed  interven- 
tion to  restore  the  royalty  to  power.  The  question,  then, 
was  concerning  the  future  goverment  of  France — would  the 
royal  authority  be  restored  or  would  a  republic  be  estal>- 
lished?  Hamilton's  contention  was  that  the  facts  and 
circumstances  proved  that  the  revolution  was  not  a  free, 
regular  and  deliberate  act  of  the  French  nation.^ 

Arguing  that  the  treaties  ought  to  be  renounced  in  the 
interests  of  peace,  Hamilton  declared  that  the  existence  of 
an  option  and  its  non-use  were  equivalent  to  adandoning 
neutrality  for  an  alliance,  hence  giving  the  enemies  of  France 
just  reason  to  regard  the  United  States  as  an  enemy;  and 
if  under  the  treaties  we  were  not  bound  to  go  to  war,  it 
was  due  to  casualty  or  inability:  the  former  relieving  us 
only  in  case  of  an  offensive  war,  and  the  plea  of  inability 
being  the  weakest  means  of  maintaining  neutrality.  The 
latitude  other  governments  were  taking  in  giving  sanction 
to  Fraich  treaties ;  the  embarrassments  ensuing  in  regard 
to  the  clause  of  guarantee,  should  the  French  cause  fail; 
the  refusal  of  European  nations  to  treat  with  the  new  govern- 
ment, and  their  armed  intervention  in  behalf  of  royalty; 
and  the  prudence  of  requiring  the  reservation  of  the  question 
imtil  the  circiunstances  of  the  case  furnished  light  for  a 
right  and  safe  decision;  were  arguments  conclusive  of  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  sever  her  alliance  ^^^th  P'rance. 
In  answer  to  tlie  fourth  question  it  was  advanced  that  ap- 
plying the  principle  of  the  first  one  taking  up  arms  as  con- 
ducting a  defensi\-e  war,  the  facts  revealed  France  as  en- 
gaged in  a  war  of  oflFense  only,  while  the  alliance  wa-  clearly 
a  defensive  one." 

'Hamilton,  JVorks,  by  Lodge,  vol.  iv,  p.  373. 
*Ibid..  vol.  iv,  p.  397. 


44  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [330 

While  arguing  from  diftereait  points  of  view,  and  as- 
suming a  given  state  of  facts  in  certain  cases,  Jefferson  and 
Hamilton  in  this  Cabinet  controversy  made  possible  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  before  the  actual  circumstances 
arose  to  test  the  policy.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the 
questions  were  submitted  by  Washington  before  Morris 
informed  the  President  of  Genet's  plans  hi  America.  In 
trying  to  appraise  the  value  of  the  opposing  arguments,  one 
is  compelled  tO'  conclude  that  Jefferson  was  more  academic 
and  more  liberal,  with  a  greater  appreciation  of  the  duties 
of  the  United  States  under  the  treaties,  and  yet  with  a  due 
regard  for  American  rights  and  interests  as  well.  Hamil- 
ton was  governed  purely  by  practical  considerations.  With 
him,  the  circumstances  were  the  determining  factor.  Justi- 
fying renunciation  on  the  grounds  of  danger  to  the  United 
States,  he  entertained  the  same  opinion  of  the  French  govern- 
ment as  the  enemies  of  France  held,  and  he  thought  the 
American  view  should  be  identical  with  the  EuropearL 
They  differed,  naturally,  in  interpreting  the  authorities  on 
the  question  of  alliances.  Jefferson  believed  that  to  re- 
nounce the  alliance  would  be  just  cause  for  a  declaration 
of  war  by  France;  Hamilton  belie\'ed  just  as  firmly  that 
maintaining  the  alliance  would  lead  to  war  with  the  enemies 
of  France,  and  if  war  came,  it  would  be  better  to  fight  for 
non-intervention  and  neutrality  as  permanent  national 
foreign  policies  rather  than  to  fight  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  a  questionable  alliance.  Jefferson  regarded  the 
French  government  as  regular  and  the  treaties  as  binding 
because,  every  nation  having  a  right  to  change  its  form  of 
government,  the  alliance  existed  between  the  nations  and 
not  between  the  govemmeivts.  He  accorded  the  revolu- 
tionary government  both  a  de  jure  and  de  facto  character. 
Hamilton,  however,  while  admit^'ng  the  right  of  a  nation 
to  change  its  government  at  will,  denied  that  an  alliance  need 


^3l]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  FOLIC V  45 

be  continued  by  a  change  in  government.  If  the  revolu- 
tion be  consummated  and  the  government  established  and 
recognized,  with  strength  to  secure  the  performance  of  the 
alliance,  the  treaty  would  hold.  But  he  took  into  account 
the  probable  circumstances.  Without  detemiining  the  de 
jure  status  of  the  French  government  (for  wliich  reason- 
able doubt  was  entertained).  Hamilton  refused  to  accord 
to  the  new  French  government  a  de  facto  character  until 
it  had  established  itself.  With  all' Europe  in  arms,  refus- 
ing to  recognize  the  go\'ernmeni  as  de  facto,  and  interven- 
ing to  restore  the  monarchy,  the  United  States  could  not  be 
guilty  of  a  breach  of  neutrality  by  continuing  an  alliance 
with  a  government  not  as  yet  able  to  maintain  itself,  but 
would  be  guilty  of  an  act  of  inten^ention  by  being  the  ally 
of  a  government  the  rise  of  which  many  goverimients  re- 
garded as  in  itself  a  ground  for  intervention.  By  insist- 
ing upon  a  reserv'ation  of  the  question  of  suspension  and 
annulment  until  the  circumstances  of  the  case  could  be  ex- 
amined, and  by  declaring  for  the  renunciation  of  the  treat- 
ies, which  in  itself  was  a  denial  of  the  de  facto  character  of 
the  French  go\ernment,  Hamilton  attempted  to  commit  the 
United  States  to  the  extreme  policy  of  abandoning  treaty  re- 
lations with  a  government  which  proved  itself  able  to  offer 
effective  resistance  to  nearly  all  the  states  of  Europe,  on 
the  grounds  of  non-recognition  and  intervention  by  enemy 
states  opjx)sed  to  the  liberal  form  of  government  adopted 
by  the  French  nation.  To  have  followed  Hamilton's  course 
would  have  constituted  a  disparagement  of  revolution,  both 
as  a  right  and  as  basis  of  governmental  succession,  would 
have  led  to  a  test  of  governmental  eflficacy  common  to  the 
old  world  but  antagonistic  to  our  principles,  and  would  have 
led  to  an  unwarranted  discrimination  between  the  French 
state  and  the  French  government.  It  would  also  have  meant 
the  unnecessary  suspension  or  annulment  of  treaties  at  a 


^6  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [332 

time  most  likely  to  provoke  war.  Jefferson's  view  was  the 
one  adopted.  With  tlie  likelihood  of  being  called  upon  to 
perform  dangerous  obligations  a  matter  of  doubt,  Jefferson 
declared  that  one  ground  alone  would  justify  renunciation — 
the  preservation  of  the  life  of  the  state.  In  defense  of  this, 
all  alliances  would  be  put  aside.  Some  of  the  obligations 
might  be  useless  or  disagreeable,  but  they  could  be  dealt  with 
through  diplomatic  channels  when  the  question  should  arise, 
and  did  not  justify  suspension.  He  recognized  the  right  of 
revolution  (through  which  means  our  government  was 
founded),  and  recognized  no  distinction  between  a  state  and 
a  government  by  reason  of  the  government's  liberal  or  revo- 
lutionary character,  or  the  character  of  opposition  entertained 
by  intervening  enemy  states.  His  test  was  purely  a  de 
facto  one.  His  dealings  with  the  French  government  as 
Secretary  of  State  with  respect  to  the  alliance  and  the  war 
fully  justified  the  wisdom  of  his  course  and  definitely  es- 
tablished his  connection  with  the  origin  and  adoption  of 
the  policies  of  non-intervention  and  neutrality.  By  the 
abrogation  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France  by  act  of 
Congress,  July  27,  1798,  the  policy  of  foreign  alliances  was 
definitely  abandoned,  but  the  policy  of  non-intervention 
antedates  the  abrogation,  as  stated  by  Jefferson  and  adopted 
by  Washington  as  a  fK>licy  in  1793. 

The  arrival  of  Genet  at  Charleston,  April  8,  1793,  marked 
the  beginning  of  many  annoying  acts  on  his  part.  He  at 
once  began  fitting  out  and  commissioning  privateers  before 
he  had  delivered  his  credentials  or  before  he  had  even  been 
recognized  as  minister  to  the  United  States.  On  May  23, 
he  wrote  to  Secretary  of  State  Jefferson,  suggesting  that 
the  United  States  anticipate  the  stipulated  payment  of  their 
debt  to  France  by  furnishing  provisions  and  military  stores.*- 
The  Secretar)'  of  the  Treasury  was  of  the  opinion  that  there 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  i,  p.  142. 


333]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  47 

was  no  need  for  assigning  any  reason  for  non-compliance, 
since  by  the  terms  of  its  contract,  the  United  States  was 
not  bound  to  make  the  payments/  The  Secretary  of  State, 
howe\'er,  thought  that  a  reason  should  be  assigned."  On 
June  II,  Jefferson  politely  refused  the  proposal  of  the 
French  minister.^ 

Great  Britain  at  once  protested  against  the  making  of  the 
United  States  a  base  of  operations  against  that  coimtry.  The 
British  ship  Grange  was  seized  by  a  French  cruiser  within 
the  capes  of  the  Delaware.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Attorney 
General  Randolph  that  the  vessel  had  been  seized  in  neutral 
waters  and  that  restitution  should  follow.*  Hamilton 
favored  restitution  on  the  ground  that  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  United  States  excluded  the  exercise  of  authority  by 
France  within  American  territory,  except  by  express  consent 
or  by  treaty  stipulation.^  On  June  5,  Jefferson  wrote  Genet : 

After  fully  weighing  again,  all  the  principles  and  circumstances 
of  the  case,  the  result  appears  still  to  be,  that  it  is  the  right  of 
every  nation  to  prohibit  acts  of  sovereignty  from  being  exer- 
cised by  any  other  within  its  limits,  and  the  duty  of  a  neutral 
nation  to  prohibit  such  as  would  injure  one  of  the  warring 
powers ;  that  the  granting  of  military  commissions  within  the 
United  States  by  any  other  authority  than  their  own,  is  an  in- 
fringement on  their  sovereignty,  and  particularly  so  when 
granted  to  their  own  citizens,  to  lead  them  to  commit  acts  con- 
trary to  the  duties  they  owe  their  own  country ;  that  the  de- 
parture of  vessels,  thus  illegally  equipped,  will  be  but  an  ac- 
knowledgment of  respect,  analogous  to  the  breach  of  it,  while. 

^Hamilton,  H''orks,  by  Lodge,  vol.  iv.  p.  420. 
'Jefferson,  Writiitgs,  by  Ford,  vol.  vi,  p.  jSy. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  294-295. 

*  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-Gciwrcil  vol.  i,  n>.  .33-38. 
^Hamilton,  Works,  by  Lodge,  vol.  iv,  p.  409. 


48  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVESTIOS       [334 

it  is  necessary  on  their  part,  as  an  evidence  of  their  faithful 
neutrality/ 

Genet  replied: 

The  United  States,  friends  of  the  French,  their  allies  and  guar- 
antees of  their  possessions  in  America,  have  permitted  them 
to  enter  armed  and  remain  in  their  ports,  to  bring  there  their 
prizes,  to  repair  in  them,  to  equip  in  them,  whilst  they  have 
expressly  refused  this  privilege  to  their  enemies." 

In  a  note  of  June  22,  1793,  he  attempted  to  defend  the  pro- 
priety of  a  military  expedition  within  the  United  States 
against  Great  Britain.  While  actually  engaged  in  aiding 
France  in  America,  he  was  jealous  that  the  United  States- 
should  be  a  faithful  ally.  He  urged  that  the  American 
government  prevent  the  fitting  out  of  armed  vessels  hostile 
to  France  in  American  ports,  and  further  demanded  that 
the  British  privateer  Jayie  be  ordered  away  from  American 
ports.^  And  finally  he  demanded  that  the  American  govern- 
ment protect  American  rights  and  maintain  the  security  of 
the  American  f^ag  against  British  aggression.* 

On  August  23,  1793.  Jefferson  asked  for  the  recall  of 
Genet.^  On  September  18.  Cknet  made  a  vigorous  reply, 
complaining  of  ill-treatment  and  humiliation,  attacking 
Washington  for  slighting  him  and  Hamilton  for  abusing  him, 
complaining  of  the  incompetency  of  the  courts,  and  finally 
appealing  to  the  people  as  against  the  government.'  On 
December  25,  he  disavowed  any  activities  on  his  part  to  re- 
cruit an  armed  force  within  the  United  States,  but  he  did' 

"^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  ReL.  vol.  i,  p.  150. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  151. 
Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  154,  163. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  164, 
Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  172. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  172-174. 


335]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  49 

admit  the  granting  of  military  commissions  to  American, 
citizens  in  South  Carolina  for  that  purpose/  On  January 
20,  1794.  ^^'ashington  in  a  message  to  Congress  stated  that 
the  conduct  of  Genet  had  been  unequivocally  disapproved, 
and  his  recall  would  be  expedited  without  delay."  Jefferson, 
in  writing  to  James  Madison,  referred  to  Genet's  appoint- 
ment as  "calamitcus."  and  referred  to  him  personally  as 
"  hot-headed,  all  imagination,  no  judgment,  passionate  and 
disrespectful."^  In  compliance  with  a  reciprocal  request, 
Washington  recalled  Morris  as  minister  to  France,  at  the 
same  time  expressing  his  highest  regard  for  Mr.  Morris  in 
spite  of  the  recall.* 

The  recall  of  Genet  ended  a  severe  test  of  the  .\merican 
policy  of  neutrality  favored  both  by  Jefferson  and  Hamilton 
and  adopted  by  'Washington.  In  a  communication  of  May 
3,  1793,  Genet  stated  that  his  government  had  charged  him 
"  to  propose  to  your  government,  to  establish,  in  a  true 
family  compact,  that  is.  in  a  national  compact,  the  liberal 
and  fraternal  basis,  on  w^hich  she  wished  to  see  raised  the 
commercial  and  political  system  of  two  people,  all  whose 
interests  are  confounded."  "  The  proposal  was  a  definite 
invitation  to  strengthen  the  former  alliance  and  if  accepted 
would  have  led  to  intervention  in  the  European  w-ar.  The 
practical  renunciation  of  the  French  alliance  and  the  re- 
fusal of  the  United  States  to  form  either  a  "  family  "  or 
"  national  compact  "  established  more  finnly  the  American 
policy  of  non-intervention^^ 

The  neutral  policy  of  the  United  States  is  closely  related 
to  the  policy  of  non-intervention.     Both  develop  simultan- 

1  Am.  State  Papers.  For.  Rel.,  vol.  i,  p.  311. 

^  Ibid.,  vol.  i.  p.  314. 

'Jefferson,  Writings,  by  Ford,  vol.  vi.  pp.  33&-339. 

*  Washington.  IVritings,  by  Ford,  vol.  xii,  pp.  433-434. 

^ Am.  State  Papers.  For.  Rel.,  vol.  i,  p.  147. 


^O  THE  UNITED  STATES  A.\'D  L\TERyENTION       [336 

eously,  and  the  observance  of  one  required  the  observance 
of  the  other.  The  treaties  of  1778  concluded  with  France 
almost  led  the  United  States  into  the  European  conflict  in  the 
wars  following  the  French  Revolution ;  which  intervention 
was  prevented  only  by  the  strictest  adherence  to  the  policy 
of  neutrality.  But  there  was  a  further  responsibility. 
The  maintenance  of  neutrality,  together  with  the  duty  of 
the  United  States  as  the  champion  of  neutral  rights,  made 
the  policy  of  non-intervention  difficult  to  uphold.  At-> 
tention  will  be  given  the  questions  of  neutrality  and  neutral 
rights  only  as  they  are  germane  to  the  principle  of  non- 
interv^ention.  The  relation  between  the  two  policies  of 
neutrality  and  non-intervention  is  clear.  Physical  separa- 
tion from  Europe;  a  new  state  in  a  new  continent  wnth  a 
form  of  government  entirely  different  from  those  of 
Europe  at  the  time;  the  apparent  advantages  of  a  policy 
of  separation  from  European  alliances  maintaining  the 
troublesome  principle  of  the  balance  of  power;  were  in- 
fluences which  contributed  to  the  adoption  and  the  main- 
tenance of  both  policies. 

The  rights  and  duties  of  neutrals  had  not  been  clearly 
defined.  The  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the 
European  conflict  was  to  be  an  epoch-making  decision.  The 
French  treaties,  already  discussed,  complicated  this  problem. 
It  was  decided  at  the  meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  April  19.  1793. 
that  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  should  issue.  The  pro- 
clamation was  issued  in  April  22 : 

Whereas  it  appears  that  a  state  of  war  exists  between  Austria, 
Prussia,  Sardinia,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  Netherlands, 
of  the  one  part,  and  France  on  the  other;  and  the  duty  and 
interest  of  the  United  States  require,  that  they  should  with 
sincerity  and  good  faith  adopt  and  pursue  a  conduct  friendly 
and  impartial  toward  the  belligerent  Powers : 

I  have  therefore  thought  it  fit  by  these  presents  to  declare 


337] 


ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY 


the  disposition  of  the  United  States  to  observe  the  conduct 
aforesaid  towards  those  powers  respectively;  and  to  exhort 
and  warn  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  carefully  to  avoid 
all  acts  and  proceedings  whatsoever,  which  may  in  any  manner 
contravene  such  disposition. 

And  I  do  hereby  also  make  known,  that  whatsoever  of  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  shall  render  himself  liable  to 
punishment  or  forfeiture  under  the  law  of  nations,  by  com- 
mitting, aiding  or  abetting  hostilities  against  any  of  the  said 
Powers,  or  by  carrying  to  any  of  them  those  articles  which  are 
deemed  contraband  by  the  modern  usage  of  nations,  will  not 
receive  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  against  such  pun- 
ishment or  forfeiture;  and  further,  that  I  have  given  instruc- 
tions to  those  officers,  to  whom  it  belongs,  to  cause  prosecu- 
tions to  be  instituted  against  all  persons  who  shall,  with  the 
cognizance  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  violate  the  law 
of  nations,  with  respect  to  the  powers  at  war,  or  any  of  them.^ 

In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
a  strict  neutrality,  the  relation  of  this  country  to  the  wars 
growing  out  of  the  French  Revolution  continued  to  be 
perilous.  With  the  renewal  of  the  war  between  England 
and  France  in  1803,  the  Republican  party,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  President  Jefferson,  was  forced  to  grapple  with  the 
problem'  anew.  Whatever  sympathy  Jefferson  niay  have 
had  for  France  did  not  in  any  way  alter  the  consistent 
policy  of  a  "  fair  neutrality "  which  he  advocated  while 
Secretary  of  State  and  rigidly  adhered  to  as  President. 
Whatever  clamor  had  existed  for  the  formation  of  a  French 
alliance  in  1793  had  absolutely  disappeared  by  1803.  There 
was  no  time,  however,  when  the  great  majority  of  citizens 
did  not  uphold  the  government  in  its  policies  of  non-inter- 
vention and  neutrality. 

While  engaged  in  preventing  violations  of  American 
neutrality,  the  United  States  government  was  equally  con- 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  i,  p.  140. 


52  THE  UNITED  STATES  AXD  INTERVENTION       [338 

cerned  with  the  protection  of  commercial  and  neutral  rights. 
The  French  decrees  and  the  British  orders  in  council 
threatened  the  very  existence  of  neutral  commerce  as  well 
as  the  sanctity  of  neutral  rights.  The  question  as  to  how 
far  belligerents  could  prey  upon  neutral  commerce  was  fully 
as  important  as  the  question  of  neutrality.  John  Jay  con- 
cluded a  treaty  of  amity,  commerce  and  navigation  with 
Great  Britain  on  November  19,  1794.  The  object  of  this 
treaty  was  to  settle  the  question  of  neutral  rights  as  far  as 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  were  concerned.  By 
article  XVII,  enemy  goods  could  be  taken  from  neutral 
vessels.^  By  article  XXIII,  asylum-  was  granted  to  ships  of 
war."  By  article  XXIV,  privateering  was  forbidden  to 
any  holding  commissions  from  any  state  at  war  with  either 
country-."  The  negotiation  of  the  Jay  treaty  with  the  most 
effective  enemy  of  France  made  clear  the  position  of  the 
United  States  as  a  neutral  power,  and  rendered  the  hope  of 
American  intervention  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  France  an 
impossibility. 

The  displeasure  of  France  was  expressed  by  additional 
decress  against  neutral  commerce,  and  by  complaints  of- 
fically  made  against  the  United  States.  On  IMarch  9.  1796, 
the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  coirtmunicated  to 
Mr.  Monroe  the  complaints  of  the  French  Republic  against 
the  United  States.  The  first  general  complaint  was  as  re- 
regards  the  inexecution  of  treaties.  The  first  example  was 
"  tlie  submission  to  our  tribunals  of  the  cognizance  of  prizes 
brought  into  our  ports  "  by  French  privateers,  in  spite  of 
the  treaty  clause  co\'ering  the  subject.*  Mr.  Monroe  an- 
swered that  "  those  rights  which  are  secured  by  treaties  fomi 

'Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc..  vol.  i,  p.  601. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  603. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  604. 

*  Am.  Slate  Papers,  For.  ReL,  vol.  i.  p.  658. 


339]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  53 

the  only  preference  in  a  neutral  port  which  a  neutral  nation 
can  give  to  either  of  the  parties  at  war;  and  if  these  are 
transcended,  the  nation  so  acting  makes  itself  a  party  to  the 
war,  and,  in  consequence,  merits  to  be  considered  and 
treated  as  such."  ^  To  the  com.plaint  that  English  ships  of 
war  had  been  admitted  to  American  ports  in  contravention 
of  Article  XVII  of  the  commercial  treaty  of  1778,  it  was 
maintained  that  the  enemies'  warships  were  not  barred  by 
the  treaty  except  when  accompanied  by  prizes."  As  regards 
the  judicial  proceedings  against  the  captain  of  the  Cassiiis, 
it  was  stated  that  while  the  treaty  (article  nineteen)  stipu- 
lated that  "  the  commandants  of  vessels,  public  and  private, 
shall  not  be  detained  in  any  manner  whatever,"  yet  the  treaty 
contained  no  stipulation  as  to  the  right  to  arm,  and  not  to 
have  proceeded  judicially  would  have  amounted  to  a  col- 
lusive breach  of  neutrality.^  M.  de  la  Croix  complained  of 
the  outrage  committed  by  a  British  frigate  and  aided  by  a 
British  consul  against  the  French  minister,  on  the  ground 
that  the  punishment  inflicted  by  the  United  States  was  not 
comrruensurate  with  the  indignity  imposed.*  The  revoca- 
tion of  the  consul's  exequatur  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
British  vessel  from  American  waters,  combined  wath  a 
formal  protest  to  England,  was  all  the  United  States  could 
do,  since  there  was  no  effective  fleet."'  In  support  of  the 
last  general  complaint  that  by  the  Jay  treaty  the  United 
States  had  "  knowingl}'.  and  evidently  sacrificed  their  con- 
nections with  the  republic  and  the  most  essential  and  least 
contested  prerogative  of  neutrality,"  I\I.  de  la  Croix  alleged 
that  the  United  States  had  departed  from  the  principles  of 
the  armed  neutrality  and  to  the  prejudice  of  France  had 

1  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rcl.,  vol.  i,  p.  660. 
^  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  660. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  660-661. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  659. 

''Ibid.,  \'oli, -p.  66j. 


54  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [340 

abandoned  tlie  limits  of  contraband;  and  had  even  extended 
contraband  to  include  provisions/  Monroe  answered  that 
Great  Britain  had  never  acceded  to  the  principles  of  the 
armed  neutrality,  and  that  the  United  States  had  agreed 
upon  the  most  liberal  list  of  contraband  which  Great  Britain 
would  recognize." 

Other  complaints  were  presented  by  M.  Adet.  the  French 
minister,  to  Mr.  Pickering,  Secretary^  of  State.  He  pro- 
tested that  the  United  States  had  questioned  whether  or  not 
it  should  execute  the  treaties,  "  or  receive  the  agents  of  the 
rebel  and  proscribed  princes.''  It  was  replied  that  the  con- 
duct of  the  United  States  as  proved  by  the  facts,  was  ex- 
emplary; and  on  account  of  the  rapid  succession  of  revolu- 
tionary events,  the  American  government  had  the  right  to 
deliberate."  To  the  charge  that  the  President  had  issued 
"  an  insidious  proclamation  of  neutrality."  the  Secretary  of 
State  answered  that  the  object  of  the  proclamation  was  to 
preserve  the  United  States  in  a  state  of  peace,  to  be  observed 
by  an  impartial  neutrality.*  M.  Adet  was  also  reminded 
that  the  French  ministers  had  declaned  that  the  French 
government  did  not  desire  the  United  States  to  enter  the 
war.  Protests  were  made  against  Hamilton's  instructions 
to  the  collectors  of  the  customs,  the  neutrality  laws,  the 
treatment  of  French  privateers,  the  Jay  treaty,  and  favorit- 
ism' on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  England.  The 
blockade  of  the  French  colonies,  Mr.  Pickering  stated,  was 
an  active  one  and  binding  on  all  neutrals  alike.^  He  also 
contended  that  the  United  States  had  aided  France  in 
various  ways,  citing  as  examples  the  aid  given  M.  Genet, 

"^  Am.  State  Papers.  For.  Rel,  vol.  i,  p.  659. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  661. 

'Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Lazv,  vol.  v,  p.  5QS. 

*Ibid..  p.  595. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  V,  pp.  596-597. 


341  ]  ORIGIX  A\'D  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  55 

the  meeting  of  the  debt  to  France  and  the  aid  given  relative 
to  the  insurrection  in  Santo  Domingo.^ 

In  spite  of  the  efforts  to  reply  satisfactorily  to  the  com- 
plaints of  the  French  government,  new  decrees  were  issued, 
directed  against  neutral  commerce.  On  August  22.  1796, 
Mr.  Pickering  informed  Mr,  Monroe  of  his  recall.  Mr. 
C.  C  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina  was  named  as  his  suc- 
cessor." M.  de  la  Croix  infofmed  Mr.  Monroe  that  the 
Directory  would  "  no  longer  recognize  nor  receive  a  minister 
plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States  until  after  a  re- 
paration of  the  grievances  demanded  of  the  American 
government,  and  which  the  French  republic  has  a  right  to 
expect/'  ^  Pinckney  was  directed  to  leave  France.  He 
was  even  denied  the  privileges  of  a  resident  alien.  A  new 
decree  was  issued  by  the  French  Directory,  the  substantial 
effect  of  which  was  to  declare  a  "  general  and  summary  con- 
fiscation of  American  vessels."*  In  February  of  the  next 
year,  Mr.  Pickering  filed  formal  complaints  against  the 
French  government  for  alleged  interference  with  American 
commerce. 

The  suspended  diplomatic  relations  made  the  situation 
more  serious.  The  President  of  the  Directory,  Barras,  said 
in  an  unfortunate  speech: 

France  .  .  .  strong  in  the  esteem  of  her  allies,  will  not  abase 
herself  by  calculating  the  consequences  of  the  condescension 
of  the  American  government  to  suggestions  of  her  former 
tyrants.  .  .  .  They  will  weigh,  in  their  wisdom,  the  magnani- 
mous benevolence  of  the  French  people  with  the  crafty  caresses 
of  certain  perfidious  persons  who  meditate  bringing  them 
back  to  their  former  slavery.-^ 

*  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  597. 

*  Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  i.  p.  741. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  746. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Laze,  vol.  v,  p.  599. 
^Ani.  State  Papers.  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  ii,  p.  12. 


56  T?1E  UMTED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [342 

In  a  message  to  a  special  session  of  Congress,  ]May  16, 
1797,  President  John  Adams  reviewed  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  France/  Adams  complained  of  the  in- 
sults to  Pinckney,  but  he  was  more  enraged  at  the  speech  of 
Barras,  which  he  thought  more  serious  because  it  was  danger- 
ous to  American  independence,  for,  while  it  was  studiously 
marked  with  indignities  to  the  American  government,  it 
also  suggested  the  separation  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  from  its  government."  He  suggested  that  such  in- 
sults should  be  decisively  repelled  so  as  to  convince  France 
and  the  world  that  the  United  States  were  "  not  a  degraded 
people,  humiliated  under  a  colonial  spirit  of  fear  and  sense 
of  inferiority,  fitted  to  be  the  miserable  instruments  of 
foreign  influence,  and  regardless  of  national  honor,  charac- 
ter, and  interest."  *  This  wound  in  the  American  breast 
Adams  faithfully  tried  to  heal.  On  May  31,  1797,  Pick- 
ney,  John  Marshall  and  Francis  Dana  were  nominated  as 
ministers  to  France.  Elbridge  Gerry  finally  replaced  Dana. 
They  were  given  plenary  power  to  settle  all  differences  with 
France.  They  were  given  protection  by  Talleyrand,  but 
a  formal  reception  was  at  first  refused. 

Three  gentlemen  known  as  X,  Y.  and  Z  suggested  that  as 
a  doticciur  for  the  members  of  the  Directory  who  had  been 
offended  by  the  President's  message,  a  sum  of  money  would 
be  required,  and  that  a  loan  to  the  government  would  also 
be  necessary.  Pinckney  reminded  them  that  he  had  been 
treated  with  great  disrespect,  but  said  that  he  would  treat 
for  a  reconciliation  on  honorable  terms  jointly  with  his 
colleagues.  Finally,  after  some  negotiations,  the  American 
envoys  offered  to  send  one  of  their  number  forthwith  to 
America  to  interv^iew  the  government  on  the  matter  of  a 

^Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i,  p.  2^. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  235. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  235. 


343]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY 

loan,  if  proceedings  in  regard  to  captured  American  ships 
would  be  suspended.  Later  the  envoys  informed  the  in- 
termediaries that  in  spite  of  the  course  of  the  Directory, 
they  must  guard  the  interest  and  honor  ofx\merica;  and 
further,  they  would  no  longer  hear  propositions  from  per- 
sons having  no  authority  to  act.  A  new  decree  was  issued 
Januar}-  17,  1798.  On  January  28,  a  formal  review  of 
the  questions  betw^een  the  two  countries  was  submitted  to 
Talleyrand.  In  March  an  audience  was  granted.  The  mat- 
ter of  a  loan,  the  Jay  treaty,  and  other  complaints  were  men- 
tioned. The  ministers  disclaimed  all  authority  to  agree 
to  a  loan.  Talleyrand  informed  them  that  he  would  be  dis- 
posed to  treat  with  the  one  whose  opinions  were  most  im- 
partial (meaning  Gerry).  They  replied  that  negotiations 
could  only  be  considered  jointly,  whereupon  Pinckney  and 
Marshall  left  France.     Gerry  remained,  only  to  be  recalled. 

The  treatment  accorded  the  American  representatives 
aroused  much  hostility  in  the  United  States.  President 
Adams  said  in  a  message  to  Congress:  ''  I  will  never  send 
another  minister  to  France  without  assurance  that  he  will 
be  received,  respected  and  honored  as  the  representative  of 
a  great,  free,  powerful,  and  independent  nation."  Measures 
were  taken  to  prepare  for  war.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the 
Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  that  actual  maritime 
warfare  not  only  existed  between  France  and  the  United 
States,  but  a  maritime  war  authorized  by  both  nations.  The 
indignation  of  the  United  States  caused  Talleyrand  to  alter 
his  course.  He  suggested  through  the  French  legation  at 
The  Hague,  that  any  minister  sent  to  France  by  the  United 
States  would  receive  the  treatment  demanded  by  President 
Adams  in  his  message  of  June  21,  1798.  Our  participation 
in  the  war  against  France  was  thus  narrowly  averted. 

Ellsworth.  Davie  and  Murray  were  sent  as  ministers  in 
response  to  the  above  overture,  with  full  powers  to  nego- 


38  THE  UNITED  STATES  AXD  INTERVENTION       [344 

tiate,  but  with  specific  instructions.  They  claimed  that  the 
treaties  of  1778  had  been  abrogated  by  a  solemn  public  act 
only  after  France  had  in  many  ways  violated  the  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce.  The  French  plenipotentiaries 
claimed  that  they  could  not  consider  the  treaties  as  annulled ; 
there  had  been  no  state  of  war  as  far  as  France  was  con- 
cerned.  They  regarded  an  abrogation  as  provocation  to 
war,  and  in  that  case  would  refuse  to  treat  further  unless 
negotations  were  preceded  by  a  treaty  of  peace.  To  have 
insisted  on  American  claims  would  have  led  to  war.  Their 
consideration  was  postponed  to  avert  such  a  condition.  The 
French  would  not  agree  to  deal  separately  as  regards  the 
question  of  claims  and  treaties.  A  treaty  was  signed  Sep- 
tember 30,  1800.  By  article  II  it  was  agreed  that  since  no 
concurrence  could  be  reached  in  respect  to  the  treaties  of 
alliance,  amity  and  commerce  of  1778,  and  the  convention 
of  1788,  nor  upon  the  alleged  indemnities  of  both  nations, 
negotiations  would  continue  at  a  more  convenient  time.  The 
convention  and  treaties  in  the  meantime  were  to  have  no 
operation.  Provision  was  made  for  the  commercial  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries.^  This  article  was  expunged 
on  demand  of  the  Senate.  It  was  agreed  that  the  convention 
should  be  in  force  for  eight  years  from  the  time  of  the  ex- 
change of  ratifications.  This  brought  to  an  end  the  long 
struggle  between  France  and  the  United  States  over  tlie 
treaties  of  1778,  which  were  the  main  factors  in  bringing 
up  the  question  of  intervention.  The  conflict  over  them 
resulted  in  the  adoption  and  maintenance  of  the  policy  of 
non-intervention. 

Non-interv^ention  in  its  relation  to  the  government  as  a 
practical  policy  has  already  been  discussed  in  detail.  The 
formation  of  the  French  alliance,  and  the  trouble  caused  by 
it  during  the  wars  growing  out  of  the  French  revolution, 

*Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  497. 


345 

togi  ..^j   diia  tne  pro- 

tect-^.X  yjL  ucLiirai  rights,  illustrate  the  practical  workings 
of  the  polic}'.  But  the  theory  of  non-intervention  existed 
as  a  political  principle  and  as  a  part  of  the  political  philos- 
ophy of  American  statesmen,  both  during  and  following 
the  Revolutionary  period,  quite  apart  from  any  question  of 
alliances,  neutrality,  or  neutral  rights.  The  fact  that  these 
unforeseen  questions  played  a  definite  part  in  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  policy  and  sorely  tested  it,  and  our  consistent 
adherence  to  it  in  spite  of  all  complications,  demonstrate 
most  clearly  that  the  policy  was  one  of  conscious  purpose, 
designed  to  be  maintained,  if  possible,  in  all  emergencies; 
it  was  not  a  matter  of  casual  development.  The  purpose 
was  already  fixed  in  the  minds  of  the  statesmen.  The  ap- 
plication of  the  purpose  had  to  await  the  matter  of  state 
action,  which  always  limits  the  operation  of  a  theory. 

The  reasons  for  entertaining  such  a  theory  are  obvious. 
The  matter  of  geographical  isolation  was  the  most  ap- 
parent. Edmund  Burke  made  much  of  the  physical  separa- 
tion of  England  and  the  Colonies  in  his  plea  for  concilation. 
This  reason,  while  very  clear  as  a  prima  facie  matter,  has 
a  few  practical  applications  to  the  American  situation. 
Physical  separation  from  the  mother  cotmtry  prevented  the 
colonists  from  securing  equal  rights  with  English  citizens. 
It  also  gave  England  every  advantage  to  stifle  the  Colonies 
commercially,  and  to  control  the  seas  as  far  as  colonial  trade 
was  concerned.  The  disadvantages  of  physical  separation 
under  political  union  demonstrated  clearly  the  manifold  ad- 
vantages of  both  physical  and  political  separation.  The 
idea  was  given  more  practical  significance  in  the  Revolution- 
ary war,  when  the  Americans  saw  how  difficult  it  was  for  a 
power  of  Europe  to  conduct  a  successful  war  in  America 
because  the  base  of  operations  was  so  far  removed  from 
the  territorv'  of  the  European  l>elligerent. 


(jQ  THF.UMTIW  STATES  AMD  INTERVENTION       [346 

The  second  reason  for  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of 
non-intervention  was  found  in  the  American  form  of 
government,  and  in  the  conception  of  the  right  of  revolu- 
tion. Wars  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power  had  largely 
originated  in  the  design  to  save  or  to  enhance  the  position' 
of  reigning  monarchies.  The  establishment  of  a  repub- 
lican government  with  no  royal  house  would  elim^inate  such 
dynastic  wars  as  liad  been  the  curse  of  Europe.  Current 
political  theories  and  their  diversities  were  well  represented 
in  the  waitings  of  Hobbes,  Locke  and  Rousseau.  All  three 
writers  espoused  the  conception  of  the  social  contract,  but 
their  applications  of  it  were  very  different.  Hobbes  in- 
ferred from'  it  that  men  had  consented  to  the  establishment 
of  an  all-powerful  sovereign.  The  state  existed  to  main- 
tain order  and  the  rights  of  property;  but  their  maintenance 
was  in  the  discretion  of  the  sovereign,  who  made  the  laws 
but  was  not  himself  bound  by  them.  Any  state  was  better 
than  no  state,  since  the  condition  of  war  which  existed  pre- 
vious to  the  establishment  of  society  was  more  terrible 
than  the  tyranny  of  the  worst  prince.  The  sovereign  power, 
when  once  relinquished  and  conferred,  could  not  be  alien- 
ated. This  theory  was  more  applicable  to  the  English 
system  than  to  any  other.  Locke  drew  different  conclu- 
sions. There  were  certain  inalienable  rights  which  could 
not  be  surrendered  by  the  individual.  The  state  was  estab- 
jished  to  maintain  life,  liberty  and  propert}^  through  the 
institution  of  a  known  law  and  a  common  judge.  The 
purpose  of  the  state  was  secured  through  the  establish- 
ment of  a  government,  the  duty  of  which  was  a  protect 
life,  liberty  and  property.  Whenever  government  failed 
to  secure  these  purposes,  it  might  be  overthrown  and  a  new 
one  set  up  in  its  pla.ce.  This  was  very  acceptable  philosophy 
to  the  Americans.  Rousseau  held  that  the  individuals  con- 
ferred all  their  rights  and  powers  on  an  organized  society 


347]  ORIGIX  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  6l 

which  was  the  sovereign  power,  and  gave  expression  to  its 
sovereignty  through  the  general  will.  Government,  being 
only  an  administrative  agent,  C':>uld  be  changed  at  will  by 
the  sovereign  power. 

Instead  of  adopting  one  of  the  extremes,  American  states- 
men took  the  middle  ground  as  advocated  by  Locke.  To 
admit  that  the  sovereign  only  coidd  maintain  rights,  that 
the  sovereign  was  not  bound  by  law,  and  that  sovereignty 
once  conferred,  could  not  be  alienated,  would  be  to  favor 
ro^^ulty  and  the  consequences  of  dvtiastic  quarrels.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  conclude  that  the  governmient  could  be  chang^ 
at  will  without  qualification  was  not  satisfactory.  Ameri- 
cans were  satisfied  to  reason  that  certain  rights  could  not  be 
conferred;  and  if  the  government  formed  to  secure  these 
rights  could  not  guarantee  them,  it  could  be  overthrown. 
The  right  of  revolution,  then,  was  justified  onh"  on  the 
grounds  that  a  government  failed  to  secure  the  natural 
rights  of  man.  The  Declaration  of  Independence  is  practi- 
cally a  statement  of  these  principles.  It  was  declared  that 
when  any  form  of  government  did  not  secure  these  ends,  it 
was  the  right  of  the  people  to  abolish  it.  But  while  the 
right  was  recogniized,  stress  was  laid  upon  the  seriousness 
of  the  step.  "  Prudence,  indeed,  will  dictate  that  govern- 
ments long  established  should  not  be  changed  for  light  and 
transient  causes;  and  accordingly  all  experience  hath  shown, 
that  mankind  are  more  disposed  to  suffer,  while  evils  are 
sufferable,  than  to  right  themselves  by  abolishing  the  form^ 
to  which  they  are  accustomed."  ^  The  Declaration  then 
goes  into  detail,  enumerating  the  failures  of  the  Britisii 
government  to  secure  these  rights,  thereby  justifying  poli- 
tical separation  from  England.  It  is  well  to  point  out 
the  wisdom  of  the  American  course.  To  have  adopted  the 
view  of  Hobbes  would   have  led   either  to   colonial   sub- 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i.  p.  3. 


62  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [348 

mission  or  to  the  establishment  of  an  independent  monarchy 
with  all  its  dangers;  while,  to  have  followed  the  principles 
of  Rousseau  would  have  meant  the  carrying  of  the  right  of 
revolution  to  the  straining  point.  Its  effect  was  seen  in 
France,  when  the  effort  was  made  to  carry  liberty  to  all 
oppressed  peoples.  The  adoption  of  either  of  these  ex- 
tremes might  have  resulted  in  the  virtual  abandonment  of 
the  policy  of  non-intervention. 

The  Congressional  view  was  strictly  in  favor  of  the  non- 
intervention principle.  The  management  of  foreign  affairs 
after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  was  practically  trans- 
ferred from  Congress  to  the  President.  Congress  would 
favor  no  policy  which  would  suggest  direct  interference  in 
European  affairs.  Such  an  attitude  had  been  manifested  by 
the  Congress  under  the  Article  of  Confederation  in  the 
matter  of  the  armed  neutrality.  On  ]May  21,  1783,  in  con- 
nection with  the  Dana  mission  to  Russia  and  the  desirability 
of  a  commercial  treaty  with  that  country,  it  was  on  motion 
of  Mr.  Hamilton,  seconded  by  Air.  Madison,  resolved : 
"  That  though  Congress  approve  the  principles  of  the  armed 
neutrality,  founded  on  the  liberal  basis  of  the  maintenance 
of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations  and  of  the  privileges  of 
commerce,  yet  they  are  unwilling,  at  this  juncture,  to  be- 
come a  party  to  a  confederacy  which  may  hereafter  too  far 
complicate  the  interests  of  the  United  States  with  the 
politics  of  Europe,  and  therefore  if  such  a  progress  is  not 
yet  made  in  this  business  as  may  make  it  dishonorable  to 
recede,  it  is  their  desire  that  no  further  measures  may  be 
taken  at  present  towards  the  admission  of  the  United  States 
into  that  Confederacy."  ^  Congress  had  approved  on  Octo- 
ber 5,  1780.  the  principles  of  the  armed  neutrality;^  and 

'Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution, 
vol.  vi,  p.  438. 
^  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  438. 


349]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  63 

the  board  of  admiralty  was  instructed  to  prepare  rules  for 
the  commanders  of  American  ships  conformable  to  those 
contained  in  the  Russian  declaration,  while  American  minis- 
ters were  authorized,  if  invited  to  do  so,  to  accede  to  the 
principles.  But  on  June  12,  1783,  the  Congress  declared 
that  the  primary  object  of  the  resolution  of  October  5,  1780, 
and  of  the  commission  and  instructions  to  Mr.  Dana  in  re- 
gard to  the  accession  of  the  United  States  to  the  neutral 
confederacy,  could  no  longer  operate,  and  that,  as  the  true 
interests  of  the  States  required  that  they  be  as  little  as  pos- 
sible entangled  in  the  politics  and  controversies  of  European 
nations,  it  was  inexpedient  to  renew  such  powers  to  the 
American  ministers  abroad.  And  it  was  accordingly  re- 
solved : 

That  the  ministers  plenipotentiary  of  these  United  States  for 
negotiating  a  peace  be,  and  they  are  hereby,  instructed,  in  case 
they  should  comprise  in  the  definitive  treaty  any  stipulations 
amounting  to  a  recognition  of  the  rights  of  neutral  nations,  to 
avoid  accompanying  them  by  any  engagements  which  shall 
oblige  the  contracting  parties  to  support  those  stipulations  by 
arms.^ 

The  most  independent  of  American  diplomatists  was  John 
Adams.  From  the  first  he  was  the  spokesman  and  defender 
of  the  principle  of  non-interventioiL  On  November  10, 
1782,  he  disclosed  in  no  mistakable  terms  to  Mr.  Oswald's 
secretary-,  his  views  on  this  question.  He  observed  that 
there  was  something  in  the  minds  of  the  English  and  French 
which  impelled  them'  to  war  frequently,  but  if  anything  was 
done  as  regards  peace  which  the  Americans  thought  hard 
or  unjust,  ''both  the  English  and  French  would  be  continually 
blowing  it  up.  and  inflaming  the  American  minds  with  it, 
in  order  to  make  them  join  one  side  or  the  other  in  a  future 

^  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  483. 


64  THE  UNITED  STATES  AXD  INTERVENTION       [350 

war."  ^  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  Oswald  had  good 
reason  to  think  that  America  would  be  glad  to  join  France 
in  such  a  war.  and  he  took  pains  to  undeceive  him  on  this 
point.^     He  summarized  his  view^  in  the  following  words: 

For  my  own  part,  1  thought  America  had  been  long  enough 
involved  in  the  wars  of  Europe.  She  had  been  a  football  be- 
tween contending  nations  from  the  beginning,  and  it  was  easy 
to  foresee  that  both  France  and  England  would  endeavor  to 
involve  us  in  their  future  wars.  I  thought  it  our  interest  and 
duty  to  avoid  them  as  much  as  possible  and  to  be  completely 
independent,  and  to  have  nothing  to  do  but  in  commerce  with 
either  of  them ;  that  my  thoughts  had  been  from  the  beginning 
to  arrange  all  our  European  connections  to  this  end,  and  that 
they  would  be  continued  to  be  so  em.ployed." 

A  few  days  later  he  told  Oswald  that  he  was  afraid  the 
United  States  would  be  made  the  tools  of  the  European 
powers  and  of  their  manoeuvering  to  get  the  United  States 
into  their  real  or  imaginary  balances  of  power,"*  It  should 
be  the  rule  of  the  United  States  not  to  interfere,  and  of  the 
powers  of  Europe  not  to  desire  or  even  permit  such  inter- 
ference. Later,  President  Adams,  in  referring  to  certain 
French  indignities,  stated  that  France  and  the  world 
should  be  decisively  convinced  that  the  United  States  would 
not  be  made  "  the  miserable  instruments  of  foreign  in- 
fluence."^ He  recognized  that  the  American  form  of 
government  exposed  the  United  States  openly  to  the  "  in- 
sidious intrigues  and  pestilent  influence  "  of  foreign  nations, 

1  Wharton,  op.  cif.,  vol.  v,  p.  879. 

*3  John  Adams'  Works,  p.  307. 

'Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspoiideuce  of  the  American  Rezolution, 
vol.  V,  p.  880. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law.  vol.  vi.  p.  11. 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i.  p.  233. 


351  ]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY    >         65 

which  could  only  be  averted   by  an   "  inflexible  neutral- 
ity."^ 

The  views  of  President  Washington  are  best  set  forth 
dn  his  Farewell  Address  of  September  17,  1796.  He  warned 
the  American  people  against  favoritism  towards  or  hatred 
of  any  particular  nation.  Favoritism  could  easily  lead  to  an 
imaginary  cunmion  interest  where  no  interest  really  existed ; 
and  would  easily  lead  to  concessions  to  the  favored  nations 
w^hich  would  be  regarded  as  grounds  for  resentment  by  the 
others.  He  further  pointed  out  how  the  favoritism  of  a 
small  nation  for  a  larger  would  result  in  the  ultimate  sub- 
mission of  the  former  to  tlie  rule  of  the  latter,  and  how 
foreign  influence  was  one  of  the  most  baneful  foes  of  re- 
publican government.  He  stated  his  position  in  the  follow- 
ing memorable  words: 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  rela- 
tions is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations  to  have  with 
them  as  little  political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we 
have  already  formed  engagements  let  them  be  fulfilled  with 
perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop.  Europe  has  a  set  of 
primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none  or  a  very  remote  rela- 
tion. Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies, 
the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns. 
Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  to  us  to  implicate  our- 
selves by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her 
politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her 
friendships  or  enmities. 

Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and  enables  us  to 
pursue  a  different  course.  If  we  remain  one  people,  under  an 
efficient  government,  the  period  is  not  far  off  when  we  may 
defy  material  injury  from  external  annoyance;  when  we  may 
take  such  an  attitude  as  will  cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at 
any  time  resolve  upon   to  be  scrupulously   respected :   when 

'9  John  Adams'  Works,  p.  277. 


66  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [352 

belligerent  nations,  under  the  impossibility  of  making  acquisi- 
tions upon  us,  will  not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  us  provoca- 
tion; when  we  may  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest, 
guided  by  justice,  shall  counsel. 

Why  forego  the  advantages  of  such  a  peculiar  situation? 
Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground?  Why,  by 
interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe, 
entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European 
ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice?  ^ 

A  review  of  the  more  important  factors  involved  in  the 
origin  and  adoption  of  the  American  policy  of  non-interven- 
tion reveals  that  the  formation  of  the  alliance  wnth  France 
was  the  most  important  diplomatic  event  of  the  Revolution 
related  directly  to  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  policy. 
The  Revolutionary  statesmen  desired  first  of  all  to  win 
tlieir  independence  from  Great  Britain.  Recognition  and 
regular  diplomatic  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  was 
sought,  as  is  done  by  every  new  state.  The  alliance  was  a 
matter  of  expediency  on  both  sides.  The  Colonies  desired 
aid  from  France  and  wished  to  negotiate  a  treaty  as  well. 
France  desired  the  pennanent  separation  from  England  of 
her  American  colonies.  In  order  to  secure  their  immediate 
•needs,  the  American  commissioners  must,  b}"  a  defensive 
alliance,  agree  to  reciprocate  in  a  similar  emergency.  The 
post-Revolutionar}'  period  was  the  great  testing  time.  The 
French  revolution  and  the  wars  growing  out  of  it  constantly 
threatened  the  position  of  the  United  States  as  a  neutral 
coimtry.  The  Europeati  struggle  and  the  arrival  of  Genet 
caused  Washington  to  detemiine  upon  a  policy  of  non-in- 
tervention and  neutrality.  The  question  of  the  absolute  or 
qualified  reception  of  the  French  minister  and  of  the  abroga- 
tion or  suspension  of  treaties  was  referred  to  the  Cabinet. 
All  agreed  upon  a  proclamation  of  neutrality.     Jefterson 

'Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i,  p.  222. 


353]  ORIGIN  AND  ADOPTION  OF  THE  POLICY  67 

believed  that  to  renounce  the  alliance  would  be  just  cause 
for  declaration  of  war  by  France;  Hamilton  believed  just 
as  firmly  that  maintaining  the  alliance  would  lead  to  war 
with  the  enemies  of  France.  Hamilton  favored  a  qualified 
reception;  Jefferson  held  that  any  reception  at  all  was  a  re- 
cognition of  the  legitimacy  of  the  French  government. 
Genet  was  received  and  the  alliance  was  not  annulled. 
Washington  was  more  inclined  to  Jefferson's  than  to 
Hamilton's  view.  The  urgency  with  which  Hamilton 
argued  his  case  demonstrated  his  desire  for  a  more  com- 
plete separation  from  the  European  war.  Both  worked 
for  a  policy  of  non-intervention;  the  question  was  one  of 
procedure.  That  the  United  States  would  have  been  in  a 
better  position  without  the  alliance  is  obvious.  The  point  is 
whether  or  not  Hamilton  would  have  defeated  the  very  end 
for  which  he  was  striving  by  his  own  plan  of  procedure. 
The  activities  of  Genet  only  intensified  American  adher- 
ence to  the  policy  which  was  the  outgrowth  of  the  famous 
cabinet  meeting.  His  conduct  was  repudiated,  and  his 
proposals  for  an  alliance  were  rejected.  Hand  in  hand  with 
the  policy  of  non-intervention,  we.  find  the  maintenance 
of  lfeuffaJity''ancf  the  protection  of  neutral  rights.  The 
consistent  effort  of  the  government  to  maintain  these  princi- 
ples constantly  threatened  the  existence  of  the  non-inten^en- 
tion  policy.  The  abrogation  of  the  French  alliance  did  not 
solve  the  treaty  question.  After  many  negotiations  which 
in  a  few  cases  nearly  led  to  war,  the  matter  was  practically 
settled  by  the  treaty  of  Septemder  30,  1800.  The  theory  of 
non-intervention  was  an  important  matter  in  the  practical 
evolution  of  the  policy.  Physical  separation  from  England 
and  a  different  form  of  government  were  the  chief  reasons 
for  the  existence  of  the  policy  as  a  fundamental  principle 
of  American  statesmen.  The  writings  of  Adams,  Wash- 
ington. Jefferson  and  Hamilton  prove  this  fact.     The  views 


58  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [354 

of  Congress  proxe  the  same.  Some  foreign  policies  develop 
casually  without  conscious  direction.  Others  are  the  re- 
sult of  the  discerning  and  guiding  will  of  statesmen.  The 
policy  of  non-intervention,  while  lacking"  an  orderly  plan  of 
development,  enjoyed  the  conscious  and  deliberate  attention 
and  direction  of  our  ablest  leaders.  Its  origin  and  adoption, 
then,  is  attributed  to  a  conscious  purpose,  and  not  to  cir- 
cumstance or  accident. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Extension  of  tke  Policy  of  Xon-intervention 

Non-intervention  in  the  politics  of  Europe  having  been 
delinitely  accepted  by  American  statesmen  as  a  cardinal 
rule  of  .American  foreign  policy,  based  not  only  on  physical 
conditions  but  also  and  in  the  main  on  a  deep-seated  belief 
in  a  distinct  American  destiny,  political  and  social,  the  de- 
velopment of  the  principle  only  awaited  the  happening  of 
events  which  should  require  its  further  application.  Of  im- 
mediate concern  to  the  United  States  was  the  question  of 
European  colonial  possessions  in  America.  Not  only  the 
transfer  of  colonies  from  one  European  nation  to  another, 
but  also  the  efforts  of  European  governments  to  acquire  new 
domains,  by  settlement  or  by  conquest,  would  result  in 
making  territory  adjacent  to  the  United  States  a  battle 
ground  among  European  powers.  The  possibility  of  the 
expansion  of  the  United  States  might  be  affected  by  each 
new  treaty  of  peace  made  in  Europe.  Even  the  security  of 
the  country  might  be  threatened. 

From  the  very  outset  the  United  States  was  obliged  to 
exert  itself  in  order  to  secure  commercial  and  territorial 
rights  essential  to  the  growth  of  a  young  nation.  The  first 
such  struggle  was  that  with  Spain  over  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  River.  The  vital  importance  of  the  Missis- 
sippi to  the  West  wa-s  obvious.  The  restrictive  control 
which  Spain  exercised  over  the  lower  part  of  the  river  was 
felt  to  be  unendurable.  A  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans 
was  gained  by  the  treaty  of  October  27,  1795.  The  next 
step  was  the  acquisition  of  the  territory  of  Louisiana.  The 
355]  69 


70  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [355 

cession  of  that  territory  by  Spaiii  to  France  had  changed  the 
entire  aspect  of  our  foreign  relations.  It  was  necessary 
for  the  United  States  not  only  to  protect  commercial  rights 
already  gained,  but  also  to  consider  the  territorial  question. 
New  Orleans  would  be  the  destination  of  hostile  expeditions 
in  case  of  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France.  Jef- 
ferson thought  that  French  control  of  the  Mississippi  was 
to  be  resisted,  even  to  the  extent  of  forming  an  alliance  with 
Great  Britain.  The  situation  was  unexpectedly  relie\'ed  by 
the  cession  of  Louisiana,  by  France  to  the  United  States  on 
April  30,  1803.  The  territorial  question,  of  so  much  con- 
cern to  the  United  States,  was  being  disposed  of  satisfac- 
torily. A  vast  area  was  forever  excluded  from  the  sphere 
of  contests  between  European  powers,  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  United  States  was  further  secured.  The 
next  step  in  excluding  European  territorial  control  was  the 
acquisition  of  the  Floridas.  West  Florida  was  claimed  as 
a  part  of  the  Louisiana  cession,  while  the  hold  of  Spain 
on  East  Florida  was  feeble  and  imcertain.  Both  provinces, 
as  well  as  other  territory-,  were  ceded  by  Spain  on  February 
22,  18 19.  The  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  the  ces- 
sion of  Louisiana,  and  the  cession  of  the  Floridas,  were 
three  \ntal  factors  in  the  exclusion  of  European  territorial 
and  colonial  influence.  This  cleared  the  way  for  the  L'nited 
States  per  se.  It  remained  for  subsequent  events  to  re- 
quire the  extension  of  this  policy  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
United  States  to  other  American  states  for  the  mutual  pro- 
tection of  all.  The  significance  of  the  Louisiana  cession  was 
expressed  by  the  commissioners  as  follows : 

We  cease  to  have  a  motive  of  urgency,  at  least,  for  inclin- 
ing to  one  Power,  to  avert  the  unjust  pressure  of  another.  We 
separate  ourselves  in  a  great  measure  from  the  European  world 
and  its  concerns,  especially  its  wars  and  intrigues.  We  make, 
in  fine,  a  great  stride  to  real  and  substantial  independence,  the 


357]  ^^^  EXTE^'SIO^'  of  the  policy  yi 

good  effect  whereof  will,  we  trust,  be  felt  essentially  and  ex- 
tensively in  all  our  foreign  and  domestic  relations.  Without 
exciting  the  apprehension  of  any  power,  we  take  a  more  im- 
posing attitude  with  respect  to  all.  The  bond  of  our  Union 
will  be  strengthened,  and  its  movements  become  more  har- 
monious by  the  increased  purity  of  interest  which  it  will  com- 
municate to  the  several  parts  which  compose  it.^ 

While  the  United  States  was  engaged  in  securing  ter- 
ritorial gains,  and  thus  making  European  colonial  aggran- 
dizement impossible  as  regards  territory-  contiguous  to  the 
United  States,  other  events  were  happening  which  required 
a  definite  American  policy  as  regards  recognition  and  a 
further  development  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention. 
These  events  centered  in  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America  and  their  struggle  for  independence.  The  ces- 
sion of  Louisiana  by  Spain  to  France  had  roused  the  coimtry 
to  the  dangers  that  might  ensue  from  the  passing  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  into  other  European  hands ;  and  the  United 
States  was  'now  confronted  with  additional  questions  as  to 
the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  those  colonies,  and 
as  to  the  attitude  to  be  taken  towards  intervention  by 
European  powers  to  suppress  that  independence. 

At  the  close  of  the  American  revolution,  Spain's  actual 
occupation  of  territory  in  the  Am'ericas  was  at  its  height. 
She  owned,  with  the  exception  of  Brazil,  the  entire  country 
enclosed  by  the  Atlantic  coastline  from  the  St.  Marv''s  River 
in  Florida  to  Cape  Horn,  and  then  northward  along  the 
Pacific  coast  to  the  archipelago  of  the  Northwest  coast. 
Most  important  to  the  United  States  at  this  time  were  the 
Floridas  and  Louisiana.  Next  came  the  Kingdom  of 
New  Spain,  including  Mexico.  Texas,  New  Mexico  and 
California.     The  Spanish  colonies  in  South  America  were 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  ii,  p.  559. 


72  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [358 

remote  from  the  United  States,  both  in  a  pliysical  sense  and 
in  interest.  The  Spanish  West  Indies,  however,  were  near 
enough  to  present  a  serious  problem.  The  decline  of  Spain 
in  Europe  and  the  supervening  chaos  in  her  internal  ad- 
ministration resulted  in  the  disintegration  of  her  vast 
American  colonial  empire.  During  the  American  revolu- 
tion. France  hesitated  to  join  the  United  States  because  of 
her  financial  weakness.  Spain's  financial  condition  was  still 
weaker.  Later,  the  results  of  the  French  revolution  to 
Spain  were  disastrous.  Her  misfortunes  culminated  when, 
in  1808,  Napoleon  placed  his  brother  Joseph  on  the  Spanish 
throne.  This  was  promptly  followed  by  revolts  in  Spain's 
South  American  colonies.  The  loyal  adherents  of  the  legiti- 
mate Spanish  monarchy  were  inclined  to  assist  the  new 
regime,  while  others  yet  desired  independence  for  its  own 
sake.  The  liberal  ideas  advocated  by  Montesquieu,  Rous- 
seau and  Voltaire  found  their  way  into  Spanish  America. 
The  American  and  French  revolutions  seemed  to  give  to 
those  ideas  practical  effect.  Subsequent  history  has  shown 
how  susceptible  were  the  Spanish  Americans  to  revolution- 
ary propaganda.  ]Vloreover,  the  success  of  the  American 
constitutional  system  exerted  a  profound  influence. 

On  January  10,  181 1,  President  Madison  communicated 
to  Congress  a  letter,  which  had  come  into  his  hands,  from 
the  Chevalier  de  Onis  to  the  loyalist  Captain  General  of  the 
Province  of  Caracas.  De  Onis  had  been  sent  to  the  United 
States  as  a  diplomatic  representative  by  the  Central  Junta, 
which,  on  the  setting  up  of  the  Napoleonic  government  in 
Spain,  was. formed  in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VTI  to  main- 
tain the  independence  of  the  nation,  but  the  United  States, 
in  view  of  the  conditions  in  Spain  and  the  uncertainty  as 
to  government  there,  declined  to  receive  him  in  his  repre- 
sentative character.  De  Onis,  in  his  letter,  complained  to 
the  Captain  General  of  the  facility  with  which  American 


259]  T^HE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  73 

vessels  were  admitted  into  the  Spanish  colonies,  thus  causing 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  he  said,  "  to  believe  that 
Spain's  weakness  did  not  permit  her  even  to  talk  to  them 
on  equal  terms,  much  less  to  take  measures  which  might  in- 
jure them."  ^  It  was  from  this  source,  he  declared,  that 
they  gained  the  opinion  that  Joseph  Bonaparte  would  rule 
in  Spain  and  her  colonies;  "and  hence  the  incitement  to 
their  scandalous  conduct  in  promoting,  by  every  means  in 
their  power,  the  machinations  of  Joseph  to  make  himself 
master  of  our  colonies,  as  if  upon  that  depended  our  hap- 
piness." ^  De  Onis's  letter  served  ro  apprise  Congress  of 
the  hopeless  condition  of  Spain,  and  to  attract  attention 
to  the  question  of  the  fate  of  the  Spanish  colonies.  In  the 
negotiations  regarding  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, the  fear  was  expressed  by  Spain  that  the  principles  of 
independence  would  spread  among  the  Spanish  colonists  by 
communication  with  the  Americans.^  President  Madison, 
on  the  other  hand,  in  referri'ng  later  to  West  Florida,  de- 
clared that  the  United  States  *'  could  not  see  without  serious 
inquietude  any  part  of  a  neighboring  territory  in  which 
they  have  difTerent  respects  so  deep  and  so  just  a  concern 
pass  from  the  hands  of  Spain  to  those  of  any  other  foreign 
pcnver."  * 

In  his  message  to  Congress,  November  5.  181 1,  President 
Madison  dealt  with  the  situation  developing  in  the  provinces 
south  of  the  United  States.^  "  An  enlarged  philanthropy 
and  an  enlightened  forecast  concur  in  imposing  on  the 
national  councils  an  obligation  to  take  a  deep  interest  in 
their  destinies,   to   cherish   reciprocal   sentiments  of   good 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  viii,  p.  404- 

*  Ibid.,  voJ.  iii,  p.  404. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  3,  p.  261. 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i.  p.  488. 
''Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  494. 


74  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [360 

will,  to  regard  the  progress  of  events,  and  not  to  be  unpre- 
pared for  whatever  order  of  things  may  be  nltinuately  es- 
tablished." ^  On  December  ro,  181 1,  a  committee  made  a 
report  to  Congress  relative  to  the  Spanish- American  colon- 
ies. The  report  took  the  form  of  a  resolution  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  decision  of  the  colonies  to  "  form  federal  govern- 
ments upon  the  elective  and  representative  plan,  and  to  de- 
clare themselves  free  and  independent"  '  The  United  States 
beheld  with  friendly  interest  the  establishment  of  inde- 
pendence by  the  Spanish  provinces,  as  inhabitants  of  the 
same  hemisphere,  and  they  were  promased  that  when  they 
had  attained  the  condition  of  nations,  the  House  and  Senate 
■would  unite  with  the  President  in  entering  into  diplomatic 
and  commercial  relations  with  them  as  soa^e reign  and  inde- 
pendent states.^  This  was  a  promise  of  recognition,  only 
on  condition  that  a  sovereign  status  should  be  attained. 

American  sympathy  with  the  revolutionists  in  Spanish 
America  did  not  determine  the  attitude  of  the  government. 
Neutrality  and  the  refusal  of  premature  recognition  of  in- 
dependence were  consistently  adhered  to;  but  the  recogni- 
tion of  their  belligerency  and  the  admission  of  their  visits 
to  United  States  ports  were  no  doubt  helpful  to  them. 
Joel  R.  Poinsett  and  Alexander  Scott  were  sent  to  Buenos 
Aires  and  to  Venezuela  in  order  to  promjote  commerce  with 
the  United  States  and  to  secure  liberal  and  stable  commercial 
regulations.  They  were  to  give  certain  information  to 
the  government.  Rodney,  Bland  and  Graham  were  sent 
at  a  later  time  to  report  on  conditions  in  South  America. 
In  order  the  more  eflfectively  to  maintain  a  policy  of  neutral- 
ity. President  Madison  issued  a  proclamation  warning  all 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  494. 

2  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rei,  vol.  iii,  p.  538. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  p.  538. 


361]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  75 

citizens  to  have  no  part  in  hostile  expeditions  against  the 
colonies  of  Spain.^  On  December  2,  18 17.  President 
Mo'nroe  in  his  first  annual  message  to  Congress,  declared  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  be  one  of  impartial  neutrality. 
He  also  clearly  indicated  the  policy  of  the  United  States, 
should  the  question  of  recognition  arise. 

They  (the  United  States)  have  [he  declared]  regarded  the 
contest,  not  in  the  light  of  an  ordinary  insurrection  or  re- 
bellion, but  as  a  civil  war  between  parties  nearly  equal,  having, 
as  to  neutral  powers,  equal  rights.  Our  ports  have  been  open 
to  both ;  and  every  article,  the  fruit  of  our  soil,  or  the  industry 
of  our  citizens,  which  either  was  permitted  to  take,  has  been 
equally  free  to  the  other.  Should  the  colonies  establish  their 
independence,  it  is  proper  now  to  state  that  this  government 
neither  seeks  nor  would  accept  from  them  any  advantage  in 
commerce  or  otherwise  which  will  not  be  equally  open  to  all 
other  nations.  The  colonies  will,  in  that  event,  become  inde- 
pendent states,  free  from  any  obligation  to  or  connection  with 
us,  which  it  may  not  then  be  their  interest  to  form  on  the 
basis  of  a  fair  neutrality. - 

The  United  Provinces  of  South  America,  after  declaring 
their  independence,  desired  to  be  regarded  by  the  United 
States  as  free,  sovereign  and  independent.^'  Don  Manuel 
Hermenegildo  de  Aguirre  was  conmiissioned  as  minister 
near  the  United  States.  On  January  6.  18 18,  Seiior  Doti 
Aguirre  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  after  a  pre- 
vious interview,  that  the  independence  of  the  United  Pn>- 
vinces  be  acknowledged  by  a  formal  act  in  the  nature  of  a 
treaty.*     The  recognition  question  will   be   followed   here 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i,  pp.  561-2. 
"Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  iv,  p.  130. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  i8r. 
*Ihid..  vol.  iv,  p.  182. 


76  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [362 

only  as  it  opened  the  way  to  extend  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention to  independent  American  states.  On  March 
8,  1822,  President  Monroe  recommended  to  Q>ngress  the 
recognition  of  the  revolted  colonies/  He  justified  such, 
action  on  the  grounds  that  Spain  had  done  nothing  to  quell 
the  rebellions.  "  When  the  result  of  such  a  contest  is  mani- 
festly settled."  he  said,  "  the  new  governments  have  a  claim 
to  recognition  by  other  powers,  which  ought  not  to  be  re- 
sisted." ^  On  March  9,  1822,  Joaquin  de  Anduaga  pro- 
tested vigorously  to  the  Secretary  of  State  against  President 
Monroe's  proposed  recognition,  "declaring  that  it  (the  United 
States )  call  in  no  way  now,  or  at  any  time,  lessen  or  invali- 
date in  the  least  the  right  of  Spain  to  the  said  provinces, 
or  to  employ  whatever  means  may  be  in  her  power  to  reunite 
them  to  the  rest  of  her  dominions."  ^  To  this  protest 
Secretar}'  of  State  Adams  made  a  significant  reply.  He  re- 
minded the  Spanish  Mi'nister  that  in  the  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  nations,  the  principles  of  right  and  of  fact 
were  involved,  the  former  depending  exclusively  upon  the 
determination  of  the  nation  itself,  and  the  latter  resulting^ 
from  the  successful  execution  of  that  determination.*  The 
United  States  had  taken  no  part  in  the  revolutions,  and 
where  war  existed  had  been  neutral.  But  the  civil  war  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  new  states  was  at  an  end.  They  had 
maintained  and  established  their  independence  against  all 
who  had  opposed  it.  The  recognition,  then,  was  merely  the 
acknowledgment  of  existing  facts,  with  the  intention  to 
enter  into  proper  commercial  and  political  relations.  The 
United  States  had  already  defined  its  policy  as  regards  the 
transfer  of  Spanish  colonies  from  one  sovereignty  to  an- 

^  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  vol.  iv,  p.  818. 
*Ihid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  819. 
*Ihid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  846. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  846. 


363]  ^-^^  £AT£.V5/0A'   OF  THE  POLICY  yy 

Other.  The  question  of  their  independence  was  another 
thing.  They  were  ultimately  recognized  on  the  grounds 
that  they  had  successfully  established  and  maintained  their 
independence — an  application  of  the  non-intervening  de 
facto  principle  of  recognition. 

But  another  and  vital  question  soon  arose.  What  would 
be  the  attitude  of  the  European  governments  toward  the 
'new  American  States,  and  what  policy  would  the  Unite<l 
States  adopt  in  regard  to  that  attitude?  It  was  one  thing 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Spanish-American 
states  on  the  dc  fac^o  principle,  but  to  secure  their  indepeii- 
dence  against  European  aggression  was  quite  another  thing. 
Their  independence  was  of  great  advantage  to  the  United 
States,  but  an  additional  responsibility  as  well.  The 
country  had  gone  too  far  in  establishing  definitely  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  United  States  would  have  no  political  dealings 
wuth  Europe,  and  had  developed  the  counter-principle  of 
European  non-intervention  to  too  great  an  extent,  to  de- 
part from  this  policy,  no  matter  where  it  might  lead.  As 
there  could  be  no  abandoninent  of  the  policy,  an  effort  was 
made  to  provide  it  with  an  additional  safeguard. 

In  order  to  understand  the  policy  enunciated  by  President 
Monroe,  it  is  necessary  to  review  its  antecedents.  The  de- 
feat of  Napoleon  and  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  made  the  reconsideration  of  the  Amer- 
ican question  inevitable.  The  European  coalition  had  in- 
tervened in  France  first  to  check  the  liberal  movement  which 
might  spread  to  the  other  nations,  and  then  to  crush  the 
inordinate  am.bition  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  This  done. 
it  was.  natural  that  the  powers  should  seek  to  put  down  re- 
voW'tions,  to  preserve  the  rights  of  succession,  and  to  de- 
fend the  principle  of  legitimacy  even  in  America,  whose  ex- 
ample and  influence  could  not  be  disregarded. 

The  treaty  known  as  the  Holy  Alliance  was  concluded 


yS  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [364 

at  Paris,  September  26,  18 15,  by  the  Emperors  of  Austria 
and  Russia  aiid  the  King  of  Prussia.  They  declared  the  ob- 
ject of  the  alliance  to  be  to  publish  to  the  world  their  fixed 
resolution  to  take  for  their  sole  guide,  in  the  administration 
of  thdr  own  governments  and  in  their  relations  with  every 
other  go\-ernment,  the  precepts  of  the  Christian  religion, 
justice,  charity  and  peace.  By  article  L  they  agreed  to 
'*  remain  united  by  bounds  of  a  true  and  indissoluble  frater- 
nity," agreeing  to  lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance  on  all 
occasions  and  in  all  places.  Article  II  provided  that  the 
sole  principle  of  conduct  was  the  rendering  of  mutual  ser- 
vice. The  three  nations  w^ere  recognized  as  three  branches 
of  one  family,  of  w^hich  Christ  was  the  sovereign.  The 
subjects  of  these  monarch s  were  exhorted  to  strengthen  them-* 
selves  in  the  principles  and  exercise  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion. By  article  III,  all  powers  avowing  these  principles 
and  recognizing  the  necessity  of  their  application  were  in- 
vited to  join  the  alliance. 

Together  with  other  treaties  signed  at  Paris,  November 
20,  181 5,  a  treaty  of  alliance  was  entered  into  by  Great 
Britain,  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia  providing  for  the  re- 
storation of  the  monarchy  in  France  and  the  control  of 
Europe.  The  contracting.^parties  considered  that  the  repose 
of  Europe  was  "  essentially  interwoven  with  the  order  of 
things  founded  on  the  maintenance  of  the  Royal  authority 
and  of  the  Constitutional  Character,''  and  were  determined 
to  use  all  their  means  to  prevent  a  further  disturbance.^ 
The  treaty  provided  for  the  maintenance  of  an  allied  army 
in  France,  and  renewed  the  engagements  made  the  year  be- 
fore, one  of  which  was  the  treaty  of  the  eleventh  of  April, 
1814,  by  which  Napoleon  Bonaparte  and  his  family  were 
forever  excluded  from  the  rule  of  France.  The  concert 
thus  formed  managed  with  a  rigid  vigor  the  affairs  of 

*3  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  273. 


265]  ^-^-E  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  79 

Europe.     The  purpose  of  the  alliance  is  clearly  stated  in  the 
second  article: 

And  as  the  same  Revolutionary  principles  which  upheld  the 
last  criminal  usurpation,  might  again,  under  other  forms,  con- 
vulse France,  and  thereby  endanger  the  repose  of  other  States ; 
under  these  circumstances,  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
solemnly  admitting  it  to  be  their  duty  to  redouble  their  watch- 
fulness for  the  tranquility  and  interests  of  their  people,  engage, 
in  case  so  unfortimate  an  event  should  again  occur,  to  concert 
amongst  themselves,  and  with  His  Most  Christian  Majesty, 
the  measures  which  they  may  judge  necessary  to  be  pursued  for 
the  safety  of  their  respective  states,  and  for  the  general  tran- 
quility of  Europe.^ 

By  article  VI  of  the  above  treaty,  the  contracting  parties 
agreed  to  renew  their  meeting  at  stated  periods  for  the  more 
effective  execution  of  their  plans  and  for  the  ccnisideration 
of  any  new  situations  which  might  arise."  The  bitterness 
and  resentment  of  the  French  against  the  continued  occupa- 
tion of  France  by  the  allied  army,  and  the  growth  of  the 
monarchy  in  favor,  which  might  be  increased  by  evacuation, 
occasioned  the  conference  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  A  declara- 
tion was  made  by  the  courts  of  Great  Britain,  Austria, 
France,  Prussia  and  Russia  on  November  15,  18 18,  re- 
lative to  the  arrangements  coincluded  between  France  and 
the  allies.  They  regarded  their  efforts  as  the  work  of  peace 
and  the  completion  of  a  political  system  which  would  assure 
its  continuance.  This  union  between  the  monarchs,  repre- 
senting their  peoples'  interests,  offered  to  Europe  its  only 
safe  and  sacred  pledge  of  future  tranquility.*  It  had  as  its 
object  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the  guarantee  of  those 

^S  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  277. 
'3  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  279. 
^6  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  19. 


8o  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [366 

transactions  on  which  the  peace  was  founded  and  consoli- 
dated. The  fundamental  basis  of  the  Union  was  declared 
to  be  the  resolution  never  to  turn  aside,  either  in  their  deal- 
ings among  themselves  or  in  their  relations  with  other  states, 
from  the  observance  of  the  strict  principles  of  the  law  of 
nations.  Further  meetings  were  to  be  held  to  consider 
common  interests  and  particularly  the  questions  in  which 
the  intervention  of  the  governments  was  formally  asked. 
The  repose  of  the  world  was  declared  to  be  motive  of  the 
Union  at  all  times.  ^ 

Mettemich  summoned  the  Conference  of  Troppau  to  de- 
termine the  principles  on  which  the  Powers  could  intervene 
in  Naples.  He  held  that  Christian  interests  in  Naples  were 
European  interests ;  that  revolutions  were  legitimate  when 
initiated  from  above  and  no  intervention  should  be  allowed ; 
that  they  were  illegitimate  when  enforced  from  below,  and 
no  such  change  should  be  recognized.  Castlereagh  denied 
that  these  were  proper  grounds  for  a  Conference,  as  the 
powers  were  not  bound  so  as  to  act  by  the  treaties.  The 
representatives  of  Great  Britain  and  France  were  not  given 
power  to  act."  A  preliminan-  protocol  was  entered  into 
privately  between  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia,  espousing 
the  principle  of  intervention : 

States  which  have  undergone  a  change  of  government  due 
to  revolution,  the  results  of  which  threaten  other  states,  ipso 
facto  cease  to  be  members  of  the  European  x\lliance,  and  remain 
excluded  from  it  until  their  situation  gives  guarantees  for  legal 
order  and  stability.  If  owing  to  such  alterations,  immediate 
danger  threatens  other  states,  the  Powers  bind  themselves,  by 
peaceful  means  or  if  need  be  by  arms,  to  bring  back  the  guilty 
state  into  the  bosom  of  the  Great  Alliance.' 

'6  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  19. 

2  Phillips,  W.  A.,  Confederation  of  Europe,  p.  221. 

*Ibid.,  p.  222. 


367]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  8 1 

Greait  Britain  refused  to  agree  to  the  protocol.  Castle- 
reagh  declared  that  Great  Britain,  was  neutral  as  regards 
Naples,  and  that  the  proposal  would  restore  the  general 
system  of  guarantee,  both  territorial  and  political,  which 
was  abandoned  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.^  He  also  distinguished 
between  the  French  revolution  and  other  revolutions.  The 
signatures  to  the  protocol  were  withdrawn  and  the  Con- 
ference adjourned  to  meet  at  Laibach  in  order  to  allow  the 
King  of  Naples  to  attend.  Here  the  same  debate  continued, 
Great  Britain  and  France  opposing  the  stand  taken  by  the 
three  autocratic  powers,  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia. 
There  was,  therefore,  a  distinct  difference  between  the  ideas 
of  the  Western  liberal  powers  and  the  original  members  of 
the  Holy  Alliance. 

The  Congress  of  Verona  was  called  to  consider  the  re- 
volutionary movement  in  Spain.  France  immediately  asked 
the  allies  whether  they  would  withdraw  their  ministers 
from  Madrid  should  France  do  so.  In  case  of  war,  how 
would  the  allies  express  their  moral  and  material  support? 
Emperor  Alexander  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  question 
was  a  European  one,  not  French."  Wellington  urged  the 
allies  not  to  become  the  enemies  of  Spain,  and  declared  that 
Great  Britain  could  not  be  party  to  interference  in  that 
country."  By  a  treaty  of  November  22,  1822,  it  was  de- 
clared that  representative  government  was  incompatible  with 
monarchical  principles,  and  they  engaged  "  to  use  all  their 
efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  representative  govern- 
ments, in  whatever  country  it  may  exist  in  Europe,  and  to 
prevent  its  being  introduced  in  those  countries  where  it  is 
not  yet  known."  *     The  liberty  of  the  press  was  to  be  sup- 

*  Phillips,  W.  A..  Confederation  of  Europe,  pp.  223-227. 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  260-270. 

*Ibid.,  p.  274. 

*Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  46. 


82  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [368 

pressed,  and  the  clergy  were  to  be  sustained  in  whatever 
measures  they  should  adopt  to  preserve  the  authority  of 
Princes.  This  adoption  of  the  principle  of  intervention  by 
the  allied  powers  marked  the  formal  withdrawal  of  Welling- 
ton from  the  Conference. 

The  various  Congresses  were  held  for  practical  purposes, 
not  theoretical.  The  principle  of  intervention  was  a  serious 
reality  to  the  smaller  states  of  Europe.  The  Congresses  of 
Troppau  and  Laibach  concerned  the  revolution  in  Naples. 
The  Congress  of  Verona  concerned  the  uprising  in  Spain- 
Austria  intervened  in  Naples  and  in  Piedmont.  France  in- 
tervened in  Spain.  Portugal  was  dangerously  threatened, 
but  protected  by  England.  The  purpose  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  w-as  a  real  one,  which,  if  exte^ided  to  America, 
would  cause  infinite  trouble  for  the  United  States. 

The  principle  of  intervention  pursued  by  the  Holy 
Alliance  could  result  only  in  intervention  in  the  Americas, 
if  unopposed.  Such  intervention  was  regarded  by  the  con- 
tinental powers  as  their  clear  right.  The  Spanish  colonies 
were  discussed  at  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  due 
largely  to  the  insistence  of  France.  Richelieu  favored  the 
establishment  of  the  royal  house  of  Bambara  in  the  revolted 
provinces.  The  mediation  asked  by  Spain  was  to  be  with- 
out force,  the  revolted,  colonies  being  treated  as  the  loyal 
ones.  Spain  refused  the  mediation,  as  she  was  excluded 
from  the  Conference.  France  and  Russia  proposed  that 
the  United  States  be  invited  to  a  Conference  at  Madrid  to 
consider  the  question  of  the  Spanish  colonies.^  Richelieu 
regarded  the  United  States  as  no  source  of  danger;  but  an 
entirely  new  and  complete  republican  world  would  endanger 
the  old  world.  It  was  his  purpose  to  get  the  United  States 
to  meet  "in  order  to  attach  the  United  States  to  the  general 
system  of  Europe  and  to  prevent  a  spirit  of  rivalry  and 

*  Phillips,  W.  A.,  Confederation  of  Europe,  p.  256. 


369]  T^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  83 

hatred  establishing  itself  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
World/'  ^  May  13,  1818,  President  Monroe  submitted  the 
following  question  to  his  Cabinet :  '*  Whether  the  Ministers 
of  the  United  States  in  Europe  shall  be  instructed  that  the 
United  States  will  not  join  in  any  project  of  interposition 
between  Spain  and  the  South  Americans  which  should  not 
be  to  promote  the  complete  independence  of  these  provinces ; 
and  whether  measures  shall  be  taken  to  ascertain  if  this  be 
the  policy  of  the  British  government,  and,  if  so,  to  establish 
a  concert  with  them  for  the  support  of  this  policy  "  "  The 
ministers  of  the  United  States  to  France,  England  and 
Prussia  were  instructed  to  make  known  to  those  govern- 
ments that  the  United  States  would  have  no  part  in  any 
mediation  or  interference  which  did  not  have  as  its  basis 
the  absolute  independence  of  the  Spanish  colonies.^  Russia 
unofficially  invited  the  United  States  to  become  a  party  to 
the  Holy  Alliance,  holding  that  it  was  essentially  a  pledge 
of  principles.  Mr.  Adams,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in- 
structed Mr.  Middleton,  minister  to  Russia,  to  refuse  ex- 
plicitly for  the  United  States.  He  stated  to  Mr.  Middleton 
the  following  as  regards  the  origin,  growth  and  difficulties 
of  the  American  policy : 

The  political  system  of  the  United  States  is  also  essentially 
extra-European.  The  stand  in  firm  and  cautious  independence 
of  all  entanglements  in  the  European  system,  has  been  a  car- 
dinal point  of  their  policy  under  every  administration  of  their 
government,  from  the  peace  of  1783  to  this  day.  If  at  the 
original  adoption  of  their  system  there  could  have  been  any 
doubt  of  its  justice  or  its  wisdom,  there  can  be  none  at  this  time. 
Every  year's  experience  rivets  it  more  deeply  in  the  principles 
and  opinions  of  the  nation.     Yet  in  proportion  as  the  import- 

1  Phillips,  W.  A.,  Confederation  of  Europe,  pp.  256-257. 

*Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  48. 

•Moore,  Digest  of  International  I.azu,  vol.  vi,  pp.  375-376. 


84  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [370 

ance  of  the  United  States  as  one  of  the  members  of  the  general 
society  of  civilized  nations  increases  in  the  eyes  of  the  others, 
the  difficulties  of  maintaining  this  system  and  the  temptations 
to  depart  from  it  increase  and  multiply  with  it.^ 

The  growing  hostility  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Holy 
Alliance,  and  her  aversion  to  the  principle  of  interventicwi' 
against  all  revolutionary  movements  has  already  been 
pointed  out.  A  share  in  South  American  commerce  was  de- 
sired by  Great  Britain,  but  this  could  not  be  gained  under 
Spanish  control.  In  an  interview  with  Richard  Rush, 
American  minister  to  England,  Canning  indicated  the 
general  outlines  of  British  policy.  Increasing  difficulties 
surrounded  the  Spanish  cause,  he  thought.  The  course  of 
time  and  events  had  settled  the  separation  of  the  colonies 
from  Spain,  although  their  recognition  by  Great  Britain 
depended  on  circumstances.  The  British  King  had  no  in- 
tention of  appropriating  any  Spanish  territon,^  in  America 
to  himself.^  Any  such  attempt  by  France  would  not  be 
acquiesced  in  by  England.  He  proposed  that  England  and 
America  make  known  to  the  world  their  views  on  the  sub- 
ject. Rush  could  not  give  a  definite  reply.  He  was  of  the 
opinion  that  there  would  be  no  reconciliation  betw^een  Spain 
and  the  colonies,  but  in  case  there  should  be,  England  would 
do  nothing  to  prevent  it.^  No  formal  recognition  had  taken 
place,  but  a  commission  of  inquiry'  was  likely  to  be  sent  to 
America  to  report  on  the  status  of  the  de  facto  governments. 
On  August  20,  1823,  Canning  proposed  to  Rush  that  the 
time  was  at  hand  for  an  open  avowal  of  their  attitude.  He 
submitted  the  following  propositions: 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  378. 

*  Hamilton,  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  voL  vi,  p.  Z^-- 

^Ihid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  363. 


-^ij  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  85 

1.  We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be 
hopeless. 

2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  them,  as 
independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and  circumstances. 

3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to  throw  any 
impediment  in  the  v^ay  of  an  arrangement  between  them  and 
the  mother  country  by  amicable  negotiation. 

4.  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of  them 
ourselves. 

5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred  to  any 
other  power  with  indifference.^ 

Canning  argued  that  if  both  countries  were  of  this  opin- 
ion, there  was  no  reason  why  they  should  not  confide  in 
each  other  and  publish  it  in  the  face  of  the  w^orld.  It 
would  put  at  rest  the  ambitions  of  European  states,  while 
ending  the  jealousies  of  Spain  and  the  agitation  in  the 
colonies.  He  believed  that  an  opportunity  w^as  never  before 
afforded  "  when  so  small  an  effort  of  two  friendly  govern- 
ments might  produce  so  unequivocal  a  good,  and  prevent 
such  extensive  calamities."  ^  Rush  replied  on  August  23, 
agreeing  to  Mr.  Canning's  propositions,  but  disclaiming 
any  authority  to  act.'  In  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Rush  feared  that  Canning  knew  of  designs  against  the  in- 
dependence of  the  South  American  states.*  This  fear  was 
confirmed  by  Canning's  notification  to  Rush  (August  23, 
1823)  that  a  Congress  on  Spanish-American  afifairs  was 
planned  after  the  affairs  in  Spain  were  settled.'' 

President  Monroe  favored  meeting  the  British  proposal. 
He  submitted  Canning's  proposals  to  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  asking  three  questions : 

1  Hamilton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  365. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  366. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  366-367. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  368-369. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  369. 


86  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [372 

1.  Shall  we  entangle  ourselves,  at  all,  in  European  politics 
and  wars,  on  the  side  of  any  power,  against  others,  presuming 
that  a  concert  by  agreement,  of  the  kind  proposed,  may  lead 
to  that  result  ? 

2.  If  a  case  can  exist,  in  which  a  sound  maxim  may,  and 
ought  to  be  departed  from,  is  not  the  present  instance  precisely 
that  case? 

3.  Has  not  the  epoch  arrived  when  Great  Britain  must  take 
her  stand,  either  on  the  side  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe,  or  of. 
the  United  States,  and  in  consequence,  either  in  favor  of  despot- 
ism or  of  liberty  and  may  it  not  be  presumed,  that  aware  of 
that  necessity,  her  government,  has  seized  on  the  present  oc- 
currence, as  that,  which  it  deems,  the  most  suitable,  to  announce 
and  mark  the  commencement  of  that  career?  ^ 

Jefferson  regarded  it  as  the  most  serious  question  since 
that  of  independence.  He  advised  that  the  United  States 
join  Great  Britain  in  the  declaration,  maintaining  that  the 
United  States  should  oppose,  with  all  its  means,  the  forcible 
interposition  of  any  other  power,  and  especially  the  transfer 
of  territory  by  any  form  of  acquisition.^  Far  from  em- 
broiling us  in  British  affairs,  it  was  getting  England  to  pro- 
pose the  very  policy  for  which  we  stood.  Madison  thought 
it  a  matter  of  particular  good  fortune  that  the  British  and 
American  policies  coincided,  even  if  based  upon  different 
considerations.  He  advised  a  joint  declaration  of  policy, 
feeling  secure  that  with  England's  aid  America  could  have 
nothing  to  fear  from  Europe.^ 

Relations  with  Russia  also  furnished  an  occasion  for  de- 
fining the  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  European 
interference  in  the  Americas.  The  controversy  with  Rus- 
sia was  twofold.     In  the  first  place.  Russia  had  issued  a 

1  Hamilton,  op.  cit..  vol.  vi,  p.  324. 
» Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  392-393. 
*lbid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  394-395- 


373]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  87 

ukase  in  1821,  claiming  the  Pacific  coast  of  America  as  far 
south  as  the  fi.fty-first  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  forbid- 
ding persons  engaged  in  navigation  or  in  fishing  to  approach 
within  100  miles  of  the  sphere.  Adams  told  Baron  Tuyll 
that  Russia  would  be  opposed  in  any  territorial  estab- 
lishment in  the  New  World,  and  that  the  American  con- 
tinents were  no  longer  subject  for  any  new  European 
colonial  establishments.  He  also  advised  Mr.  Middleton, 
American  minister  to  Rus'sia,  that  Russian  settlements  in 
the  New  World  could  only  injure  the  peace  of  the  world, 
and  that  settlements  other  than  those  already  occupied  by 
Russia  must  be  left  to  American  hands.  In  the  second 
place,  there  was  a  discussion  over  the  recognition  of  the 
South  Amjerican  de  facta  governments.  Baron  TuylL 
announced  that  his  government  could  not  receive  any  agent 
of  any  of  the  de  facto  governments  formed  in  the  New 
World  in  contravention  of  the  political  principles  for  which 
Russia  stood.  He  also  expressed  the  hope  that  the  United 
States  would  remain  neutral  in  regard  to  the  Spanish-Amer- 
ican States,  as  it  had  declared  itself  to  be.  when  recogniz- 
ing them.  This  doubtless  meant  that  the  United  States 
would  be  expected  to  do  nothing  in  case  of  intervention. 
Adams  expressed  to  Barron  Tuyll  "the  hope  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  that  Russia  would  on  her 
part  also  continue  to  observe  the  same  neutrality." 

Just  as  the  declaration  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention 
and  neutrality  was  the  outcome  of  a  cabinet  meeting  in 
1793,  so  thirty  years  later  the  formial  extension  of  the 
policy  of  non-intervention  was  the  result  of  a  series  of 
cabinet  mjeetings.  The  Canning  proposals  were  before  the 
cabinet.  Rush  had  reported  in  favor  of  joining  Canning 
in  a  joint  declaration,  as  expressed  in  his  letter  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  August  23,  1823.'     The  questions  raised  by 

*  Moore,  Digest  of  Intfrnaftonal  Latv.  vol.  vi,  p.  391. 


gg  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [374 

Baroii  Tuyll  were  also  awaiting  the  action  of  the  cabinet. 
The  cabinet  met  November  7,  1823.  Secretary  of  State 
John  Quincy  Adams  in  his  "  memoirs "  interpreted  the 
object  of  Canning  to  be  "  to  obtain  some  public  pledge 
from  the  government  of  the  United  States,  ostensibly 
against  the  forcible  interference  of  the  Holy  Alliance  be- 
tween Spain  and  South  America;  but  really  or  especially 
against  the  acquisition  to  the  United  States  themselves  of 
any  part  of  the  Spanish  American  possessions."  ^  Monroe  had 
declared  himself  in  favor  of  the  joint  declaration  in  a  let- 
ter to  Jefferson.  Jefferson  and  ]\ladison  had  expressed  them- 
selves in  favor  of  the  joint  declaration.  John  C.  Calhoun, 
then  Secretaiy  of  War,  advocated  giving  discretionary  power 
to  Rush  to  join  Canning  in  a  declaration  against  intervention 
on  the  part  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  even  if  the  United  States 
should  be  required  to  agree  not  to  take  Cuba  or  Texas. 
His  reason  was  that  Great  Britain  had  greater  power  to 
seize  these  territories,  and  the  United  States  would  gain 
from  her  a  similar  agreement."  Adams  argued  that  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  Great  Britain 
were  not  identical,  and  a  joint  declaration  would  give  Great 
Britain  a  substantial  pledge  against  oiirselves;  while  a  re- 
fusal would  leave  the  United  States  free  to  act  as  emergen- 
cies arose."  Monroe  was  opposed  to  any  course  of  action 
which  would  appear  to  be  subordinate  to  that  of  Great 
Britain.  Adams  saw  clearly  that  a  joint  declaration  would 
be  likely  to  commit  the  United  States  in  an  embarrassing 
w^ay,  since  it  would  concern  not  only  the  part  Great  Britain 
should  play  in  American  affairs,  but  also  the  part  the  United 
States  should  play,  especially  in  case  any  of  the  revolted 
provinces  should  desire  membership  in  the  American  federal 

'  Adams.  C.  F.,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  vol.  vi,  p.  177. 
'  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  177. 
'  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  178. 


375]  '^^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  89 

system.  Most  important  of  all  was  the  question  whether 
the  United  States  should  bind  itself  in  regard  to  its  future 
policies  of  the  New  World  or  retain  a  free  hand.  At  the 
meeting  of  the  cabinet,  November  fourteenth,  IVIonroe 
and  Calhoim  were  despondent  regarding  affairs  in  South 
America.  Adams  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  Holy  Allies 
could  not  permianently  restore  the  Spanish-American  states 
to  Spanish  rule.  Calhoim,  Adams  said,  "  is  for  plunging 
us  into  a  war  to  prevent  that  which,  if  his  opinion  is  cor- 
rect, we  are  utterly  unable  to  prevent."  ^  Adams  suggested 
that  Canning's  proposals  be  subjected  to  a  test  of  right  and 
wrong.  As  the  South  American  countries  were  indepen- 
dent nations,  they  themselves  and  no  other  nation  had  a 
right  to  make  any  disposition  of  their  condition.  The 
United  States  had  no  right  to  dispose  of  them  either  singly 
or  jointly,  nor  did  any  other  nation  have  such  a  right  with- 
out their  consent."  The  Secretary  of  State  gained  his  point 
and  was  directed  to  draft  a  dispatch  accordingly,  which 
he  did  on  November  17th.  While  the  President  from  later 
advices  thought  that  Canning  had  changed  his  purpose, 
Adams  still  considered  the  alarm  as  affected,  with  a  design 
to  obtain  from  the  United  States  a  pledge  not  only  to  oppose 
the  transfer  of  Cuba  to  France  but  to  refrain  from  ac- 
quiring the  island."  On  November  20th,  the  President  was 
inclined  toward  Calhoun's  idea  of  giving  discretionary 
powers  to  Rush.  Adams  was  utterly  opposed  to  this,  think- 
ing fthat  Rush  should  be  distinctly  authorized  to  act  in 
specific  contingencies,  and  in  all  others  to  report  to  his 
government.*     Adams  presented   a   memorandum   to   this 

*  Adams,  C.  F.,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adatns,  voU  vi,  p.  186. 
*Jbid.,  vol,  vi,  p.  186. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  188, 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  192. 


QO  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [376 

effect.  Several  substitutes  were  drawn  up  before  the  matter 
was  finally  settled,  but  the  paper  finally  adopted  was  in 
the  main  a  statement  of  Adams'  views/ 

The  message  of  President  Monroe  to  Congress  engrossed 
the  attention  of  the  Cabinet.  The  European  political 
system  and  the  necessity  of  proclaiming  to  the  world,  es- 
pecially Europe,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  as  to 
European  interests  in  America,  were  questions  of  vital  con- 
cern to  the  men  engaged  in  the  serious  task  of  extending  the 
traditional  policy  of  non-intervention.  The  President  sub- 
mitted parts  of  his  message  on  November  21st.  It  con- 
demned the  invasion  of  Spain  by  France,  and  acknowledged 
the  independence  of  the  Greeks,  together  with  a  recommenda- 
tion that  a  minister  be  sent  to  them."  Adams  dissented 
strongly  from  this  view^  He  argued  that  we  were  at  peace 
with  the  world,  and  this  message  would  be  a  summons  to 
arms  against  all  Europe  for  objects  of  policy  exclusively 
European — Greece  and  Spain.  Europe  had  been  in  convul- 
sions for  thirty  years.  "  Empires,  kingdoms,  principalities, 
had  been  overthrown,  revolutionized,  and  counter-revolu- 
tionized, and  we  had  looked  on  safe  in  our  distance  beyond 
an  intervening  ocean,  and  avowing  a  total  forbearance  td 
interfere  in  any  of  the  combinations  of  European  politics." 
With  the  serious  situation  thus  facing  the  United  States, 
Adams  favored  postponing  any  issue  w^ith  Europe  as  long 
as  possible,  and  by  all  possible  means  to  maintain  the  tran- 
quility of  the  nation  and  of  the  world.'  Calhoun  doubted 
the  existence  of  the  state  of  tranquility  suggested  by  Adams, 
and  thought  the  time  had  come  for  an  alarm  to  be  sounded 
to  the  nation.*     On   November   22.   Adams   again  urged 

1  Adams,  op.  cif.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  193-194. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  194. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  194. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  195. 


2^^^^^  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  91 

President  Monroe  to  abstain  from  anything  in  his  message 
which  the  Holy  Allies  cooild  construe  as  meaning  aggres- 
sion/ Should  the  Holy  Alliance  be  determined  to  make  an 
issue  with  the  United  States,  it  should  be  our  policy  to  meet, 
and  not  to  make  it.  and  we  should  have  all  we  could  do  to 
prevent  intervention,  without  bidding  them  actual  defiance 
in  matters  strictly  European." 

On  November  25,  Adams  proposed  that  a  paper  be  de- 
livered to  Baron  Tuyll,  designed  to  be  a  "  firm,  spirited, 
and  yet  conciliatory  answer  "  to  the  communications  re- 
ceived from  the  Russian  govemru'ent,  as  well  as  an  answer 
to  the  proposals  of  Canning  to  Rush.^  It  was  to  be  a  disn 
cussion  of  the  principles  of  the  American  government  and 
of  the  political  system  to  be  maintained  in  the  future.  It 
was  to  be  republican  in  that  it  would  maintain  its  own  in- 
dependence and  would  respect  that  of  others.  It  was  to 
be  pacific  in  that  it  would  studiously  avoid  all  involvement 
in  the  combinations  of  European  politics,  and  cultivate 
friendship  with  the  most  absolute  of  governments.  The 
United  States  wished  to  retain  the  friendship  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander,  but  having  recognized  the  independence 
of  the  South  American  states,  the  United  States  could  not 
view  with  indifference  any  attempt  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  by  direct  intervention  either  (i)  to  restore  the 
Spanish  rule  on  the  American  continents,  (2)  to  introduce 
monarchical  principles  into  these  countries,  or  (3)  totransfer 
any  portion  of  the  present  American  provinces  of  Spain  to 
any  other  European  power.*  Calhoun  objected  on  the 
ground  that  the  paper  was  too  great  a  display  of  republican- 
ism and  would  bring  the  United  States  into  direct  issue  with 

1  Adams,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi.  p.  196. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  197. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  199. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  200. 


(^2  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION        [378 

the  Holy  Alliance.  Southard  aiid  Wirt  suggested  that 
the  paper  was  aimed  nominally  at  Russia,  but  practically  at 
the  Holy  Alliance.^  Adams,  however,  felt  that  the  time  had 
come  for  an  explicit  answer  to  the  Russian  government. 
The  status  of  things  left  the  United  States  without  an 
avowed  policy,  which  he  thought  should  be  distinctly  taken 
and  resolutely  maintained.  He  felt  that  the  Holy  Alliance 
would  not  invade  South  America,  and  he  was  equally  sure 
that  the  Emperor  Alexander  did  not  intend  to  include  the 
United  States  in  his  invectives  against  revolutions.'  Such 
a  note  would  bring  a  formal  disavowal  of  any  unfriendly 
attitude  toward  the  United  States,  or  it  would  reveal  his 
exact  intentions."  Wirt  thought  that  the  United  States  was 
taking  a  serious  responsibility  in  any  event,  and  especially 
if  we  were  assuming  the  attitude  of  menace  without  mean- 
ing to  strike.*  The  question  was,  should  the  Holy  Allies 
act  in  direct  hostility  against  the  revolted  provinces  in 
South  America,  would  the  American  government  resist 
them  by  war?  Adams  admitted  that  this  question  gave 
him  grave  concern.  This  course  would  commit  the  United 
States  so  far  as  the  President  constitutionally  could  act  on 
this  jx>int,  and  Adams  desired  that  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress pass  resolutions  to  the  same  effect.  But  the  course 
would  not  commit  the  United  States  to  absolute  war,  be- 
cause of  the  cooperation  of  England  with  the  United  States 
and  because  the  restoration  of  Spanish  rule  in  South  Amer- 
dca  would  not  be  of  any  advantage  to  the  allied  govern- 
ments.^ 

^  Adams,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  200-201. 
'Jbid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  201. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  202. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  202. 
''Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  203. 


379]  ^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  93 

On  November  26,  Adams  reviewed  with  the  Cabinet  the 
results  of  the  former  meetings.  The  President's  message 
had  been  presented,  expressing  general  alarm  at  the  situa- 
tion, censuring  European  powers  for  the  invasion  of  Spain, 
and  recognizing  Greece  as  an  independent  state.  Adams 
suggested  a  substitute.  In  case  of  any  issue  with  the  Holy 
Alliance,  it  should  be  on  grounds  exclusively  American ; 
that  we  should  disclaim  all  interference  in  European  affairs 
and  make  the  American  cause  alone  supreme;  that  an  an- 
swer should  be  made  to  the  British  and  Russian  communica- 
tions in  the  same  paper,  at  the  same  time  stating  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  toward  the  designs  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  upon  South  America.^  The  only  remaining  ques- 
tion was  whether  there  would  be  any  advantage  in  a  policy 
of  opposition  to  the  Holy  Alliance.  Wirt  doubted  that  the 
country  would  support  the  government  in  a  war  for  the 
independence  of  South  America."  Calhoun  favored  action, 
but  feared  that  the  contrast  between  republican  and  monar- 
chial  principles  might  be  too  offensive.  An  important  ques- 
tion was  raised  by  President  Monroe.  What  if  England 
should  resist  the  Allies,  should  they  attack  South  America, 
without  the  aid  of  the  United  States?  Adams  thought 
England  would  be  victorious,  and  the  probability  of  Eng- 
lish occupation  should  hasten  American  action.  The  pro- 
posals of  Canning,  however,  did  not  contemplate  war,  and 
hence  there  was  little  danger  of  it.*  On  November  27, 
President  Monroe  advised  the  omission  of  all  paragraphs 
objected  to  in  the  paper.  Adams  acquiesced,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  paragraph  containing  the  declaration  of 
principles  of  the  government.  This  paragraph  referred  to 
Liberty,  Independence  and  Peace  as  the  fundamental  prin- 

1  Adams,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  205. 
^ Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  205. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  209. 


94  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [380 

ciples  of  our  govenimient.  The  object  of  their  exposition 
was  "  to  compress  into  one  sentence  the  foundation  upon 
which  the  mind  and  heart  at  once  could  repose  for  our  justi- 
fication of  the  stand  we  are  taking  against  the  Holy 
Alliance."  ^  He  argued  strenuously  with  the  President  to 
retain  the  paragraph,  but  Monroe  thought  it  better  omitted 
because  of  the  circimistances.'  He  reserved  final  decision, 
howevei" 

On  December  2.  1823,  President  Monroe  delivered  his 
seventh  annual  message  to  Congress.  This  message  con- 
tained a  definite  statement  of  the  policy  of  non-interven- 
tion in  its  extended  form,  as  worked  out  in  the  Cabinet  meet- 
ings immediately  preceding  the  delivery  of  the  message. 
He  first  spoke  of  the  arrangement  to  settle,  by  amicable 
negotiation,  the  disputes  between  the  United  States  and 
Russia  (yn  the  Northwest  coast  of  North  America.  He 
took  advantage  of  this  opportunity  to  declare  "  that  the 
American  continents,  by  a  free  and  inde|)endent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not 
to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  powers."  ^'  In  other  words,  any  further  coloniza- 
tion by  European  nations  in  the  Americas  was  not  to  be 
acquiesced  in  by  the  United  States.  A  paragraph  was  de- 
voted to  conditions  in  Greece,  but  recognition  was  not  ac- 
corded.* After  reviewing  the  intervention  in  Spain  and 
Portugal,  the  message  expressed  the  interest  of  the  United! 
States  in  the  countries  of  Europe,  but  distinctly  stated  that 
American  policy  was  averse  to  engaging  in  any  of  the  wars 
of  the  European  powers  in  matters  relating  to  themselves. 

^  Adams,  op.  cit..  vol.  vi,  p.  211. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  212. 

•Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  ii,  p.  209. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  217. 


381]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  95 

Only  the  invasion  or  the  menacing  of  our  rights  could  se- 
cure our  participation  in  a  European  struggle.  But  with 
regard  to  any  movements  in  the  Western  hemisphere  the 
policy  was  reversed.  The  political  systems  of  the  two 
Continents  were  different,  based  upon  a  difference  in  govern- 
ment, and  what  rights  had  been  thus  far  gained  would  be 
scrupulously  defended.  The  time  had  come  to  declare  that 
any  extension  of  the  European  political  system  to  any  part 
of  the  Western  hemisphere  would  be  resisted  by  the  United 
States.  The  status  quo  would  be  observed  as  regards  ex- 
isting European  dependencies,  and  there  need  be  no  fear  of 
intervention.  But  where  governments  had  declared  and 
maintained  their  independence,  and  it  had  been  acknowledged 
by  the  United  States,  any  intervention  to  oppress  or  in  any 
way  control  them  would  meet  the  opposition  of  the  United 
States.^  A  policy  of  neutrality  had  been  adopted  and  fol- 
lowed, both  in  relation  to  these  governments  and  Spain. 
Only  the  security  of  the  United  States  could  cause  a  change 
in  this  policy.  The  forcible  intervention  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  Spain  raised  the  question  as  to  what  extent  such 
intervention  could  be  carried,  on  the  same  principle.  This 
raised  the  question  of  legitimacy.  The  policy  of  the  United 
States  was  not  to  intervene  in  any  of  the  internal  concerns 
of  the  powers,  and  in  all  cases  to  recognize  the  de  facto 
government  as  the  legitimate  government  and  the  one  with 
which  the  United  States  would  deal.  This  settled  the  ques- 
tion of  recognition  of  governments  and  also  stated  the  pro- 
position that  the  United  States  would  not  intervene  in 
other  states  for  rights  of  succession  or  for  the  purp^ose  of 
determining  the  legitimacy  of  governments.  But  in  the 
American  continents,  where  circumstances  were  absolutely 
different,  any  extension  of  their  political  system  would  en- 
danger the  peace  of  the  United  States,  and  the  new  states 

^  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  218. 


^6  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [382 

would  not  adopt  it  voluntarily.  Since  Spain  could  not  sub- 
due them,  the  United  States  had  adopted  the  policy  of 
leaving  them  to  themselves,  which  policy  was  commended 
to  the  rest  of  the  world/  The  conditions  of  peace  with 
Europe  were,  then :  (a)  non-intervention  in  European  affairs 
as  regards  the  United  States,  and  (b)  non-intervention  in 
American  affairs,  as  regards  the  powers  of  Europe. 

European  responsibility  was  characterized  by  President 
Monroe  to  be  of  two  kinds,  non-intervention  in  the  affairs 
of  the  independent  states  of  America,  and  non-colonization 
in  any  American  territory.  The  latter  was  stated  in  the 
seventh  paragraph  of  President  Monroe's  message  of  De- 
cember 2.  1823,  and  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  prin- 
ciple of  non-colonization.  This  declaration  was  occasioned 
larg-ely  by  Russian  claims  to  the  Northwest,  the  circum- 
stances of  which  have  already  been  related.  At  a  Cabinet 
meeting  on  June  28,  1823,  Adams  had  stated  that  the  Rus- 
sian claim  could  not  be  admitted  as  no  settlement  had  beeit 
made  upon  the  territory  in  dispute,  except  in  California, 
and  hence  no  territorial  right  could  accrue.-  The  Emperor's 
ukase  of  182 1  claimed  territorial  rights  to  the  fifty-first 
degree  of  north  latitude,  and  prohibited  foreign  navigation 
and  fishing  within  one  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  Coast- 
On  July  17,  Adams  told  Baron  Tuyll  that  the  United  States 
"  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any  territorial  es- 
tablishment on  this  continent,  and  that  we  should  assume 
distinctly  the  principle  that  the  American  continents  are 
no  longer  subjects  for  any  new  European  colonial  establish- 
ments."^ Adams  addressed  a  communication  to  Rush, 
July  22,   1823,  relating  to  the  right  of  colonization.     He 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  219. 

'Adams,  C.  F,,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  vol.  \i,  p.  157. 

^  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  163. 


383]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  9- 

denied  the  claim  that  the  occupation  of  an  island  gave  a 
right  to  the  adjoining  mainland/  He  could  not  conceive  of 
any  European  nation  planting  a  colony  on  the  northwest 
coast  of  America.  The  ultimate  settlement  of  the  country, 
including  an  absolute  territorial  right,  was  both  natural 
and  expected,  and  had  been  a  subject  of  Congressional 
deliberations."  He  considered,  then  the  following  principles 
as  the  settled  principles  of  colonization :  the  American  con- 
tinents were  no  longer  subjects  of  colonization;  American 
independent  nations  possessed  rights  incident  to  that  con- 
dition; the  Pacific  Ocean  was  open  to  the  navigation  of  all 
nations  alike;  the  rights  of  interior  navigation  of  their 
rivers  would  belong  to  each  of  the  American  nations  within 
its  own  territories;  the  United  States  would  not  admit  the 
colonial  principle  of  exclusion  as  applying  to  any  part  of 
the  Northwest  coast  of  i\merica,  or  regard  any  part  of  it 
as  belonging  to  any  European  nation.^ 

An  incident  of  much  significance  was  the  Panama  Con- 
gress. The  governments  of  Colombia,  Mexico  and  Central 
America  had  invited  the  United  States  to  participate.  The 
motive  of  American  participation,  was  "  neither  to  contract 
alliances  nor  to  engage  in  any  undertaking  or  project  im- 
parting hostility  to  any  other  nation."  *  President  John 
Quiiicy  Adams  declared  in  a  special  message  to  Congress, 
December  26,  1825,  that  ~"  an  agreement  between  all  the 
parties  represented  at  the  meeting  that  each  will  guard  by 
its  own  means  against  the  establishment  of  any  future 
European  colony  within  its  border  may  be  found  advis- 
able."^    In  his  message  of  March  15,  1826,  he  stated  that 

^Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  v,  p.  446. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  V,  p.  447. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  V,  p.  447. 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  ii,  p.  417. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  417. 


(jS  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [384 

most  of  the  new  republics  had  assented  to  the  principle  of 
non-colonization,  and  that  they  were  considering  means  of 
asserting  that  principle  as  well  as  of  repelling  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  American  states.^  The  American  dele- 
gates to  the  Congress  did  'not  arrive  in  time  to  attend  the 
sessions,  and  the  adjourned  session  did  not  meet  as  planned. 
Doubts  as  to  the  aims  of  Bolivar  threw  a  shadow  over  the 
Congress.  On  April  18,  1826,  an  important  resolution 
passed  the  House  of  Representatives  by  a  lean  majority.  It 
was  resolved  that  the  United  States  should  be  represented 
at  the  Panama  Congress  only  in  a  diplomatic  character.  No 
alliance,  offensive  or  defensive,  nor  any  negotiations  for 
sucli  an  engagement,  should  be  undertaken  with  all  or 
with  any  of  the  South  American  republics.  No  joint  de- 
claration should  be  made  regarding  interference  of  European 
powers  with  their  independence  or  form  of  government, 
nor  any  compact  formed  for  preventing  colonization  upon 
the  continent  of  America.  The  United  States  should  be 
left  free  to  act  when  the  crises  might  arise,  as  her  friend- 
ship and  interests  might  at  the  time  demand.^  The  Panama 
Congress  failed  in  its  immediate  purpose,  but  it  clarified  the 
issue  raised  by  Monroe  and  Adams.  The  republics  to  the 
South  recognized  the  principle  of  non-intervention  and  its 
corollary,  the  principle  of  non-colonization.  The  United 
States,  however,  always  true  to  its  policy  of  non-interven- 
tion, held  itself  free  from  any  alliance  with  the  Americaii 
states,  in  order  to  maintain  a  consistent  policy,  and  in  order 
to  be  better  able  to  deal  with  any  crisis  unhampered  by 
prior  engagements. 

In  discussing  the  factors  leading  to  and  resulting  in  the 
extension  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention,  one  is  impressed 
by  the  fact  that  the  extension  of  the  policy  was  made  as  the 

'  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  334. 

^Cofig.  Debates,  1825-1826,  vol.  ii,  pt.  2,  pp.  2369,  2457. 


385]  T^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  gg 

demands  arose.  The  adoption  of  the  policy  in  the  earlier 
days  of  the  Republic  was  largely  the  result  of  a  given  set 
of  circumstances  requiring  definite  action  upon  a  policy  as 
regards  Europe.  The  early  conception  of  non-intervention 
concerned  relations  exclusively  American-European.  The 
first  form  which  the  extension  of  the  policy  took  was 
resistance  to  the  territorial  and  commercial  aims  of  the 
European  powers.  The  independence  of  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces in  South  America  raised  quite  anoth*_r  question. 
Before  any  further  extension  of  the  policy  of  non-interven- 
tion could  take  place,  the  United  States  must  settle  its  own 
policy  as  regards  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
republics.  They  were  ultimately  recognized  because  they 
had  successfully  established  and  maintained  their  indepen- 
dence, the  de  facta  government  being  recognized  as  the 
legitimate  government.  Neutrality  was  impartially  ob- 
served, and  there  was  no  premature  recognition.  The 
United  States  declined  to  inquire  either  into  the  form  of 
government  or  into  the  means  by  which  the  government 
had  been  established.  This  was  later  elaborated  by  Monroe 
by  declaring  de  facto  governments  as  legitimate  as  far  as 
the  United  States  was  concerned,  in  contrast  with  the  Euro- 
pean intervention  in  Spain  to  put  down  revolution  and  to 
determine  the  form  of  government. 

The  United  States,  while  avoiding  intervention,  en- 
deavored to  avoid  occasion  for  it  and  to  restore  tranquil- 
lity to  the  western  world  by  attempting  in  a  conciliatory 
manner  to  induce  Spain  to  make  peace  with  Mexico  and 
with  the  Central  and  South  American  governments.  On 
January  20,  1826,  Alexander  H.  Everett,  United  States 
Minister  to  Spain,  addressed  a  lengthy  communication  to 
the  Duke  de  Infantado,  Spanish  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  history  of  the 
Colonial  struggle,  the  attitude  of  the  United   States,   the 


lOO         T^tiE-  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [386 

depleted  condition  of  Spain,  and  pleaded  for  peace  between 
the  mother  country  and  the  colonies/  From  the  first,  it 
will  be  remembered  that  the  United  States  maintained  a 
strict  neutrality  as  between  Spain  and  the  colonies.  Thio 
policy  was  commended  to  Russia.  Both  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  had  taken  the  ground  that  they  would  not 
interfere  with  any  reconciliation  between  Spain  and  her 
colonies,  but  both  had  indicated  that  they  would  oppose  any 
interference  by  a  third  power  to  induce  the  colonies  to  sub- 
mit. The  efforts  of  Minister  Everett  to  persuade  Spain 
to  recognize  their  independence  were  based  solely  on  the 
fact  that  their  independence  was  actually  achieved,  that 
Spain  could  not  possibly  subdue;  them,  and  that  the  continua- 
tion of  the  struggle  must  be  altogether  fruitless.  As  he 
pointed  out,  the  United  States  did  not  depart  from  its 
neutral  position,  even  so  far  as  to  express  an  opinion  upon 
the  merits  of  the  quarrel ;  still  less  did  it  entertain  a  thought 
of  active  intervention  in  favor  of  either  party.'  But  the 
advantages  of  peace  and  commerce  were  urged  upon  Spain 
as  adequate  compensation  for  the  recognition  of  the  new 
states. 

On  different  occasions  the  United  States  has  opposed 
foreign  intervention  in  Mexico.  Henrv-  Clay,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  in  instructions  to  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  Minister  to 
Mexico,  on  March  25,  1825.  declared  that  the  purpose  of 
Poinsett's  mission  was  "  to  lay,  for  the  first  time,  the 
foundations  of  an  intercourse  of  amit\',  commerce,  naviga- 
tion, and  neighborhood,"  helpful  to  both  States.^  Poin- 
sett was  furnished  with  full  powers  to  negotiate  concerning 
commerce  and  navigation.*     But  he  was  also  instructed  to 

^Am.  State  papers.  For.  Rcl.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1006-1044. 
2  Tbid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1006,  1008,  1009,  loio. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  578. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  579. 


387]  ^^£  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  lOi 

bring  to  the  notice  of  the  Mexican  government  the  non-colon- 
ization principle  stated  by  President  Monroe  in  his  message 
of  December  2,  1823,  as  well  as  the  principle  that  any  at- 
tempt by  the  European  Powers  to  extend  their  political 
system  to  this  hemisphere  would  be  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety,  and  to  "  urge  upon  the  government  of  Mexico 
the  utility  and  expediency  of  asserting  the  same  principL-s 
on  all  proper  occasions."  In  1825  the  Mexican  Secretary 
of  State,  ]\Ir.  Alaman,  brought  to  the  notice  of  Mr.  Poinsett 
and  also  to  that  of  Mr.  Ward,  the  British  charge  d'affaires, 
a  report  from  a  Mexican  agent  in  Jamaica  in  regard  to  the 
movements  of  the  French  fleet  in  tht  West  Indies.  In  this 
report  an  apprehension  was  expressed  that  the  French  in- 
tended to  occupy  Cuba  with  a  view  to  eventual  military  opera- 
tions against  Mexico.  Mr.  Poinsett  assured  Mr.  Alaman 
that  the  United  States  would  not  view  with  indifference  the 
occupation  of  Cuba  by  France,  especially  if  it  was  done  with 
hostile  intentions  towards  Mexico,  but  hinted  that  the  im- 
prudent conduct  of  some  of  the  Mexican  commanders  might 
have  induced  Spain  to  cede  the  island  to  the  French  rather 
than  have  it  wrested  from  her  as  Santa  Anna  had  proposed. 
It  was  agreed,  however,  that  Mr.  Alaman  should  address 
lidentic  notes  to  Mr.  Poinsett  and  Mr.  Ward.  These  notes, 
as  received,  stated  that  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  ad- 
dressed had  declared  not  only  that  their  governments  never 
would  consent  to  the  interposition  of  a  third  power  between 
Spain  and  her  former  colonies,  but  also  that  the  conduct  of 
France  constituted  such  an  interposition,  and  then  asked  that 
the  matter  be  brought  by  them  to  the  notice  of  their  govern- 
ments in  order  that  the  latter  might  demand  of  France  such 
explanations  as  the  case  required.  Mr.  Poinsett  objected  to 
these  statements  on  the  ground  that  the  friendly  disposition 
of  the  United  States  towards  the  Spanish-American 
countries  did  not  confer  upon  Mexico  the  privilege  of  de- 


102         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [388 

fnmiding  the  interference  of  the  United  States  as  a  right 
The  notes  were  altered  so  as  to  meet  this  objection,  and  were 
then  answered  both  by  Mr.  Poinsett  and  by  Mr.  Ward  in 
the  sense  of  the  assurance  which  Mr,  Poinsett  had  pre- 
viously given  to  Mr.  Alaman  as  to  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States.^  Mr.  Clay  subsequently  complained  that,  when 
questions  of  commerce  were  involved,  Mexico  treated  the 
United  States  as  a  European  rather  than  as  an  American 
nation,  but  that,  when  Mexican  independence  was  menaced 
by  Europe,  the  government  appealed  to  fraternal  s>-mpathies 
which  were  supposed  to  spring  from  the  United  States,  as 
a  member  of  the  American  family.  This  comment  related 
to  the  proposed  insertion  by  Mexico  in  a  commercial  treaty 
with  the  United  States  of  an  exception  in  favor  of  nations 
that  were  formerly  Spanish  possessions.  Mr.  Clay  ob- 
served that  the  United  States  had  asked  only  equality  and 
reciprocity,  and  could  consent  to  no  other  basis  of  negotia- 
tion.^ 

The  proposed  interventions  by  European  nations  in 
Mexico  during  the  years  1858-60  were  firmly  and  consis- 
tently opposed  by  the  United  States.  A  repwDrt  reached  the 
United  States  in  1858  that  Spain  was  preparing  to  send  a 
military  and  naval  force  to  Mexico  in  order  to  obtain 
political  ascendancy  there  by  taking  advantage  of  Mexico's 
mifortunate  internal  condition.  The  American  minister 
at  Madrid.  Mr.  Dodge,  was  instructed  incidentally  to  re- 
mind the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  in  the  subject.  With  respect  to  the 
causes  of  war  between  Spain  and  Mexico,  Mr.  Dodge  was 
advised  that  the  United  States  had  no  concern.  It  did  not 
undertake  to  judge  those  causes,  or  claim  to  interpose  in 

^Am.  Stafe  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  v,  pp.  908-910. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  582-583. 


389]  ^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  103 

any  hostilities  that  might  take  place ;  its  "  policy  of  observa- 
tion and  interference  "  was  "  limited  to  the  permanent  sub- 
jugaticyn  of  any  portion  of  the  territory  of  Mexico,  or  of 
any  other  American  state  to  any  European  power  what- 
ever." ^  Mr.  Tassara,  Spanish  minister  to  the  United 
States,  informed  the  government  that  the  naval  force  had 
been  ordered  to  Mexican  waters  only  for  the  protection  of 
the  persons  and  property  of  Spanish  subjects  resident  In 
Mexico  and  to  compel  justice  from  Mexico  for  injuries 
which  had  been  committed.  This  explanation  was  satis- 
factory, but  the  American  policy  was  again  stated  to  tlie 
Spanish  government.  Later,  the  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  in  Mexican  waters  were  increased  to  protect  American 
rights  and  interests.  The  Spanish  fleet  had  been  ordered 
to  Vera  Cruz  to  attack  the  city  in  case  the  Juarez  govern- 
ment did  not  comply  with  certain  demands.  The  Amer- 
ican fleet  was  directed  not  to  resist  the  Spanish  fleet  if  war 
measures  were  adopted.  Secretary  of  State  Cass  declared 
to  the  Spanish  minister  that  the  United  States  was  utterly 
opposed  to  the  holding  of  Mexico  by  any  foreign  power, 
as  well  as  to  any  forcible  interference  with  a  view  to 
control  of  Mexico's  political  destiny,  and  that  any  measures 
taken  for  such  objects  the  United  States  would  resist  '*  by 
all  the  means  in  their  power.''  The  American  minister  at 
Madrid  was  directed  to  suggest  to  the  Spanish  government 
that  it  would  be  desirable  to  avert  the  impending  struggle, 
if  possible,  by  peaceable  means. ^ 

Great  Britain  also  made  plans  to  intervene  in  Mexico. 
On  the  strength  of  a  statement  by  the  British  consul  at 
Vera  Cruz  that  the  British  government  had  determined  to 
enforce  the  payment  by  the  Liberal  Govemrrtent.  then  at 

'Moore,  J.  B,,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi.  pp.  477,  478 
'  Ibid^  vol.  vi.  pp.  478,  48r>48i 


lO^.         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [390 

Vera  Cruz,  of  certain  British  claims  against  Mexico,  Secre- 
tary of  State  Cass  on  May  12,  1859,  instructed  Mr.  Dallas, 
then  American  manister  at  London,  in  case  the  consul's 
annoimcement  should  prove  to  be  true,  to  say  that  while  the 
United  States  did  not  undertake  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the 
difficulties  between  Great  Britain  and  Mexico  or  on  the 
measures  adopted  to  bring  about  a  settlement  of  them,  yet 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico  were  for 
political  as  well  as  for  geographical  and  commercial  reasons, 
of  vital  interest  to  the  United  States,  that  the  Liberal 
party  was  thought  b}'  the  President  to  be  the  best  means  of 
consolidating  power  in  Mexico,  and  that  an  attack  on  Vera 
Cruz  would  probably  result  in  great  injury  to  the  general 
interest.^  The  British  government  therefore  was  asked  to 
leconsider  its  decision  to  use  force. 

In  July  i860.  Lord  Lyons,  then  British  minister  at 
Washington,  invited  the  United  States  tO'  join  France  and 
Great  Britain  in  an  effort  to  induce  the  Miramon  and 
Juarez  governments  to  end  their  struggles  for  power,  by 
calling  a  national  assembly.  It  was  declared  that  the 
general  policy  of  the  United  States  was  "  opposed  to  any 
interference,  especially  the  joint  interference,  of  other 
powers  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  an  independent  nation."  ^ 
The  Juarez  government  had  been  recognized  by  the  United 
States,  and  joint  intervention,  the  President  thought,  would 
do  no  practical  good.  Even  when  all  designs  to  intervene 
by  force  in  order  to  influence  the  Mexican  government  by 
any  means  except  friendly  were  disavowed,  the  President 
refused  to  consider  a  departure  from  our  established  policy. 
The  French  government  made  a  similar  representation  to 
the  United  States,  disclaiming  the  intent  to  use  force,  but 
reserving  the  right  to  use  such  measures  as  were  expedient 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  479. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  479-480. 


391  ]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  105 

df  the  rights  of  French  citizens  in  Mexico  were  violated.^ 
Mr.  Cass  replied  that  the  permanent  occupation  of  any  part 
of  the  territory  of  Mexico  by  a  foreign  power,  any  forcible 
attempt  to  inter\^ene  in  its  internal  affairs  or  to  control  it 
politically  would  greatly  offend  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Cass  reviewed  the  situation  in  a  note  to  Mr.  McLane, 
minister  to  Mexico,  September  20,  i860.  The  govern- 
ments of  England,  France,  and  Spain  had  disavowed  all 
designs  to  do  anything  against  the  policy  of  the  United 
States.'  The  United  States  would  not  oppose  any  effort 
to  bring  the  contending  parties  together,  if  the  plan  be 
honestly  carried  out,  but  the  non-intervention  policy  of  the 
country  prevented  any  direct  participation  in  the  arrange- 
ment. Mr.  McLane  feared  that  the  European  powers 
would  use  this  as  a  means  of  securing  political  control." 
Mr.  Cass  did  not  share  this  view,  but  made  it  clear  that  any 
such  attempt  would  meet  the  armed  opposition  of  the 
United  States. 

Resistance  to  threatened  European  intervention  in 
Mexico  was  not  the  only  difficulty  experienced  by  the 
United  States  with  the  southern  republic  during  President 
Buchanan's  administration.  The  question  of  American  in- 
tervention was  equally  vexing  to  the  government  at  Wash- 
ington, and  led  to  strong  representations  by  the  President  to 
Congress  in  several  annual  messages.  Incessant  civil 
strife  and  a  hopeless  state  of  anarchy  had,  he  declared, 
rendered  the  adequate  protection  of  American  citizens  im- 
possible; American  claims  and  remonstrances  against  griev- 
ances had  passed  unnoticed;  and  confiscatory  decrees  had 
been  promulgated.  These  conditions  led  to  the  with- 
drawal of  the  American  legation  from  Mexico,  and  to  the 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  4S0. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  481. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  482. 


I06         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [392 

suggestion  by  the  President  of  the  estabHshment  of  a  temj>- 
orary  protectorate  over  the  northern  portion  of  the  Mexican 
States  of  Chihuahua  and  Sonora.  The  President  regarded 
it  as  his  duty  to  protect  Mexican  territory-  against  hostile 
interference  by  other  powers/  A  special  agent,  dispatched 
to  Mexico  with  discretionary  powers,  accorded  recognition 
to  the  Juarez  government,  but  outrages  against  American 
citizens  continued."  Intervention  was  again  suggested  as 
the  only  eflfective  remedial  measure,  in  concert  with  the 
"  constitutional "  govermnent  of  Mexico.  Such  a  course 
was  justified  by  the  President  in  the  following  terms : 

It  may  be  said  that  these  measures  will,  at  least,  indirectly, 
be  consistent  with  our  wise  and  settled  policy  not  to  interfere 
in  the  domestic  concerns  of  foreign  nations.  But  does  not  the 
present  constitute  an  exception?  An  adjoining  republic  is  in  a 
state  of  anarchy  and  confusion  from  which  she  has  proved 
wholly  unable  to  extricate  herself.  She  is  entirely  destitute 
of  the  power  to  maintain  peace  upon  her  own  borders  or  to  pre- 
vent the  incursions  of  bandits  into  our  territory.  In  her  fate 
and  in  her  fortune,  in  her  power  to  establish  and  maintain  a 
settled  government,  we  have  a  far  deeper  interest  socially,  com- 
mercially and  politically,  than  any  other  nation.  She  is  now 
a  wreck  upon  the  ocean,  drifting  about  as  she  is  impelled  by 
different  factions.  As  a  good  neighbor,  shall  we  not  extend  to 
her  a  helping  hand  to  save  her?  If  we  do  not,  it  would  not  be 
surprising  should  some  other  nation  undertake  the  task,  and 
thus  force  us  to  interfere  at  last,  under  circumstances  of  in- 
creased difficulty,  for  the  maintenance  of  our  established  policy.* 

In  his  last  annual  message.  President  Buchanan  again 
reviewed  relations  with  Mexico,  contending  that  the  risk 

'Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  v,  pp.  512-514. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  V,  p.  564. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  V,  p.  568. 


393]  ^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POUCV  107 

attending  the  removal  of  the  cause  for  European  interven- 
tion was  preferable  to  the  risk  attending  the  continuance 
of  the  danger/  Congress,  however,  refused  to  accept  his 
proposal.  Injured  American  citizens  awaited  the  slow  pro^- 
cess  of  treaty  negotiation  to  secure  a  redress  of  grievances. 
Definite  plans  by  Eiu^opean  powers  for  reprisals  against 
Mexico  were  already  under  way.  In  a  joint  note  of 
November  30,  i86i,  the  Spanish,  French  and  British 
governments  declared  their  intention  to  intervene  in  Mexico 
in  order  to  secure  a  redress  of  grievances  and  to  insure  the 
protection  of  foreign  residents.  The>'  agreed  that  no 
Mexican  territory  would  be  taken,  nor  would  they  interfere 
coerclvely  with  the  form  of  the  Mexican  govermnent.  The 
aggrieved  governments  invited  the  United  States  to  join 
them,  but  they  refused  to  allow  their  purpose  to  be  de- 
feated by  delay."  The  United  States,  while  referring  to 
its  attempts  to  aid  Mexico  in  meeting  foreign  claims,  re- 
fused to  take  part  in  the  intervention,  for  the  following 
reasons : 

First,  the  United  States,  so  far  as  is  practicable,  prefers  to 
adhere  to  a  traditional  policy  recommended  to  them  by  the 
father  of  their  country,  and  confirmed  by  a  happy  experience, 
which  forbids  them  from  making  alliances  with  foreign  nations  ; 
second,  Mexico  being  a  neighbor  of  the  United  States  in  this 
continent,  and  possessing  a  system  of  government  similar  to 
our  own  in  many  of  its  important  features,  the  United  States 
habitually  cherish  a  decided  good  will  towards  that  republic, 
and  a  lively  interest  in  its  security,  prosperity,  and  welfare." 

The  forces  of  the  allied  governments  seized  Vera  Cruz 
m   1861 ;  but  the  British  and   Spanish  forces  were  with- 

^  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  645-646. 
'5.?  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  394- 
'5^  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  pp.  396-397- 


Io8         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [394 

drawn  in  April,  1862.  Both  those  governments  were  dis- 
satisfied with  the  course  of  France.  Moreover.  Mr. 
Seward,  as  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  in  a 
series  of  notes  protested  against  any  poHcy  of  permanent 
intervention  in  Mexican  affairs,  and  insisted  that  recogni- 
tion by  the  United  States  of  the  government  of  Maximilian, 
which  France  had  set  up,  must  await  the  choice  and  act  of 
the  Mexican  people.^  He  also  peremptorily  remonstrated 
against  an  Austrian  proposal  to  aid  the  French,  and  the 
project  was  definitely  abandoned  by  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment.^ The  protestations  of  the  French  government  that 
•it  did  not  aim  at  the  acquisition  of  territory  or  at  the  setting 
up  of  a  form  of  government  different  from  that  which  the 
Mexicans  desired,  and  that  the  satisfaction  of  existing 
"  griefs  "  and  the  establishment  of  a  responsible  govern- 
ment were  all  that  it  desired,  were  accepted,*  but  only  sa 
long  as  was  necessary.  The  formal  acceptance  by  the 
Archduke  Maximilian  of  the  imperial  crown  on  x\pril  10, 
1864,  led  the  House  of  Representatives  unanimously  to  re- 
solve : 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States  are  unwilling  by  silence 
to  have  the  nations  of  the  world  under  the  impression  that 
they  are  indifferent  spectators  to  the  deplorable  events  now 
transpiring  in  the  republic  of  Mexico,  and  they  think  fit  to 
declare  that  it  does  not  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  acknowledge  any  monarchical  government  in  America 
under  the  auspices  of  any  European  power.* 

No  sooner  was  the  burden  of  the  Civil  War  lifted,  than 

^H.  Ex.  Doc.  100,  Z7  Cong.  2  Sess.,  p.  217;  Diplomatic  Correspondence, 
1863,  vol.  ii,  pp.  783,  799. 

'Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  pp.  505,  506. 

•  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  1862,  pp.  354-355,  377,  404. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  496. 


395]  -^^^  EXTEXSION  OF  THE  POLICY  109 

Seward  complained  of  continued  foreign  military  rule 
against  the  will  of  the  Mexican  people/  He  demanded  the 
withdrawal  of  French  troops,  and  the  observance  by  France 
of  the  principle  of  non-intervention  as  regards  Mexico.' 
He  virtually  threatened  war,  unless  France  shoidd  comply, 
and  an  agreement  for  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  the 
French  forces  was  reached.^  The  United  States,  in  hi- 
sisting  upon  the  removal  of  a  cause  of  intervention,  reaf- 
firmed its  own  continued  adhesion  to  the  non-intervention 
principle.*  Mexico  City  was  evacuated  by  the  French  in 
Februaiy  1867,  and  the  government  of  Maximilian  was 
left  to  the  only  test  consistent  with  American  policy — the 
will  of  the  Mexican  people. 

Next  to  Mexico,  Venezuela  has  caused  the  United  States 
the  most  concern  in  the  maintenance  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention. In  a  controversy  between  the  Venezuelan 
and  Spanish  governments,  the  former  requested  the  inter- 
position of  the  United  States.  Secretary  of  State  Cass, 
in  a  note  to  General  Paez,  the  Venezuelan  Minister  at 
Washington,  November  5,  i860,  replied  that  the  established 
policy  of  the  United  States  forbade  interference  "  with 
the  relations  of  foreign  nations  to  each  other/'  and  that 
it  was  "  both  improper  and  impossible "  for  the  United 
States  to  decide  upon  the  course  of  conduct  towards 
Venezuela  which  Spain  might  think  "  her  honor  and  her 
interests"  required  her  to  take.  But  the  minister  of  the 
United  States  at  Madrid  was  instructed  to  tender  his  "  good 
offices  "  to  the  governments  of  Spain  and  Venezuela  if  a 
favorable  opportunity  should  arise.^ 

^  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  499-500. 

*H.  Ex.  Doc.  73,  39  Cong,  i  Sess.,  pt.  2.  p.  348. 

^Diplomatic  Correspondence.  1866.  vol.  i,  p.  37^- 

*Ibid.,  1866,  vol.  i,  p.  378. 

5  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  530. 


jlO         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [396 

On  two  different  occasions  the  United  States  refused  to 
be  a  party  to  joint  action  against  Venezuela  to  secure  a 
more  strict  observance  of  the  engagements  of  that  country. 
In  June  1871,  Baron  Gerolt,  German  Minister  at  Washing- 
ton, confidentially  sounded  the  Secretary  of  State,  Hamil- 
ton Fish,  as  to  how  the  United  States  would  receive  a  pro- 
posal, which  the  German  government  had  already  addres- 
sed to  Great  Britain,  Spain,  Italy  and  Denmark,  the  pur- 
pose of  which  was  to  inaugurate  a  joint  and  concerted, 
movement  to  urge  upon  Venezuela  the  maintenance  of  a 
more  stable  government  and  the  stricter  observance  of  her 
engagements.^  Mr.  Fish  could  not  discover  that  Germany 
was  among  the  creditors  of  Venezuela,  nor  did  he  know  of 
any  grievances  of  Germany  against  Venezuela,  and  he  was 
consequently  surprised  at  the  inquiry.  Baron  Gerolt  was 
reminded  of  the  combined  movement  against  Mexico  and 
its  consequences.  The  United  States,  said  Mr.  Fish,  if 
Germany  or  any  other  power  had  just  cause  of  war  against 
Venezuela,  could  not  c^ject  to  a  resort  to  that  measure;  but 
the  United  States  could  not  look  with  indifference  on  any 
combination  of  European  powers  against  an  American 
state.  If  what  was  desired  was  a  united  remonstrance 
against  anarchy  or  a  chronic  revolutionary  condition,  or 
appeal  to  honesty  in  the  observance  of  engagements,  the 
United  States,  while  declining  to  take  part  in  joint  represen- 
tation, would  itself  make  an  independent  but  similar  re- 
monstrance and  appeal.  In  conformity  with  these  views, 
Mr.  Fish  instructed  General  Schenck,  then  x\merican  minis- 
ter in  London,  on  June  2,  1871.  to  inquire  of  the  British 
government  as  to  its  intentions,  and  to  urge  that  the  matter 
be  settled  by  pacific  means.^ 

Fifteen  years  later,  the  American  minister  at  Caracas, 

^  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol  vi,  p.  531. 
2  Jbid.,  voL  vi,  p.  532. 


397]  ^^-E  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  1 1 1 

after  a  conversation  with  the  British  minister  at  the  capital, 
suggested  a  "  joint  representation  "  and  "  joint  cooperation  " 
by  the  two  governments  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  set- 
tlement of  British  and  American  claims.  Mr.  Bayard,  as 
Secretary  of  State,  replied  that  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  was  "  distinctly  opposed  to  joint  action  with  other 
powers  in  the  presentation  of  claims,  even  when  they  may 
arise  from  an  act  equally  invading  the  common  rights  of 
American  citizens  and  the  subjects  of  another  state  resid- 
ing in  the  country  to  whose  government  complaint  is 
made."^  A  coincident  and  even  identical  representation 
might  be  made  regarding  matters  of  common  interest  to 
the  powers,  but  a  joint  presentation  was  a  different  matter. 
A  truly  joint  demand  might  involve  a  joint  enforcement, 
which  would  be  inconsistent  with  American  policy.  An 
American  minister  might,  said  Mr.  Bayard,  act  "  in  con- 
cert "  with  his  colleagues  to  secure  the  benefits  of  co-opera- 
tive action,  but  the  United  States  was  not  disposed  to  risk 
the  embarrassments  which  united  action  might  entail." 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  instance  in  which  the  United 
States  felt  called  upon  to  assert  and  maintain  the  principle 
of  non-intervention  was  the  boundary  dispute  between 
Venezuela  and  British  Guiana.  It  was  essentially  a  case 
of  protecting,  if  not  guaranteeing,  the  territorial  integrity 
of  an  American  state  against  the  claims  of  a  pcnver  of 
Europe  holding  a  colony  contiguous  to  the  American  state. 
Repeated  efforts  by  the  United  States  to  secure  an  amicable 
settlement  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  had 
failed.  The  question  engaged  the  attention  of  Presidents 
Harrison  and  Cleveland  in  their  annual  messages,  and  of 
Congress  in  the  form  of  a  joint  resolution.' 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  532,  533. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  533. 

^  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  ix,  pp.  181, 
441,  526;  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  535. 


112         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [398 

On  July  20,  1895,  ^I^-  Olney.  as  Secretarv'  of  State, 
addressed  instructions  to  Mr.  Bayard,  then  American 
ambassador  to  Great  Britain,  covering  the  American  view 
of  the  subject.^  These  instructions  dealt  with  the  history 
of  the  boundary  question;  the  efforts  of  Venezuela  to 
secure  an  arbitral  settlement  and  Great  Britain's  refusal 
to  agree;  the  efforts  of  the  United  States  to  secure  an 
amicable  solution;  and  the  future  policy  of  the  United 
States  with  regard  to  the  threatened  aggressions  of  Great 
Britain,  The  main  question,  Mr.  Olney  contended,  was 
whether  or  not  any  right  or  duty  devolved  upon  the  United 
States  to  interfere  to  protect  Venezuelan  territorial  inte- 
grity. The  general  principle  of  intervention  was  not  in- 
voked to  justify  American  action,  but  reliance  was  placed  on 
the  peculiarly  and  distinctively  American  character  of  the 
question.  History,  geography  and  similarity  in  forms  of 
government  were  cited  as  reasons  for  American  interest 
in  Latin-American  states.  This  interest  was  further  justi- 
fied on  grounds  of  power,  for  "  Today  the  United  States," 
w^rote  Mr.  Olney,  "  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  conti- 
nent, and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  con- 
fines its  interposition."  In  the  view  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  the  dispute  involved  the  acquisition  and  ex- 
tension of  political  control.  Great  Britain  was  regarded 
as  a  state  of  Europe  in  respect  to  its  American  possessions, 
for  any  other  construction  would  allow  the  indefinite  ex- 
tension of  European-owned  territory  in  America.  Un- 
restricted arbitration  was  demanded  as  the  only  means  of 
reaching  a  just  settlement,  in  place  of  the  British  proposal 
for  restricted  arbitration. 

Lord  Salisbury,  on  November  26,  1895,  emphatically  con- 
tested the  validity   of   the  contentions  advanced   by  Mr. 

^Foreign  Relations.  1895.  vol.  i,  pp.  545-562. 


399]  ^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  113 

Olney/  While  admitting  the  justification  of  the  American 
policy  at  the  time  of  its  adoption  and  of  the  adhesion  of 
Great  Britain  to  it,  he  denied  its  application  to  the 
Venezuelan  controversy.  The  dispute  was,  he  maintained, 
only  the  determination  of  the  frontier  of  a  British  posses- 
sion owned  by  Great  Britain  before  Venezuela  became  an 
independent  state.  As  the  United  States  did  not  control 
the  conduct  of  South  American  states,  it  was  pointed  out 
that  no  right  existed  to  protect  them  from  the  consequences 
of  their  misconduct  towards  other  nations.  The  demand 
for  unrestricted  arbitration  was  rejected.  The  parties 
whose  claims  were  at  issue  were  alone  regarded  as  com- 
petent to  settle  the  dispute.  The  Monroe  declaration  was 
denied  a  place  in  the  code  of  international  law,  and  the 
claim  of  American  interest  in  anything  concerning  a  Latin- 
American  state  merely  because  of  geographical  situation, 
was  definitely  rejected. 

President  Cleveland,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress, 
December  17,  1895,  declared  that  the  Monroe  declaration 
applied  to  every  stage  of  our  national  life,  as  did  the  balance 
of  power  to  the  old,  and  that  its  maintenance  was  essential 
to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States.^  He  asked 
for  authority  to  appoint  a  commission  to  determine  the 
correct  boundary  line  between  Venezuela  and  British 
Guiana,  and  took  the  ground  that,  when  the  line  had  been 
so  determined,  any  attempt  by  Great  Britain  to  appropriate 
territory  beyond  that  line  should  be  resisted  as  a  wilful 
aggression  on  the  rights  of  the  United  States.  Congress 
promptly  complied  with  the  President's  request,  and  a] 
commission  was  duly  appointed,  with  Justice  David  J. 
Brewer   as  president.     The   commission,    however,    found 

'  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  vol.  i,  pp.  563-567- 
'Foreign  Relations,  1895,  vol.  i,  pp.  542-543- 


114         ^^^  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [400 

itself  helpless  to  proceed  without  evidence  from  British  as 
well  as  from  Venezuelan  sources.  To  meet  this  difficulty, 
Justice  Brewer  wrote  a  letter  to  Mr.  Olney,  requesting  that 
both  interested  parties  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
mission such  docimientary,  historical,  unpublished  or  other 
evidence  as  either  possessed  or  controlled ;  ^  and  he  further 
suggested  that  an  agent  or  attorney  representing  the  con- 
flicting interests  w'ould  be  welcome  to  aid  in  the  submission 
of  proofs.  Justice  Brewer  observed  that  it  would  not  be 
of  advantage  to  any  party  "  that  the  machinery  devised  by 
the  government  of  the  United  States  to  secure  the  desired 
information  should  fail  in  its  purpose."  His  letter  was 
communicated  to  the  British  foreign  office"  and  Lord 
Salisbury  made  a  favorable  response;  but  the  commission 
never  made  a  report.  On  the  other  hand,  a  treaty  of  arbi- 
tration, signed  at  Washington,  February  2,  1897,  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  ended  the  controversy  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.^  The  arbitral 
tribunal  consisted  of  Chief  Justice  Fuller,  Mr.  Justice 
Brew^er,  Lord  Herschell,  and  Sir  Richard  Collins,  with  F. 
de  Martens  as  president.  It  rendered  its  award  at  Paris 
on  October  3,  1899.* 

In  the  final  settlement  of  the  contested  boundarv'  line, 
possession  was  accepted  as  the  determining  factor.^  Pre- 
scription is  one  of  the  recognized  sources  of  title  to  territory, 
but  no  precise  period  of  time  has  been  fixed  by  interna- 
tional law  on  the  expiration  of  which  the  principle  must  be 
held   to  operate.     In   the  present   instance,   the  treaty   of 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1895,  vol.  i,  p.  576. 
*Ibid.,  1895,  vol.  i,  p.  576. 
^Ibid.,  1896,  p.  Ixxi. 
*Ibid.,  1899,  P-  xxxii. 
s  Ibid.,  1896,  p.  254. 


40l]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  II5 

arbitration  provides  that  adverse  holding  for  a  period  of 
fifty  years  was  to  be  regarded  as  conferring  title.  Exclu- 
sive political  control  as  well  as  actual  settlement  of  a  dis- 
trict was  construed  as  constituting  title  by  prescription. 
International  law  was  to  govern  wherever  the  rule  fixed  by 
the  treaty  was  inapplicable.  Under  the  award  Great 
Britain  continued  to  hold  a  large  part  of  the  disputed  ter- 
ritory in  the  interior,  while  Venezuela  retained  control  of 
the  mouths  of  the  Orinoco,  including  Barima  Point  and 
the  Caribbean  Httoral  for  some  distance  eastward.  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  reported  to  Congress  that  the  award  was 
satisfactory  to  both  parties,  and  that  the  dispute  was  de- 
finitely ended.  By  the  incorporatioin  of  the  principle  of 
prescription  in  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  arbitration,  a  large 
portion  of  the  Venezuelan  claims  was  relinquished.  The 
active  interest  of  the  United  States  ceased  upon  the  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  arbitration. 

Another  Venezuelan  controversy  causing  the  United 
States  concern  was  the  armed  intervention  of  Germany, 
Great  Britain  and  Italy  in  1902-1903,  for  the  collection  of 
claims.  Germany  complained  of  the  non-performance  of 
engagements  in  connection  with  the  building  of  a  railway 
and  of  the  non-satisfaction  of  claims  arising  out  of  damages 
suffered  by  German  merchants  and  land-owners  during  the 
Venezuelan  Civil  Wars  of  1898-1900.^  A  six-months'  term 
was  fixed  during  which  no  claims  would  be  entertained  by 
the  Venezuelan  government;  and  a  decree  was  issued  es- 
tablishing a  purely  Venezuelan  commission  to  determine  the 
claims,  which  were  required  to  be  presented  within  three 
months.^  Responsibility  for  claims  before  a  certain  date 
was  disavowed ;  diplomatic  protests  were  to  be  ignored ; 
only  appeals  to  the  Venezuelan  Supreme  Court  of  Justice 

'^Foreign  Relations,  1901,  p.  193. 
^Jbid.,  1901,  p.  193. 


Il6         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [402 

were  to  be  allowed ;  and  payment  was  to  be  made  in  bonds 
of  a  newly  emitted  revolution  debt.  After  repeated  re- 
fusals of  offers  to  arbitrate.  Germany  decided  once  more  to 
demand  a  settlement,  and  in  case  of  refusal  to  use  coercion. 
Assurances  were  given  to  the  United  States  that  Germany 
desired  only  to  secure  justice  for  her  injured  citizens,  and 
that  under  no  circumstances  was  the  acquisition  or  perman- 
ent occupation  of  any  territory  considered.^  President 
Roosevelt,  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  Deceinber  3,  1901, 
declared  that  the  United  States  did  not  "  guarantee  any 
state  against  punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided 
that  punishment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition 
of  territory  by  any  non-American  power."  ^  The  govern- 
ment was  satisfied  with  the  assurance  of  the  German 
government  that  no  territory  would  be  taken,  and  would 
await  the  actual  appearance  of  ulterior  designs  before 
taking  any  kind  of  action.  The  measures  suggested  by 
the  German  government  were  the  blockade  of  the  har- 
bors of  La  Guayra  and  PortO'  Cabello,  and  in  case  this 
coercive  measure  failed,  the  temporary  occupation  of  the 
Venezuelan  ports  and  the  levying  of  duties.'  On  July  29, 
1902,  the  British  government  warned  the  Venezuelan 
government  that  unless  the  claimants  of  British  nationality 
should  be  paid  what  was  justly  due  them,  the  British  govern- 
ment would  take  steps  to  compel  pajonent.* 

After  the  German  demand  of  December  7,  1902,  Eng- 
land, Germany  and  Italy  agreed  upon  certain  reprisals 
against  Venezuela.  Some  war  vessels  were  seized,  Porto 
Cabello  was  bombarded  and  a  Venezuelan  port  was  shelled. 
Venezuela  was  forced  to  yield,  and  the  United  States  was 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1901,  p.  194. 

*Ibid.,  1901,  p.  195. 

^Ibid.,  1901,  p.  194. 

■•Hart,  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  230. 


403]  ^^^£  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  II7 

requested  to  convey  to  the  blockading  governments  a  pro- 
posal of  arbitration.^  Full  authority  was  conferred  on 
the  American  minister  at  Caracas  to  act.  Arbitration  was 
accepted  by  Germany  and  Great  Britain  with  important  re- 
servations, and  President  Roosevelt  was  invited  to  act  as 
arbitrator.  The  Hague  Tribunal  was  ultimately  agreed 
upon  as  the  arbitrator  of  the  question  of  preferential  payment 
alone,  as  the  claims  with  the  exception  of  the  British  and 
German  reservations  were  referred  to  mixed  coinmissions." 
The  question  of  preferential  payment  was  decided  in  favor 
of  the  blockading  governments  on  February'  22,  1904.^ 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  in  this  instance  was 
guided  by  the  assurance  that  the  acquisition  of  territory 
neither  was  contemplated  nor  would  under  any  circum- 
stances be  considered.  November  11,  1902,  Mr.  Hay  told 
Sir  Michael  Herbert,  the  British  ambassador  at  Washing- 
ton, that  while  the  United  States  government  regretted  the 
use  of  force  against  Central  and  South  American  coun- 
tries, yet  no  objection  could  be  made  against  steps  taken  to 
secure  the  redress  of  injuries  suffered  by  the  subjects  of 
the  European  powers  concerned,  where  the  question  of  ter- 
ritory w^as  not  included.*  The  Argentine  minister  of 
foreign  relations.  Dr.  Drago,  communicated  certain  views 
to  the  United  States  government.  In  this  communication 
he  took  the  ground  that  proceedings  for  the  execution  of 
a  judgment  against  a  state  could  not  be  instituted;  that  a 
sovereign  state  had  the  right  to  determine  the  time  and 
mode  of  payment;  that  ability  to  pay  often  must  await  in- 
crease in  wealth;  that  the  collection  of  loans  by  military 
means  implied  territorial  occupation  to  make  them  effective ; 

^Foreign  Relations,  1903,  pp.  420,  453. 
*Ibid.,  1903,  pp.  425-426;  439-440;  477-478. 

*  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  591. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  592. 


Il8         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [404 

and  that  the  South  American  nations,  while  not  exempt 
from  the  ohUgations  of  states  under  internatio'nal  law, 
should  insist  on  the  principle  that  the  public  debt  of  a 
country  could  not  occasion  anned  intervention  nor  even  the 
actual  occupation  of  the  territory  of  American  nations  by 
a  European  power.^  In  reply,  Mr.  Hay,  Secretary  of 
State,  referred  to  President  Roosevelt's  message  of  De- 
cember 3,  1901,  in  which  he  declared  no  guarantee  against 
punishment  could  be  given  to  any  state  misconducting  it- 
self." The  question  of  territory  was  excepted  by  Mr.  Hay. 
The  Argentine  government  was  informed  that  the  United 
States  strongly  favored  the  reference  of  all  claims  by  one 
state  against  another  growing  out  of  individual  wrongs  or 
national  obligations  to  an  impartial  tribunal.  This  was 
broader  than  the  Drago  proposal,  which  referred  to  public 
debts  alone.  The  United  States,  however,  did  not  agree 
to  protect  any  country  where  the  collection  of  claims  only 
was  contemplated,  and  armed  intervention  by  three  Euro- 
pean powers  in  an  American  state  actually  took  place,  with 
the  knowledge  and  without  the  objection  of  the  governmient 
of  the  United  States. 

Our  relations  with  Brazil  afford  one  instance  of  non-in- 
tervention and  one  instance  of  intervention  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States.  Just  as  Mexico  had  called  upon  the 
United  States  for  aid  against  probable  French  invasion, 
and  Venezuela  against  Spain,  so  Brazil  called  upon  the 
United  States  for  aid  against  Portugal.  The  charge 
d'affaires  of  Brazil  in  the  year  1825  suggested  the  forma- 
tion by  the  United  States  of  an  alliance  with  Brazil  to  main- 
tain the  latter's  independence,  should  Portugal  receive  the 
aid  of  any  foreign  power,  and  also  the  conclusion  of  an 
alliance  to  expel  the  Portugese  from  any  part  of  Brazil 

'^Foreign  Relations,  1903.  pp.  1-5. 
^Ibid.,  1903,  p.  5. 


405]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  119 

which  might  fall  into  their  hands/  Mr.  Clay  replied  that 
the  prospects  of  a  speedy  peace  between  Brazil  and  Portugal 
seemed  to  remove  the  necessity  of  an  alliance,  but  intimated 
that,  if  the  independence  of  xA.merican  States  should  again  be 
threatened  by  the  European  allies,  the  President  would  take 
appropriate  action.  But  he  also  indicated  that  an  alliance 
with  Brazil  against  Portugal  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
policy  of  the  United  States,  for  ''  whilst  the  war  is  con- 
fined to  the  parent  country  and  its  former  colony,  the 
United  States  remain  neutral,  extending  their  friendship 
and  doing  equal  justice  to  both  parties." - 

Another  case  in  which  the  question  of  American  inter- 
vention arose  was  the  Brazilian  naval  revolt  during  the 
years  1893- 1894.  The  revolt  of  the  naval  vessels  under 
Admiral  Mello  was  followed  by  an  attack  on  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
resulting  in  the  declaration  of  martial  law,  the  suspension 
of  all  trade  and  commerce,  the  death  of  many  non-combat- 
ants, and  the  destruction  of  property.  The  msurgents  pro- 
fessed to  set  up  a  provisional  government,  and  asked  for 
its  recognition  by  the  United  States  and  other  foreign 
powers.  The  Brazilian  government,  on  the  other  hand, 
issued  a  decree  placing  the  revolting  squadron  outside  the 
protection  of  the  national  flag.^  Mr.  Thompson,  the  Amer- 
ican minister  of  Brazil,  was  instructed  to  take  steps  to  in- 
sure the  protection  of  American  interests.*  The  diplomatic 
representatives  of  several  foreign  governments  observed  the 
practice  of  non-intervention  in  Brazil  internal  affairs,  but 
they  strongly  insisted  that  the  insurgent  admiral  be  deprived 
of  all  pretext  for  hostile  action.  The  allied  naval  com- 
manders informed  Admiral  Mello  that  they  would  oppose 

^ Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  437. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  437. 

*  Foreign  Relations.  1803.  pp.  59-60. 

*Ibid.,  1893,  P-  47- 


I20         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [406 

by  force,  if  necessary,  all  attacks  upon  the  city  (Rio  de 
Janeiro),  and  further  insisted  that  insurgent  interference 
with  commerce  should  be  limited  to  the  lines  of  fire  of  the 
batteries  of  the  land  fortifications.^  Definite  instructions 
were  sent  by  Secretary  of  State  Gresham  to  Mr.  Thompson, 
a  summary  of  which  follows : 

1.  That,  an  actual  condition  of  hostilities  existing,  the  right 
of  the  insurgents  to  carry  on  orderly  military  operations  was 
admitted. 

2.  That  the  denial  of  this  right  by  a  foreign  power  would 
have  constituted  an  act  of  intervention,  incompatible  with 
neutral  duty. 

3.  That,  in  view  of  the  creation  of  fortified  and  armed 
strategic  positions  within  the  limits  of  the  city,  the  foreign 
naval  forces  would  not  be  justified  in  forcibly  preventing  its 
bombardment. 

4.  That,  while  "  an  announced  and  effective  blockade,"  en- 
forcement of  which  would  have  necessarily  involved  the  right 
to  extend  operations  to  the  high  seas,  would  be  recognized, 
the  insurgents  would  not  be  permitted,  after  they  had  allowed 
foreign  commerce  to  enter  the  port,  to  seek  to  accomplish  the 
objects  of  a  blockade  either  by  seizing  particular  vessels  or  by 
firing  upon  them  when  they  were  engaged  in  discharging  or 
receiving  cargo.^ 

Admiral  Benham,  commander  of  the  American  naval 
force,  informed  the  insurgents  and  the  city  that  American 
vessels  would  be  forcibly  protected.^  The  Detroit  was 
ordered  to  fire  back  if  merchant  vessels  were  fired  upon. 
An  insurgent  vessel  fired  upon,  but  missed,  an  American 
vessel,  and  the  Detroit  returned  the  fire.     This  was  fol- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1893,  pp.  56,  95-96. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol  ii,  p.  1 1 14. 

^Foreign  Relations,  1893,  PP-  116-117. 


407]  ^^^  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  121 

lowed  by  an  exchange  of  shots,  together  with  a  threat  by  the 
commander  of  the  Detroit  that  the  insurgent  vessel  would 
be  sunk  in  case  of  further  hostilities.  Admiral  Benham 
stated  that  he  had  not  interfered  with  the  military  or  naval 
operations  of  either  side,  but  had  limited  action  to  the  pro- 
tection of  American  citizens  and  commerce.  American 
vessels  in  the  line  of  fire  during  legitirruate  hostilities  were 
operating  at  their  peril,  he  declared,  while  merchant  vessels 
were  entitled  to  freedom  of  movement  elsewhere.  The 
search  of  neutral  vessels,  or  the  seizure  of  cargoes  amount- 
ing to  contraband  of  war  in  case  of  war  between  two  in- 
dependent governments  was  denied  to  the  insurgents,  on 
the  grounds  that  forcible  seizure  by  those  not  enjoying  a 
status  of  belligerency  would  constitute  an  act  of  piracy. 
Mr,  Gresham  held  that  Mr.  Thompson  had  acted  within  his 
instructions.^ 

Mr.  Gresham's  approval  of  Admiral  Benham's  course 
seemingly  sanctions  several  misconceptions  which  should 
not  pass  unnoticed.  Admiral  Benham's  communication  to 
Admiral  da  Gama  was  clearly  a  denial  of  the  right  of  the 
insurgent  party  to  prevent  the  supply  of  contraband  to  the 
city  and  to  the  federal  government.  The  protection  of 
commerce,  and  the  prevention  of  fire  upon  the  seizure  of  in- 
nocent neutral  ships  were  w^ithin  the  rights  of  Admiral 
Benham.  But  his  denial  of  the  right  to  prevent  the  supply 
of  contraband  was  a  direct  intervention  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  insurgents  and  the  Brazilian  federal  govern- 
ment, and  operated  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  fonner. 
This  was  a  course  which  he  had  no  right  to  take,  either 
under  his  instructions  or  under  international  law.  Mr. 
Gresham's  instructions  to  Mr.  Thompson  recognized  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  hostilities  and  the  right  of  the  in- 
surgents to  carry  on  military  operations.     They  therefore 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1893,  p.  117. 


122         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [408 

had  the  right  to  prevent  the  delivery  of  arms  and  munitions 
of  war  to  the  federal  forces,  as  orderly  military  operations 
include  the  crippling  of  the  enemy  by  all  fair  means.  The 
duties  of  neutral  governments  and  of  individuals  with  re- 
spect to  contraband  were  evidently  confused  in  this  case. 
Contraband  trade  is  prohibited  to  individuals,  but  the  duty 
to  enforce  this  prohibition  does  not  rest  on  neutral  govern- 
ments. A  private  citizen  supplying  war  materials  to  either 
party  to  an  armed  conflict  is  guilty  of  an  unneutral  act. 
But  he  commits  it  at  his  own  risk;  and  if  his  government 
should  assume  to  protect  him  in  it,  it  would  make  itself  a 
party  to  his  unneutrality. 

The  Department  of  State  inquired  as  to  the  attempted 
blockade  of  the  port  by  the  insurgents,  and  intirnated  that 
the  test  of  the  blockade  would  be  its  effectiveness.  This 
substantially  recognized  the  possibility  of  a  legal  blockade, 
which,  if  it  was  established,  would  gain  for  the  insurgents 
the  rights  of  belligerents.  The  denial  of  the  right  to  pre- 
vent the  supply  of  contraband  constituted  a  very  effective 
limitation  of  the  power  of  the  insurgents  to  make  their 
blockade  effective,  and  had  the  effectiveness  of  the  blockade 
depended  wholly  on  this,  Admiral  Benham's  position  would 
have  made  impossible  the  very  thing  which  the  Department 
of  State  admitted  the  insurgents  had  a  legal  right  to  do. 
The  action  of  the  American  naval  force  had,  indeed,  broken 
the  attempted  blockade. 

Until  insurgents  are  recognized  as  belligerents,  the 
titular  government  continues  to  be  prima  facie  responsible 
for  the  proper  treatment  of  foreigners  within  its  jurisdic- 
tion. Other  governments  have  no  right  to  assume  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  titular  government  in  this  respect,  in 
the  absence  of  any  necessity  for  self  defence,  to  which  acts 
of  interference  are  expressly  limited.  The  recognition  of 
belligerency,  or  the  withhoMing  of  belligerent  rights  should 


409]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  123 

not  be  confused  with  the  duty  of  neutral  governments  in 
relation  to  parties  in  a  civil  conflict  where  one  is  a  titular 
governiment  and  another  is  a  contesting  insurgent.  Recog- 
nition of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents  was  denied  by 
Mr.  Gresham,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  an  act  of 
unfriendliness  towards  the  titular  government  and  would 
g-ive  moral  support  to  the  rebellion,  since  evidence  was 
lacking  of  the  stability  and  effectiveness  of  the  insurgent 
resistance  to  the  titular  government.'-  This  denial,  how- 
ever, did  not  give  the  United  States  the  right  to  resist  the 
movements  of  the  insurgent  forces,  nor  did  it  justify 
Admiral  Benham's  denouncement  of  the  prevention  of  the 
supply  of  contraband  as  an  act  of  piracy.  Admission  by 
neutrals  of  the  right  of  insurgents  to  commit  hostile  acts 
•against  a  titular  government  carries  with  it  the  duty  of 
non-intervention,  and  is  in  no  way  connected  with  the 
according  or  withholding  of  belligerent  rights. 

The  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  Argentine 
Republic  furnish  two  illustrations  of  the  application  of 
the  policy  of  non-intervention,  and  one  example  of  inter- 
vention when  American  interests  require  it.  The  first  of 
these  was  an  attempt  of  South  American  countries  to  se- 
cure the  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  their  internal 
.affairs,  within  a  few  years  following  the  publication  of 
the  Monroe  message.  An  inquiry  having  been  made  by 
the  Argentine  Republic  as  to  the  scope  of  the  Monroe  de- 
claration, Mr.  Clay,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State,  re- 
plied that  it  was  leveled  at  apprehended  European  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  American  republics,  and  that,  while 
It  would  doubtless  receive  the  sanction  of  Congress,  it  was 
purely  a  voluntary  executive  declaration,  and  did  not  pledge 
the  United   States  to  any  obligation  the  performance  of 

^Foreign  Relations.  1893,  P-  63. 


124         ^^^  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [410 

which  might  be  demanded  by  foreign  governments.^ 
Should  the  question  again  arise,  Congress  alone  could  de- 
tennine  whether  or  not  the  country  would  engage  in  war. 
The  war  between  the  Argentine  Republic  and  the  Emperor 
of  Brazil  was  a  purely  American  war,  which  presented  no 
analogy  whatsoever  to  the  situation  described  by  President 
Monroe.  Even  if  Brazil  had  remained  under  Portuguese 
dominion,  the  war  with  Argentina  would  not  have  come 
within  the  purview  of  Mr.  Monroe's  declaration. 

On  January  26,  1832,  Mr.  Livingston,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  gave  Mr.  Baylies,  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United 
States  at  Buenos  Aires,  instructions  relative  to  American 
complaints  against  that  government.  It  was  stated  that 
one  Lewis  Vemet,  who  had  formed  an  establishment  at 
Soledad,  one  of  the  Falkland  Islands,  had  captured  three 
American  vessels, — the  Breakwater,  tlie  Harriet,  and  the 
Superior — pretending  that  they  had  violated  some  un- 
known laws  of  the  republic  of  Buenos  Aires,  for  the  pro- 
tection of  fisheries.^  Two  of  the  vessels  were  appropriated 
by  Vemet  without  any  trial,  and  were  fitted  out  to  make 
further  aggressions  on  the  property  of  American  citizens 
engaged  in  lawful  commerce  in  the  seas  around  those  is- 
lands. These  acts  were,  said  Mr.  Livingston,  regarded  as 
*'  lawless  and  piratical."  ^  Mr.  Baylies  was  instructed  to 
secure  recognition  of  American  fishery  rights,  and  if 
Vemet's  acts  were  avowed,  to  justify  the  recapture  of  the 
vessels  taken,  and  to  demand  their  restitution,  if  not  taken 
on  the  grounds  of  the  irregularity  of  proceedings;  but  if 
the  acts  should  be  disavowed,  orders  should  be  given  to  the 
squadron  to  break  up  the  settlement  and  bring  Vemet  to 
Buenos    Aires    for    trial.*     On    February    14,    1832,    Mr. 

'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  434. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  876. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  877. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  883. 


41 1 ]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  125 

Livingston  again  sent  instructions  making  further  charges 
against  Vernet's  conduct.  The  colony  was  one  composed 
of  deserters  from  American  ships  and  renegades  from  all 
nations,  governed  only  by  the  will  of  Vernet.  It  was  a 
necessary  act  of  self-defence  to  break  up  this  settlement, 
whether  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  had  or  had  not  a 
title  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  islands;  and  in  any  event,  the 
right  of  fishery  could  not  be  interfered  with/  In  answer 
to  the  protest  of  the  American  consul  against  the  seizure  of 
American  vessels,  the  Argentine  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs had  justified  the  acts  of  Vernet  as  legal. ^  The  opera- 
tions of  Vernet  were  forcibly  suppressed  by  the  American 
warship  Lexington,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Dun- 
caru  In  reply  to  the  demands  of  Mr.  Baylies,  the  govern- 
ment of  Buenos  Aires  not  only  refused  indemnity  for 
Vernet's  acts  but  demanded  reparation  for  the  acts  of 
Captain  Duncan.  After  this.  Mr.  Baylies  demanded  his 
passports.^ 

At  bottom,  this  controversy  involved  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  the  claim  of  Buenos  Aires  to  title  to  the  Falk- 
land Islands.  On  this  ground  Mr.  Webster,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  on  December  4,  1841,  declined  to  pursue  the  discus- 
sion of  the  complaints  made  against  the  course  of  Captain 
Duncan  until  the  question  of  jurisdiction  over  the  islands, 
as  between  Great  Britain  and  Buenos  Aires,  should  be  set- 
tled.* Mr.  Bayard,  as  Secretary  of  State,  on  March  18. 
1886,  took  similar  ground.*^  As  the  British  reoccupation  of 
the  islands  in  1833  was  based  on  a  claim  of  title  asserted 
and  maintained  before  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe, 

^  Moore,  op.  dt.,  vol  i,  p.  884. 

^Br.  and  Fr.  State  Papers,  vol.  xx,  pp.  3i^3i7- 

'Ibid.,  vol.  XX,  pp.  369,  437. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law.  vol.  i,  p.  888. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  889. 


126         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [412 

that  declaration,  which  Buenos  Aires  had  invoked,  was 
held  by  the  United  States  to  be  inapplicable  to  the  case.^ 
But  the  United  States  also  maintained  that,  even  if  Gneat 
Britain  had  violated  tlie  Monroe  principle,  this  would  not 
give  another  government  the  right  to  demand  from  the 
United  States  redress  for  injuries  alleged  to  have  resulted 
from  its  failure  to  act.  The  United  States  further  con- 
tended that  there  was  ample  justification  for  putting  an  end 
to  Vemet's  operations,  even  if  the  claim  of  Buenos  Aires  to 
sovereignty  over  the  islands  were  admitted.  From  this  re- 
view, it  appears  that  the  United  States  maintained,  in  the 
Falkland  Islands  affair,  the  following  positions:  (i)  that, 
where  a  dispute  as  to  title  antedated  the  Monroe  message, 
the  United  States  did  not  regard  itself  as  being  called  upon 
to  interfere;  (2)  that  the  Monroe  declaration  did  not,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  United  States,  operate  retroactively;  (3) 
that  another  government  could  not  as  of  right  demand  that 
(the  United  States  enforce  the  Monroe  declaration,  or  de- 
mand redress  for  injuries  sustained  as  the  result  of  inaction 
by  the  United  States;  (4)  that  the  United  States  had,  as 
an  independent  nation,  the  right  to  abate  a  nuisance  in- 
volving lawless  aggressions  upon  the  persons  and  property 
of  its  citizens,  without  regard  to  the  question  of  territorial 
jurisdiction. 

In  reply  to  a  suggestion,  in  1898,  that  the  United  States 
should  join  Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  representations 
to  the  Argentine  government  in  relation  to  its  alleged  re- 
fusal to  proceed  with  the  arbitration  of  the  boundary  dis- 
pute with  Chile,  the  Department  of  State  observed  that  the 
fact  that  the  queen  of  Great  Britain  had  already  been  chosen; 
as  arbitrator  would  probably  stand  in  the  way  of  joint  re- 
presentations by  Great  Britain  and  Germany;  but  the  De- 
partment added  that  it  did  not  wish  to  appear  as  opposing 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  890. 


413]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  127 

any  suggestion  of  arbitration,  when  "  made  benevolently 
and  not  in  the  form  of  intervention,  joint  or  otherwise,  in- 
consistent with  the  independence  of  the  nation  to  which  it 
was  addressed."  ^  A  tender  of  good  offices  had  already 
been  made  by  the  United  States  to  Argentina  and  Chile. 
The  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Cliile  reveal  two 
cases  where  the  principle  of  non-intervention  was  at  first 
disregarded,  but  later  applied.  The  first  was  the  contro- 
versy over  asylum  and  safe-conduct  during  the  civil  war 
following  the  dispute  between  President  Balmaceda  and  the 
Chilean  congress.  Many  persons  sought  refuge  at  the 
various  legations.  Even  prior  to  the  resignation  of  Balma- 
ceda, Mr.  Patrick  Egan,  then  American  minister  at 
Santiago,  was  threatened  with  police  inspection  for  harbor- 
ing Congressionalists.  During  the  year  1891,  when  many 
persons  were  seeking  asylimi,  the  Chilean  government, 
claiming  that  the  privilege  of  asylum  was  being  abused,  be- 
gan to  police  the  American  legation.  Mr.  Egan  protested 
vigorously,  and  declared  that  he  would  permit  his  refugees 
to  leave  the  legation  only  under  proper  safe-conduct  to 
neutral  territory.^  He  repeatedly  demanded  safe-conduct 
for  the  people  at  his  legation,  but  without  result.^  The 
State  Department  instructed  him  to  report  the  facts  of  the 
situation,  to  learn  the  practices  of  other  states  and  to  pre- 
vent the  abuse  of  the  privilege  of  asylum.*  Mr.  Egan 
argued  with  Seiior  Matta  that  his  house  was  an  integral  part 
of  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  that,  without  the 
will  and  permission  of  that  government,  Chile  could  not 
consider  as  subject  to  her  judicial  action  persons  clearly 
beyond  her  jurisdiction.     He  also  contended  that  the  grant 

'  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  435. 
^Foreign  Relations,  1891,  p.  166. 
3  Ibid.,  pp.  166,  177,  184,  185. 
*Ibid.,  pp.  167,  177.  178,  179- 


128         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [414 

of  safe-conduct  to  liarbored  refugees  was  ordinary  Chilean 
practice.  Sefior  Matta  would  admit  the  extraterritoriality 
of  the  minister's  domicil,  and  the  attendant  right  of 
asylum,  but  the  granting  of  safe-conduct,  he  held,  was  only 
a  matter  of  courtesy/ 

This  unwarranted  extension  of  extraterritorial  privi- 
leges, resulting  in  the  defeat  of  justice  and  the  crippling  of 
the  administration  of  extradition,  was  reasserted  by  Mr. 
Egan  in  1893,  during  a  new  uprising  of  the  Balmaceda 
party.  The  leaders  of  the  movement,  Colonel  Fuentes  and 
Sefior  Blanlot-Halley,  were  received  by  Mr.  Egan  at  the 
American  legation,  and  safe-conduct  was  requested  for 
them."  Mr.  Gresham,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State, 
after  learning  that  the  men  were  wanted  for  "  murder  and 
robbery,"  and  that  a  regular  trial  would  be  afforded  them, 
notified  Mr.  Egan  that  he  had  no  authority  to  protect 
Chileans  against  police  officers  who  were  boimd  to  arrest 
them  for  violation  of  the  laws  of  their  country,  and  in- 
structed him  to  cease  harboring  them  if  they  were  demanded 
by  the  Chilean  governmjent  on  a  criminal  charge.^  On 
April  18.  1893,  •'^'*-  Gresham  instructed  that  the  criminals  be 
ordered  to  leave  the  legation.*  Mr.  Cleveland  in  his  annual 
message,  December  4,  1893,  completely  disavowed  the  act 
of  Mr.  Egan  as  unauthorized  by  the  government,  not 
sanctioned  by  international  precedent,  and  provocative  of 
strife  and  sedition,  adding  that  "  under  no  circumstances; 
can  the  representatives  of  this  government  be  permitted, 
under  the  ill-defined  fiction  of  extraterritoriality,  to  inter- 
rupt the  administration  of  criminal  justice  in  the  countries 
to  which  they  are  accredited."  ® 

^  Foreign  Relations,  p.  195. 
2  Ibid.,  1893,  pp.  217,  218. 
^Ibid.,  pp.  219,  220. 
*Ibid.,  p.  221. 
5  Ibid.,  1893,  p.  iv. 


415]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  129 

The  attempted  interventicm  by  Mr.  Blaine,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  in  the  Chile-Peruvian  war  in  1881,  and  the  subse- 
quent reversion  to  the  poHcy  of  non-intervention  by  his  suc- 
cessor, Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  exemplify  in  a  striking  way 
how  deeply  intrenched  the  policy  of  non-intervention  had 
become.  The  dispute  between  Chile  and  Peru  related  to 
territorial  rights  over  the  seaboard  of  Atacama,  which  led 
to  the  Chile-Bolivian  conflict  of  1879,  and  to  the  subsequent 
entry  of  Peru  into  the  conflict.  This  comparatively  insig- 
nificant region  became  famous  in  1841  because  of  the  dis- 
covery of  vast  guano  deposits.  While  Chilean  jurisdic- 
tion had  been  generally  recognized,  Bolivian  claims  of 
jurisdiction  extending  southward  to  the  Salado  river 
formed  a  serious  complication.  Chile's  strong  denial  of 
the  Bolivian  claims  threatened  war,  but  Spanish  aggressions 
on  the  west  coast  of  South  America  stayed  the  immediate 
drift  towards  hostilities.  The  treaties  of  1866  and  1874 
between  Chile  and  Bolivia  were  aimed  at  an  amicable  set- 
tlement. The  secret  compact  between  Peru  and  Bolivia, 
made  in  1873.  further  complicated  the  situation.  Diplo- 
matic relations  between  Chile  and  Bolivia  were  broken  off 
on  February  10,  1879.  and  hostilities  commenced  four  days 
later.     On  April  5,  1879,  Chile  declared  war  against  Peru. 

Secretary  of  State  Evarts  refused  in  1879  to  join  with 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  mediation  between  Chile  and 
Peru,  on  the  ground  that  single  or  collective  mediation 
would  at  the  time  carry  the  impression  of  dictation  or 
coercion  in  disparagement  of  belligerent  rights.^  No  ob- 
jection was  made  to  efforts  to  restore  peace  wherever  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  might  be  usefully  proffered ; 
but  it  was  intimated  that  no  premature  efforts  nor  any 
effort  in  combination  with  other  neutral  powers  would  be 
made.     In  the  same  year  Mr.   Pettis,  American  Minister 

'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  34. 


130         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [416 

to  Bolivia,  visited  Lima  and  Santiago  in  order  personally 
to  acquaint  each  of  the  three  governments  w^ith  the  attitude 
of  the  others  concerning  peace/  The  Department  of  State 
criticised  his  action  as  rash  and  unauthorized.  The  Chilean 
press  had  represented  that  Mr.  Pettis  had  indicated  a  pur- 
pose on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
to  end  the  war  by  inten^-ention  or  arbitration  on  terms  pro- 
posed by  itself,  but  these  statements  were  dismissed  by  the 
Department  of  State  as  the  false  utterances  of  a  hostile 
press. 

Secretary  of  State  Blaine,  on  June  15,  1881,  instructed 
Mr.  Hurlbut,  American  Minister  to  Peru,  in  the  event  that 
the  Chilean  authorities  were  willing  to  allow  the  establish- 
ment of  the  provisional  government  set  up  by  Senor 
Calderon,  to  encourage  the  Peruvians  to  accept  any  reason- 
able conditions  to  make  this  result  possible,  and  to  im- 
press upon  the  Chileans  the  desirability  of  a  liberal  policy.^ 
The  United  States  believed  that  Peru  should  make  peace, 
even  if  loss  of  territory  were  demanded;  and  the  weight  of 
American  influence  with  Chile  would  be  used  to  make  the 
cession  of  territory  a  subject  of  negotiation,  and  not  a 
condition  precedent  to  negotiations.  The  objects  of  the 
provisional  Peruvian  government,  thought  Mr.  Blaine,  were 
to  establish  a  constitutional  government  and  to  open  nego- 
tiations for  peace  without  the  imposition  of  preliminary 
conditions  on  either  side.  Chilean  rights  as  a  result  of 
success  in  war  were  recognized,  and  it  was  admitted  that 
cession  of  territory  by  Peru  might  necessarily  follow  as  a 
price  of  peace.  Mr.  Hurlbut  was  expressly  warned  that 
the  time  for  friendly  intervention  had  not  arrived. 

The  course  of  Mr,  Hurlbut,  giving  the  impression  that 
the  United   States  would  interfere  actively   in   the   South 

'Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  35. 
^Foreign  Relations,  1881,  p.  914, 


417]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  131 

American  conflict,  led  Mr.  Blaine  to  reprimand  him  for 
acting  beyond  the  scope  of  his  instructions.  Especially  did 
Mr.  Blaine  disavow  the  statement  that  the  United  States 
would  regard  with  disfavor  any  amiexation  by  Chile  of 
Peruvian  territory  by  right  of  conquest.^  Mr.  Hurlbut  was 
expected,  complained  Mr.  Blaine,  not  so  much  to  protest 
against  possible  annexation  as  to  induce  in  a  friendly  man- 
ner the  Chilean  authorities  to  allow  the  Peruvian  author- 
ities to  attempt  the  satisfaction  of  Chilean  rights  and  in- 
terests without  enforced  annexation  as  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  negotiation.  He  also  disapproved  of  the  im- 
pression given  as  to  the  American  attitude  tOAvard  die 
Calderon  government ;  of  the  suggestion  that  the  Argentine 
government  send  a  minister  to  Peru;  and  of  Hurlbut'si 
efforts  to  secure  a  naval  station  from  Peru  for  the  United 
States.  It  was  added  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  did  not  understand  the  suppression  of  the  Calderon 
government  by  Chile  and  the  arrest  of  President  Calderon. 
These  circumstances,  it  was  thought,  justified  the  sending 
of  a  special  mission  to  deal  with  the  situation.  On  Novem- 
ber 30,  1 88 1,  Mr.  William  Henry  Trescot  was  commis- 
sioned as  special  envoy  to  Chile,  Peru  and  Bolivia,  to  deal 
with  the  difficulties  existing  between  the  three  republics." 
The  Third  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Walker  Blaine, 
was  directed  to  accompany  him.  All  matters  relating  to 
the  dispute  were  to  be  referred  to  him  instead  of  to  the 
American  ministers.  The  Calderon  government  had  been 
recognized  under  the  discretionary  authority  given  to  Mr. 
Christiancy,  and  that  government  had  been  authorized  to 
make  a  treaty  of  peace  without  the  cession  of  territory.' 
The  Chilean  authorities   forbade  the  exercise  of  govern- 

^  Foreign  Relations,  1881,  p.  949. 

^Ibid.,  p.    142. 

'Ibid.,  pp.  144,  14s,  146. 


132         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [418 

mental  fuiictions  by  the  Calderon  government  in  territory 
held  by  Chile/  Later  Calderon  was  arrested  and  his  govern- 
mient  extinguished.  Mr.  Blaine  instructed  that  if  this  was 
done  in  resentment  of  the  continued  recognition  of  the 
Calderon  government  by  the  United  States,  Chile  should  be 
informed  that  it  was  regarded  as  sufficient  cause  to  break 
ofif  diplomatic  relations.^  Should  Chile  persist  in  destroy- 
ing Peruvian  nationality  and  absorbing  an  independent 
state,  the  United  States  would  appeal  to  the  other  American 
republics  in  order  to  determine  what  steps  would  be  taken  to 
prevent  the  consummation  of  the  Chilean  designs.^  The 
objects  of  the  United  States  were  declared  to  be  the  pre- 
vention of  further  bloodshed  and  the  recognition  by  Chile 
of  the  respect  due  to  the  United  States  in  its  attempts  at 
friendly  interposition,  which  sprang  from  its  disinterested 
purpose,  legitimate  influence  and  established  position.  In 
case  of  continued  Chilean  opposition  to  the  friendly  inter- 
position of  other  powers,  Mr.  Trescot  was  instructed 
strongly  to  represent  to  that  government  "  the  disappoint- 
ment and  dissatisfaction  felt  by  the  United  States  at  such 
a  deplorable  policy."  There  was  no'  intent  to  interfere 
with  Chile's  rights  as  military  conqueror,  nor  was  there 
any  desire  to  prejudice  her  plans  for  future  security.  How- 
ever. Mr.  Blaine  declared : 

We  cannot  regard  with  unconcern  the  destruction  of  Peru- 
vian nationality.  If  our  good  offices  are  rejected,  and  this 
policy  of  the  absorption  of  an  independent  state  be  persisted  in, 
this  government  will  consider  itself  discharged  from  any  further 
obligation  to  be  influenced  in  its  action  by  the  position  which 
Chile  has  assumed,  and  will  hold  itself  free  to  appeal  to  the 

^Foreign  Relations,  1881,  p.  146. 
'Ibid.,  p.  146. 
'Ibid.,  1881,  p.  148. 


419]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  1 33 

Other  republics  of  this  continent  to  join  it  in  an  effort  to  avert 
consequences  which  cannot  be  confined  to  Chile  and  Peru,  but 
which  threaten  with  extremest  danger  the  political  institutions, 
the  peaceful  progress,  and  the  liberal  civilization  of  all  America. 

Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen  reversed  the  policy  of 
Mr.  Blaine  and  revoked  the  instructions  to  Mr.  Tnescot 
threatening  intervention.  The  President,  Air.  Frelinghuy- 
sen said,  held  that  he  had  no  right  to  dictate  terms  of  peace 
to  independent  republics,  as  a  policy  of  dictation,  even  to 
prevent  war,  would  cause  taxation  for  the  benefit  of  foreign 
nations  to  maintain  an  army  and  navy.^  Mr.  Trescot  was 
informed  that  the  policy  expressed  in  Washington's  fare- 
well address  would  control  the  conduct  of  the  United  States 
with  the  South  American  republics.  He  was  directed  not 
to  visit  the  Atlantic  republics  of  South  America  after  leav- 
ing Chile.  The  President  would  hereafter  reserve  to  him- 
self the  question  of  entering  into  consultations  to  promote 
peace  with  certain  friendly  nationalities  without  extending* 
it  to  others,  for  "  if  such  partial  confidence  would  create 
jealousy  and  ill-will,  peace,  the  object  sought  by  such  con- 
sultation, would  not  be  promoted."  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  also 
indefinitely  postponed  a  conference  of  the  American  nations 
on  international  arbitration,  for  which  invitations  had.  at 
the  instance  of  Mr.  Blaine,  been  issued. 

American  representatives  in  South  America  were,  how- 
ever, directed  to  aid  the  powers  at  war  in  a  friendly  way 
Jo  agree  on  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  the  minister  to  Chile  was 
instructed  to  make  certain  suggestions  to  the  Chilean 
government  in  relation  to  terms."  Meanwhile,  the  terms  of 
peace  which  Chile  had  demanded  and  which  the  Calderon 
government   had   refused,   were   accepted   by   the   Iglesias 

^Foreign  Relations,  1882,  p.  57. 
^Foreign  Relations,  1883,  p.  709. 


134         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [420 

government.  They  were  more  severe  than  the  terms  sug- 
gested by  the  United  States ;  but  in  spite  of  this  fact,  as 
well  as  of  the  fact  that  they  were  accepted  on  the  part  of 
Peru  by  a  government  other  than  that  which  the  United 
States  had  recognized,  the  United  States  would  not  obstruct 
the  way  to  peace.  The  United  States  made  representa- 
tions, however,  in  regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  guano 
deposits,  because  of  the  interests  of  American  creditors.^ 
On  November  15,  1883,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  writing  to  Mr. 
Phelps,  again  disclaimed  any  desire  to  interfere  with  Peru's 
right  to  settle  its  affairs  in  its  cm-^n  way."  With  the  Peru- 
vian people,  the  United  States  maintained  relations  of 
friendship  and  sympathy.  With  the  administration  at  the 
time  assuming  control  of  the  government,  the  United  States 
had  little  concern,  and  American  action  would  be  con- 
ditioned by  the  action  of  the  Peruvian  assembly  in  its  own 
choice  of  governments  and  its  own  ratifications  of  terms  of 
peace. 

A  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  between  Chile  and  Peru  on 
October  20.  1883,  and  a  truce  was  signed  between  Chile 
and  Bolivia  on  April  4  of  the  following  year.  Peru  ceded 
to  Chile  the  rich  nitrate  province  of  Tarapaca,  and  agreed 
to  the  occupation  by  Chile  of  the  provinces  of  Tacna  and 
Arica  for  a  period  of  ten  years,  after  the  expiration  of 
which  a  plebiscite  was  to  be  held,  to  determine  whether 
Peruvian  or  Chilean  nationality  would  prevail.  The 
country  favored  by  the  plebiscite  was  to  pay  to  the  other 
ten  million  dollars  in  Chilean  silver.  The  plebiscite  has  not 
taken  place,  and  the  failure  to  hold  it  has  continued  to  be  a 
subject  of  controversy  between  these  countries  till  the  pres- 
ent time.  Peru  emerged  from  the  war  financially  crippled, 
both  in  public  revenues  and  in  private  resources.     Bolivia 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1883,  p.  711. 
*Ibid.,  1883,  p.  729. 


421  ]  THE  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POLICY  135 

lost  all  her  seacoast  and  became  an  exclusively  interior 
state.  Chile  gained  primacy  among  the  republics  of  the 
west  coast  of  South  America.  Had  the  intervention  of 
Mr.  Blaine  been  successful,  the  failure  of  which  he  at- 
tributed to  President  Arthur's  refusal  to  give  it  his  con- 
tinued support,  although  previously  pledged,  the  termina- 
tion of  the  war  would  have  been  radically  different.  A 
policy  of  determined  intervention  in  a  conflict  between 
three  South  American  republics  was  displaced  by  a  policy 
of  careful  reserve  and  abundant  caution,  even  in  the 
clearest  cases  of  friendly  representation. 

In  discussing  the  extension  of  the  policy  of  non-inter- 
vention, as  originally  applied  to  Europe,  to  the  entire 
system  of  American  States,  I  have  attempted,  by  an  ex- 
amination of  actual  cases,  to  point  out  the  direction  which 
the  development  of  the  policy  has  taken.  In  the  light  of 
what  has  thus  been  disclosed,  it  appears  that  the  policy  has 
been  understood  to  preclude  the  United  States  from  inter- 
vening in  the  internal  politics  of  American  states,  and  to 
preclude  European  states  from  intervening  in  the  western 
hemisphere  either  to  gain  territory,  or  to  change  the  political 
system  or  control  the  destiny  of  American  nations.  The 
practice  of  a  policy  is  more  significant  than  its  enuncia- 
tion. We  have  seen  that  in  several  instances  American 
States  have  requested  the  intervention  of  the  United  States 
in  their  controversies  with  other  powers,  and  that  the 
United  States  has  consistently  held  that  its  intervention 
could  not  be  demanded  as  of  right.  It  also  became  settled 
that  the  United  States  would  forcibly  resist  territorial  ag- 
gression, the  imposition  of  foreign  political  systems,  or  the 
extension  of  political  control  by  non-American  governments 
in  the  western  hemisphere,  as  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the 
French  intervention  in  Mexico  and  the  Venezuela  boundary 
dispute.     The  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  to 


136         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [422 

protect  the  rights  and  safety  of  its  citizens  stands  apart 
from  the  principle  of  non-intervention  as  a  general  right,  to 
be  exercised  in  Latin-America  as  well  as  elsewhere.  On 
certain  occasions,  when  the  United  States  seemed  to  de- 
part from  its  policy  of  non-intervention,  its  action  was  later 
reversed  or  the  act  of  the  intervening  official  was  disavowed. 
The  Chile-Peruvian  war  and  the  Egan  asylum  case  were 
exaanples.  Again  and  again  the  United  States  had  re- 
fused to  take  part  in  joint  representations  to  Latin-Ameri- 
can states.  The  zealous  desire  to  protect  American  rights 
has  sometimes  led  to  excessive  claims,  such  as  that  of 
Admiral  Benham  regarding  contraband  in  the  Brazilian 
naval  revolt.  But  the  mere  enunciation  of  a  position  does 
-not  suffice  to  establish  it.  This  was  so  even  with  Presi- 
dent Monroe's  famous  declaration  of  1823;  and  it  must  be 
so  with  recent  proposals,  such  as  that  of  President  Wilson, 
to  extend  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  world.  The  effect 
of  such  proposals  must  await  the  test  of  history.  The  cases 
examined  abundantly  establish  the  principle  of  non-in- 
tervention as  a  definite  policy. 


PART  II 

DEPARTURES  FROM  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF 

NON-INTERVENTION  BY  THE 

UNITED  STATES 


CHAPTER  III 

Intervention  in  Cuba 

The  most  striking  departure  from  the  x\merican  policy 
of  non-intervention  in  relation  to  x\merican  states  and  ter- 
ritory was  the  Cuban  intervention.  The  importance  of 
Cuba  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  has  been  realized 
from  the  beginning.  The  desire  to  secure  the  island  as  a 
part  of  the  United  States,  in  case  it  should  pass  from 
Spanish  control,  was  shown  in  the  attitude  of  American 
statesmen  in  early  timies.  Jefiferson  advocated  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Cuba  by  peaceful  means. ^  The  Jefferson  Cabinet 
on  October  22,  1808,  unanimously  agreed  that  while  the 
United  States  would  be  content  that  the  island  should  con- 
tinue under  Spanish  rule,  French  or  British  rule  would  be 
frowned  upon"  In  1822  a  rumor  prevailed  that  Great 
Britain  was  secretly  negotiating  with  Spain  for  the  cession 
of  the  island.^  This  Canning  denied.  War  between 
France  and  Spain  led  John  Ouincy  Adams,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  to  declare  that  the  ultimate  annexation  of  Cuba  was 
essential  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  although  at  the 
time  inopportune.*  The  United  States,  he  said,  was  un- 
alterably opposed  to  French  or  British  encroachments.  Mr. 
Randall  was  commissioned  special  agent  to  Cuba  to  report 
on  political  conditions  and  to  observe  the  objects  and  move- 

^Ford,  Jefferson's  Writings,  vol.  x,  pp.  159,  257-258,  278. 
^Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  334- 

'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  voL  vi,  pp.  379-380. 
*44  Br.  and  Fr.  Slate  Papers,  p.  138. 

425I  139 


I40         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [426 

meiits  of  foreign  agents  there.^  Henry  Clay,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  directed  the  American  ministers  to  Spain,  France 
and  Great  Britain  to  inform  the  governments  of  those 
countries  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  United  States  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  transfer  of  Cuba  to  any  other  power.^ 
Mexico  and  Colormbia,  seeking  to  aid  Cuban  independence, 
planned  expeditions  for  that  purpose.  Colombia  complied 
with  Clay's  request  to  suspend  operations  until  the  Con- 
gress of  Panama  could  be  consulted,  but  Mexico  refused 
unreserved  acceptance  of  the  suggestion.^ 

Opposition  to  apprehended  European  intervention  in 
Cuba  was  the  central  theme  of  our  early  Cuban  relations. 
In  refusing,  in  1825,  a  proposal  of  Canning  that  the  United 
States  join  France  and  Great  Britain  in  disclaiming  any  in- 
tention to  occupy  Cuba,  Clay  gave  as  a  reason  that  Spain, 
thinking  her  colonies  safe,  might  prolong  the  colonial  wars 
in  America,  and  that  American  policy  was  opposed  to  such 
action."*  The  French  government  rejected  a  similar  pro- 
posal from  Great  Britain.  The  supposed  danger  that  Spain 
might  cede  or  lose  Cuba  to  some  European  power  caused 
Secretary  of  State  Van  Buren  in  1829  to  argue  for  continued 
Spanish  control.  Cuban  subjection  to  a  state  of  South 
America,  he  thought,  would  lead  to  European  control,  and 
the  emancipation  of  slaves  in  Cuba  would  prejudice  the 
interests  of  the  slave-holders  of  the  South.^  Confidential 
reports  to  the  Department  of  State  from  what  was  supposed 
to  be  a  trustworthy  source  indicated  the  existence  on  the 
part  of  the  British  ministry  and  certain  abolition  societies  of 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  384. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  p.  447;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  vol.  v,  pp.  855-856; 
//  Gallatin's  Writings,  p.  346. 

3  44  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  44;  ^6  ibid.,  p.  1152. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  457. 
^26  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  pp.  1149-1151. 


427]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  141 

a  purpose  to  effect  a  union  between  the  Creoles  and  negroes 
of  the  island,  and  to  set  up  a  negro  military  republic  under 
British  protection/  Daniel  Webster,  who  was  then  Secre- 
tary of  State,  thought  that  this  would  be  a  death-blow  to 
slavery  in  the  United  States,  and  would  constitute  a  serious 
menace  to  American  commerce.  '*  It  is  quite  obvious,"  he 
stated,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Campbell,  the  American  consul  at 
Havana,  "  that  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  England  to  em- 
ploy a  force  in  Cuba  for  any  purpose  would  bring  on  a] 
war,  involving  possibly  all  Europe  as  well  as  the  United 
States."  ' 

In  1852  the  ministers  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  at 
Washington,  invited  the  United  States  to  join  their  govern- 
mient  in  the  conclusion  of  a  tripartite  convention,  the  sub- 
stance of  which  was  contained  in  the  following  article : 

The  high  contracting  parties  hereby,  severally  and  collec- 
tively, disclaim,  now  and  for  hereafter,  all  intention  to  obtain 
possession  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  they  respectively  bind 
themselves  to  discountenance  all  attempts  to  that  effect  on  the 
part  of  any  power  or  individuals  whatsoever. 

The  high  contracting  parties  declare  severally  and  collec- 
tively, that  they  will  not  obtain  or  maintain  for  themselves,  any 
exclusive  control  over  the  said  island,  nor  assume  nor  exercise 
any  dominion  over  the  same.^ 

This  proposal  was  declined.  The  response  of  the 
United  States  was  made  by  Edward  Everett,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  in  identic  notes  addressed  to  the  British  and  French 
ministers  at  Washington  on  December  i,  1852.  In  these 
notes,  which  attracted  wide  attention,  the  Cuban  question 
was   comprehensively   reviewed;   and   the  conclusion   was 

1  44  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  174. 

^44  ibid.,  p.  176. 

^S.  Ex.  Doc.  13,  32  Cong.  2  Sess.,  p.  15. 


142         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [428 

reached  that  the  United  States,  although  it  entertained  no 
designs  on  the  island,  could  not  be  expected  and  could  not 
properly  be  asked  to  agree  not  to  acquire  it  under  any  future 
conditions/ 

Only  five  years  before  Mr.  Everett's  note  was  v^^ritten, 
President  Polk  had  made  a  serious  effort  to  bring  about  the 
annexation  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States.  Among  the 
reasons  by  which  he  supported  his  action  was  the  fear  that 
Great  Britain  would  eventually  seize  the  island,  and  thus  have 
the  coastwide  trade  of  the  United  States  at  her  mercy.  He 
authorized  the  offer  of  a  maximum  of  a  hundred  million 
dollars  for  the  cession."  The  Spanish  government  would 
not  listen  to  the  proposal,  the  minister  of  the  United 
States  at  Madrid  reporting  that  "  sooner  than  see  the  island 
transferred  to  any  pozver,  they  would  prefer  seeing  it  sink 
in  the  ocean."  ^ 

In  the  celebrated  "  Ostend  Manifesto  "  of  1854,  the  an- 
nexation of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  was  openly  and 
strongly  advocated.  This  document  was  signed  by  James 
Buchanan,  John  Y.  Mason  and  Pierre  Soule,  ministers  re- 
spectively to  Great  Britain,  France  and  Spain,  who  had 
been  instructed  to  meet  at  some  convenient  point  in  Europe 
to  confer  and  report  upon  the  Cuban  question.  They 
strongly  recommended  the  purchase  of  the  island,  and, 
in  case  Spain  should  persist  in  refusing  to  sell,  intimated 
that  the  United  States  would  be  justified  in  acting  upon  the 
principle  of  self-preservation,  especially  if  conditions  should 
develop,  as  regards  the  slave  population,  that  would  en- 
danger the  peace  and  tranquility  of  the  states  of  the  United 
States  in  which  slavery  existed.     Should  such  conditions 

15".  Ex.  Doc.  13,  32  Cong.  2  Sess.,  pp.  17,  22-23;  Moore,  Digest  of 
International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  460. 
*if.  Ex.  Doc.  121,  32  Cong.  1  Sess.,  p.  49. 
^Ihid.,  p.  59. 


429]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  1 43 

supervene,  and  Spain  still  remain  obdurate  to  offers  of 
purchase,  the  question  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  signers 
of  the  "  manifesto,"  then  arise  as  to  whether  further  action 
was  not  imperative;  and  in  this  relation  they  significantly 
declared : 

Should  this  question  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  then,  by 
every  law,  human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified  in  wresting 
it  from  Spain  if  we  possess  the  power ;  and  this  upon  the  very 
same  principle  that  would  justify  an  individual  in  tearing  down 
the  burning  house  of  his  neighbor  if  there  were  no  other  means 
of  preventing  the  flames  from  destroying  his  own  home. 

The  Ostend  Manifesto  became  a  political  issue,  in  con- 
nection with  the  contest  over  slavery;  but  condemnation  of 
dt  was  not  confined  to  the  members  of  any  one  political 
party.  There  were  leading  Democrats  who  requdiated  its 
recommendations.  Naturally,  the  Republican  platform  of 
1856  denounced  it,  declaring  "  that  the  highwayman's  plea 
that  might  makes  right  embodied  in  the  Ostend  circular 
....  would  bring  shame  and  dishonor  upon  any  govern- 
ment or  people  that  gave  it  their  sanction."  ^  The  Demo- 
cratic Secretary  of  State,  William  M.  Marcy,  in  a  letter  to 
Soule,  remarked  that  doubtless  "  it  was  not  extended  by 
yourself  and  your  colleagues  to  offer  to  Spain  the  alterna- 
tive of  cession  or  seizure."  ^  Marcy,  while  expressing  the 
opinion  that  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  would  be  advantage- 
ous as  "  a  precautionary  measure  of  security,"  stated  that 
he  did  not  regard  existing  conditions  as  imperiling  the  ex- 
istence of  the  government.  "  But,"  he  added,  "  should  the 
contingency  suggested  in  your  report  ever  arise  there  is 
no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  case  will  be  promptly  met  by 
the  deliberate  judgment  and  decisive  action  of  the  Ameri- 
can people."  ^ 

^  Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  p.  272. 
'H.  Ex.  Doc.  93,  33  Cong.  2  Sess.,  p.  135. 
'Ibid.,  p.  136. 


I^         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [430 

During  the  years  1 868-1 878,  the  civil  strife,  commonly 
known  as  the  "  Ten  Years'  War,"  kept  the  Cuban  question 
before  the  American  people,  and  gave  rise  to  many  per- 
plexing problems.  President  Grant,  in  his  annual  message 
to  Congress,  December  6,  1869,  said  that  the  United  States 
would  refrain  from  enforcing  its  views  upon  unwilling 
nations  and  from  exercising  an  interested  part  without  in- 
vitation in  the  quarrels  of  other  states,  whether  between 
nation  and  nation  or  between  government  and  subjects/  The 
Cuban  struggle,  he  declared,  had  not  reached  a  state  of  actual 
war,  nor  had  the  insurgents  demonstrated  their  capacity  for 
recognition  as  belligerents.  Spain  had  accepted  a  tender  of 
the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  only  on  terms  unfair 
to  Cuba,  and  the  offer  was  withdrawn.  Later,  in  a  special 
message  to  Congress,  the  President  reviewed  the  progress 
of  the  disorderly  system  of  warfare  prevailing  in  the  is- 
land, the  chief  results  of  which  were  devastation  and 
wanton  destruction.  The  law  of  nations  was  violated  by 
both  parties.  No  responsible  de  facto  government  existed 
on  the  island,  nor  had  Spain  quelled  the  revolt  or  protected 
the  rights  and  interests  of  foreign  nations  and  their  citi- 
zens. Similar  complaints,  together  with  discussions  of  the 
question  of  declaring  neutrality  and  according  to  the  in- 
surgents belligerent  rights,  may  be  found  in  the  annual 
message  of  1870,  as  well  as  in  subsequent  communications 
to  Congress.  Vigorous  protests  were  made  to  Spain 
against  her  conduct  in  numerous  matters."  The  termina- 
tion of  the  conflict,  together  with  the  abolition  of  slavery 
and  the  granting  of  autonomy  to  the  islands,  was  urged.* 
The  president  regarded  ".  .  .  .  independence,  and  emanci- 

*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vii,  p.  31. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  vii,  pp.  64,  97,  147. 

^Foreign  Relations,  1871,  p.  733;  1872,  p.  580;  1873,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1032- 
1033 ;  1874,  p.  859. 


43 1  ]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  1 45 

pation,  of  course,  as  the  oaily  certain  and  evien  necessary, 
solution  of  the  question  of  Cuba.  And,  in  his  mind,  all 
incidental  questions  are  quite  subordinate  to  those,  the 
larger  interests  of  the  United  States  in  this  respect."  ^ 

September  26,  1872,  a  circular  was  issued  by  Sehor  Jil 
Colunje,  Colombian  secretary  of  interior  and  foreign  rela- 
tions, to  the  American  governments  relative  to  the  situation 
in  Cuba.  The  length  of  the  contest,  the  hopelessness  of 
peace,  the  devastation  and  ruin  of  the  island  and  the  utter 
disregard  for  law  and  order  rendered  the  situation  so 
serious  that  the  American  nations,  so  the  circular  declared, 
could  not  longer  remain  unconcerned."  Cuban  rights 
should  be  respected.  Cuba  as  an  independent  nation  would 
mean  the  disappearance  of  slavery.  Colombia  also  pro- 
posed that  the  governments  of  Spanish  America  and  the 
United  States  act  jointly  to  obtain  from  Spain  the  recogni- 
tion of  Cuban  independence.  In  case  the  expenses  of  the 
war  caused  Spain  to  hesitate,  the  mediating  govenmients 
nuight  agree  to  a  pro  rata  reimbursement,  requiring  none  in 
return,  although  the  resources  of  Cuba  were  ample.  In 
case  mediation  was  accepted,  it  was  proposed  that  confis- 
cation of  property  and  capital  punishment  for  political  of- 
fenses be  discontinued.  In  replying  to  this  circular,  Mr. 
Fish,  speaking  as  Secretary  of  State,  intimated  that  the 
United  States  would  not  enter  upon  the  course  suggested 
by  Colombia,  unless  the  answers  of  the  Spanish  American 
states  to  the  circular  and  the  conditions  prevailing  in  Cuba, 
furnished  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  American  in- 
tervention would  be  successful.^  On  another  occasion  Mr. 
Fish  also  intimated  that,  instead  of  taking  it  for  granted 
that  the  United  States  would  act  upon  the  proposals  con- 

^  Foreign  Relations,  1874,  p.  862. 

*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  70. 

^Ibid.,  vol.  vi,  pp.  70-71. 


146         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [432 

tained  in  the  circular,  it  would  have  been  advisable  to  con- 
sult the  government  beforehand  as  to  whether  it  was  will- 
ing to  assume  the  role  of  arbiter.^ 

On  November  5,  1875,  Mr.  Fish  sent  to  Caleb  Gushing, 
fthen  American  minister  at  Madrid,  a  paper,  known  as  in- 
struction No.  266,  referring  to  the  confiscation  of  estates 
belonging  to  American  citizens,  the  trial  of  Americans  in 
contravention  of  treaty  obligations,  the  case  of  the 
Virginius,  and  finally,  the  general  relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain  as  affected  by  the  situation  in  Cuba.^ 
The  hope  that  an  adjustment  would  be  reached,  based  upon 
emancipation  and  self-government,  had,  he  said,  been  un- 
realized, and  all  efforts  by  Spain  forcibly  to  end  the  strife 
had  failed.  All  suggestions  of  reform  and  offers  of  media- 
tion made  by  the  United  States  had  been  rejected.  Re- 
conciliation was  agreed  to  only  on  terms  making  recon- 
ciliation impossible."  The  Spanish  government  had  in- 
sisted that  no  state  of  war  existed  entitling  the  insurgents 
to  belligerent  rights,  but  demanded  all  the  privileges  of  war 
for  itself.  During  seven  years  of  tremendous  strain  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  to  fulfill  the  most  exacting  de- 
mands any  government  could  make  under  any  doctrine  or 
claim  of  international  obligation  upon  another,  Spain  had 
failed  to  justify  any  hopes  for  pacification,  Mr.  Fish  de- 
clared that  the  United  States  was  therefore  entitled  to  be 
relieved  of  the  strain,  which  could  only  be  done  by  the  ter- 
mination of  the  struggle.  Any  further  reticence,  it  was 
observed,  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  interests  of  both 
governments :  and  in  case  the  war  was  not  terminated, 
Mr.  Fish  stated  that  the  time  was  at  hand  for  "other 
governments  to  intervene,  solely  with  the  view  of  bring- 

'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  70. 
*H.  Ex.  Doc.  90,  44  Cong,  i  Sess.,  p.  7. 
'Ibid.,  p.  8. 


433]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  I47 

ing  to  an  end  a  disastrous  and  destructive  conflict  and  of 
restoring  peace  in  the  islaaid  of  Cuba."  ^ 

In  its  purpose  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  the  United 
States  desired  to  obtain  the  moral  support  of  the  European 
powers.  Instruction  No.  266  was  sent  to  General  Schenck 
to  be  read  to  Lord  Derby  in  order  to  gain  the  influence  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  settlement  of  the  Cuban  question.'  It 
was  likewise  sent  to  the  American  ministers  at  Paris, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna  and  Rome,  with  directious 
to  impart  the  substance  of  it  to  the  ministers  of  foreign 
affairs,  and  to  suggest  that  Spain  be  urged  either  to  termin- 
ate or  to  abandon  the  contest.^  General  Schenck  was 
authorized  to  explain  to  Lord  Derby  that  interv^ention  was 
not  contemplated  as  an  immediate  result,  but  only  as  a  con- 
tingent necessity  in  case  the  contest  was  prolonged  and  ex- 
isting claims  were  not  adjusted.*  In  his  annual  message 
to  Congress,  December  7,  1875,  President  Grant  reviewed 
the  existing  situation  in  Cuba,  saying  that  "  other  nations 
will  be  compelled  to  assume  the  responsibility  which  de- 
volves upon  them,  and  to  seriously  consider  the  only  re- 
maining measures  possible,  mediation  and  intervention."  ^ 
The  President,  while  mentioning  these  as  the  only  alterna- 
tives for  ending  the  strife,  did  not  recommend  any  measure 
of  intervention,  holding  himself  ready  to  do  all  he  could  to 
reach  a  peaceful  solution.*  The  United  States  had  already 
had    many    opportunities    for    interference,    if    such    had 

1  H.  Ex.  Doc.  90,  44  Cong,  i  Sess.,  p.  11. 

^S.  Report  No.  885,  55  Cong.  2  Sess..  pp.  152-153;  •5"-  Doc.  213,  54  Cong. 
I  Sess. 

'//.  Ex.  Doc.  90,  44  Cong,  i  Sess.,  pp.  13-14;  -S".  Report  No.  SS5, 
55  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  pp.  130,  140-141,  mS,  152-153,  i5+  i/i-  i74- 

*  H.  Ex.  Doc.  90,  44  Cong,  i  Sess.,  p.  13. 

^Foreign  Relations,  1875,  vol.  i,  pp.  x-xi. 

« Ibid.,  1875,  vol.  i,  p.  xi. 


148         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [434 

beeii  its  purpose.  But  proposals  from  the  go^vernment 
of  Spain  and  the  immediate  reform  of  the  internal 
administration  of  the  island  checked  any  plans  for  interven- 
tion until  the  practical  result  of  the  proposals  and  measures 
could  be  ascertained. 

The  French  government,  while  professing  to  be  desirous 
of  aiding  in  the  matter,  intimated  that  it  would  have  to 
wait,  because  of  the  internal  conditions  of  Spain ;  but  ex- 
pressed a  willingness  to  cooperate  with  the  United  States  in 
terminating  the  war  when  the  time  should  seem  to  be 
favorable. '^  The  German  government  was  disposed  to  act 
only  in  concert  with  the  other  powers,  but  later  manifested 
a  disinclination  to  do  anything  on  accoimt  of  assurances  re- 
ceived from  Spain."  Great  Britain  refused  to  be  involved 
if  Spain  stood  off  and  declined  interference.*  Lord  Derby 
doubted  if  Spain  would  give  up  the  island  under  any 
circumstances  except  by  force.  Portugal  would  not  make 
any  representation  to  the  Spanish  government."*  Russia 
agreed  to  advise  Spain  regarding  the  termination  of  the 
contest,  but  in  fact  referred  more  directly  to  the  desire  to 
avert  a  conflict  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.^ 
Italy  agreed  to  the  American  proposal.^ 

The  foregoing  correspondence  practically  brings  to  a 
close  the  efforts  during  the  administrations  of  President 
Grant  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the  Cuban  question.  On 
more  than  one  occasion,  and  especially  in  the  case  of  the 
Virgimus.  a  rupture  had  seemed  to  be  imminent.  The 
resources  of  diplomacy  were  severely  taxed;  and  it  was 

^S.  Report  No.  883,  55  Cong.  2  Sess.,  pp.  143-147. 

^Ibid.,  p.  151 ;  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  vi,  p.  lOi. 

*S.  Report  No.  883,  55  Cong.  2  Sess.,  p.  163. 

*Ibid.,  pp.  154,  171-172. 

^Ibid..  pp.  173,  176-179. 

*Ibid.,  p.  169. 


435]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  149 

only  by  the  pursuit  of  a  consistent  policy,  directed  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  that  intervention  was  avoided. 
During  the  year  1876,  public  interest  in  the  United  States 
came  to  be  more  and  more  absorbed  in  domestic  problems. 
The  celebration  of  the  centenary  of  American  inde[)€n- 
dence,  the  presidential  campaign,  and  disturbed  political 
conditions  in  some  of  the  southern  states,  followed  by  the 
contest  over  the  results  of  the  presidential  election,  all  united 
to  cause  a  withdrawal  of  public  attention  from  foreign 
affairs.  Moreover,  the  continued  operation  of  the  Mixed 
Commission  under  the  agreement  of  February  12,  1871, 
by  which  the  settlement  of  claims  growing  out  of  the  Cuban 
insurrection  was  gradually  effected,  exerted  a  tranquilizing 
influence  on  relations  with  Spain.  The  insurrection  con- 
tinued to  drag  on,  but  less  notice  was  taken  of  it  than  be- 
fore. President  Hayes,  in  his  first  annual  message  of  De- 
cember 3,  1877,  adverted  to  the  strife  in  Cuba  as  being 
still  in  progress,  but  he  adhered  to  the  policy  of  non-inter- 
vention.^ In  the  following  year  the  struggle  was  formally 
brought  to  an  end  by  the  so-called  peace  of  Zanjon. 

The  insurrection  that  broke  out  in  Cuba  in  February, 
1895  spread  rapidly,  and  was  characterized  by  active  fight- 
ing. The  revolt  quickly  assumed  formidable  proportions. 
The  Spanish  authorities,  in  spite  of  their  command  of  con- 
siderable military  forces,  offered  little  effective  resistance 
to  the  insurgents.  Mr.  Olney.  in  his  communication  to 
Spain,  did  not  suggest  intervention,  but  sought  to  impress 
upon  the  government  the  importance  of  ameliorating  con- 
ditions in  the  island  and  bringing  to  an  end  the  destruction 
and  devastation  that  were  in  progress."  Spain,  on  the  other 
hand,  sought  to  minimize  the  causes  of  complaint,  and  to 
emphasize  alleged  violations   of   neutrality   in   the   United 

^Foreign  Relations,  1877,  p.  xii. 
^Foreign  Relations,  1897,  p.  542. 


I^O         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [436 

States.  In  a  comprehensive  report  to  the  President,  Mr. 
Olney  reviewed  the  relative  positions  of  the  contending 
parties,  commenting  upon  the  inabihty  of  Spain  either  to 
make  her  rule  effective  or  to  afford  redress  for  injuries, 
as  w^ell  as  upon  the  gradual  impoverishment  of  the  island.^ 
President  Cleveland,  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  De- 
cember 7,  1896.  adopted  a  conciliatory  attitude.-'  He  dis- 
cussed the  different  solutions  suggested,  and  advised  against 
intervention  on  the  ground  that  the  United  States  had  a 
character  to  maintain,  with  right  and  not  might  as  its  rule 
of  conduct.  Conscious,  however,  of  the  dangers  that 
lurked  in  the  futile  continuance  cf  the  struggle,  he  sounded 
a  note  of  warning,  saying: 

When  the  inability  of  Spain  to  deal  successfully  with  the  in- 
surrection has  become  manifest,  and  it  is  demonstrated  that 
her  sovereignty  is  extinct  in  Cuba  for  all  purposes  of  its  right- 
ful existence,  and  when  a  hopeless  struggle  for  its  reestablish- 
ment  has  degenerated  into  a  strife  which  means  nothing  more 
than  the  useless  sacrifice  of  human  life  and  the  utter  destruc- 
tion of  the  very  subject-matter  of  the  conflict,  a  situation  will 
be  presented  in  which  our  obligations  to  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  will  be  superseded  by  higher  obligations,  which  we  can 
hardly  hesitate  to  recognize  and  discharge. 

The  change  of  administration  in  the  United  States  in 
1897  was  not  attended  with  any  radical  change  of  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  towards  the  Cuban  question, 
but  there  was  a  growing  popular  feeling  against  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  policy  of  reconcentration  instituted  by  General 
Weyler.  This  sentiment  was  reflected  in  a  protest  addres- 
sed by  Mr.  Sherman,  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  to  the 
Spanish   minister   at   Washington,   on    Jime   28.    1897,    in 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1896,  pp.  xxxi-xxxvii. 
"^Ibid.,  1896,  pp.  xxxi-xxxv. 


437]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  I  5  i 

which  it  was  declared  that  -the  President  conceived  that  he 
had  a  right  to  demand  that  a  war,  conducted  almost  within 
sight  of  the  United  States  and  grievously  affecting  the  in- 
terests of  its  citizens,  should  "  at  least  be  conducted  ac- 
cording to  the  militar}'  codes  of  civilization."  The  Spanish 
government,  in  its  reply,  maintained  that  great  progress  had 
been  made  in  subduing  the  insurrection,  and,  while  denying 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  interfere  in  the  matter, 
again  complained  of  the  support  and  encouragement  which 
the  insurgents  received  from  American  sources. 

President  McKinley,  in  his  annual  message  of  December 
6,  1897,  reviewed  the  Cuban  problem  at  much  length.  His 
attitude  towards  Spain  was  altogether  friendly,  but  he 
stated  that  the  existing  conditions  were  such  as  to  cause  the 
gravest  apprehension.  The  offer  of  the  friendly  offices  of 
the  United  States,  made  by  his  predecessor  in  April  1896. 
had,  he  said,  altogether  failed,  the  answer  of  Spain  in  sub- 
stance being  that  the  pacification  of  the  island  must  begin 
with  the  submission  of  the  rebels  to  the  mother  countr^^ 
He  described  the  "  cruel  policy  of  concentration  "  initiated 
in  1896  as  a  measure  of  "  exterm'ination."  and  adverted  to 
the  demand  which  he  had  made  after  his  inauguration  as 
President  for  the  release  or  speedy  trial  of  all  American 
citizens  who  were  under  arrest  in  Cuba.  This  demand  had 
resulted  in  the  release  of  upwards  of  twenty  prisoners  who 
were  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  new  Minister  to 
Spain,  General  Woodford,  had,  said  President  McKinley, 
been  instructed  to  assure  Spain  of  the  sincere  wish  of  the 
United  States  to  lend  its  aid  toward  the  ending  of  the 
struggle  by  a  solutioii  which  should  l^e  just  and  honorable 
alike  to  Spain  and  to  the  Cuban  people.  Between  the  de- 
parture of  General  Woodford  from  the  United  States  and 
his  arrival  in  Spain,  Sehor  Canovas,  the  head  of  the  Spanish 
cabinet,  had  fallen  by  the  hands  of  an  assassin  and  a  new 


1^2         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [438 

administration  had  been  installed  under  the  leadership  of 
Senor  Sagasta.  It  had  fallen  to  the  latter  to  answer 
General  Woodford's  representations,  and  the  answer  was, 
said  President  McKinley,  in  the  direction  of  a  better  under- 
standing. Sefior  Sagasta  had  stated  that  Spain  had  de- 
cided to  put  into  effect  the  political  reforms  which  he  had 
previously  advocated  for  the  purpose  of  giving  Cuba 
autonomy  while  guarding  Spanish  sovereignty.  After 
thus  rehearsing  the  negotiations,  President  McKinley 
stated  that  of  the  untried  measures  there  remained  only 
"recognition  of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents;  recogni- 
tion of  the  independence  of  Cuba;  neutral  intervention  to* 
end  the  war  by  imposing  a  rational  compromise  between 
the  contestants,  and  intervention  in  favor  of  one  or  the 
other  party.  I  speak  not,"  declared  President  AIcKinley, 
"  of  forcible  annexation,  for  that  cannot  be  thought  of. 
Thait,  by  our  code  of  morality,  would  be  criminal  aggres- 
sion." President  McKinley  then  discussed  the  question 
of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  and  reached  the  conclu- 
srion  that  it  was  unwise  and  inadmissible.  He  also  op- 
posed intervention,  especially  in  view  of  the  hopeful  change 
that  had  apparently  taken  place  in  the  conduct  of  the 
Spanish  government.  Decrees  looking  to  the  application 
of  the  foreshadowed  reforms  had,  he  said,  already  been 
promulgated,  although  their  full  text  had  not  been  received. 
Moreover,  under  the  appropriation  made  by  Congress  on 
April  4,  1897,  effective  relief  had  been  given  to  distressed 
American  citizens  in  Cuba  and  the  new  Spanish  govern- 
ment had  reversed  the  military  policy  which  had  so  greatly 
shocked  the  sentiment  of  humanity,  having  recalled  the 
commander  under  whose  orders  it  was  initiated,  and  had 
set  on  foot  measures  to  relieve  the  horrors  of  starvation. 
No  American  citizen,  so  far  as  the  government  knew,  was 
then  in  arrest  or  confinement  in  Cuba.     The  near  future 


439]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  153 

would,  said  President  McKinley,  demonstrate  whether  the 
indispensable  condition  of  a  righteous  peace  was  likely  to 
be  attained;  and  if  it  should  later  appear  to  be  the  duty  of 
the  United  States  to  intei'vene  by  force,  it  should  be  "  with- 
out fault  on  our  part,  and  only  because  the  necessity  of 
such  action  will  be  so  clear  as  to  command  the  support  and 
approval  of  the  civilized  world." 

The  pursuit  of  the  peaceful  policy  which  President  Mc- 
Kinley had  sought  to  preserve  was  soon  interrupted  by  cer- 
tain extraordinary  incidents  which  produced  a  crisis,  and 
at  last  brought  the  United  States  to  the  point  of  forcible 
intervention.  The  first  of  these  was  the  surreptitious 
publication  of  a  letter  which  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash- 
ington had  addressed  to  a  personal  correspondent  in 
Havana.  This  letter,  besides  describing  the  negotiaticrtis 
then  pending  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  for  a 
commercial  arrangement  in  regard  to  Cuba,  as  a  mere 
diplomatic  expedient  intended  to  gain  time,  contained  an 
analysis  of  the  political  situation  in  the  United  States,  in 
which  opprobious  epithets  were  applied  to  the  President, 
who  was  represented  as  being  a  shifty  politician,  anxious  to 
keep  on  good  terms  with  those  who  advocated  as  well  as 
with  those  who  opposed  intervention  in  Cuba.  The  fact 
that  this  letter  was  private  detracted  nothing  from  the  pain- 
ful effects  produced  by  its  publication.  Its  author  mani- 
fested his  appreciation  of  the  circumstances  by  cabling  his 
resignation  to  Madrid  before  a  demand  for  his  recall  could 
be  presented.  The  excitement  caused  by  this  incident  had 
by  no  means  died  away  when,  on  February  15,  1898,  the 
sinking  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Maine,  as  the  result  of  an  explosion, 
ocurred  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  with  the  loss  of  two  of 
her  officers  and  two  hundred  and  sixty-four  of  the  crew. 
The  sinking  of  the  ship  was  separately  investigated  by 
American  and  Spanish  naval  commissions,  which  rendered 


1^4         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [440 

Opposite  reports  as  to  the  cause  of  the  explosion.  While 
public  feeling  in  the  United  States  was  deeply  stirred  by 
this  incident,  the  impression  that  Spain  was  unable  to  re- 
store Older  in  Cuba  was  greatly  strengthened  by  a  notable 
speech  made  in  the  Senate  by  Senator  Proctor  of  Vermont, 
who  had  lately  visited  the  island.  Hence,  while  nego- 
tiations to  reach  a  peaceful  solution  were  not  wholly  aban- 
doned, there  was  little  reason  on  either  side  to  believe  or 
to  hope  that  they  would  prove  to  be  successful. 

General  Woodford,  at  Madrid,  continued  earnestly  to 
labor  for  a  practicable  basis  of  settlement  The  Spanish 
Government  offered  to  submit  the  affairs  of  the  Maine  to 
arbitration,  to  revoke  all  orders  of  concentration  and  ac- 
cept assistance  from  the  United  States  in  feeding  and  ex- 
tending succor  to  persons  in  need,  and  to  confide  the  pre- 
parations for  the  pacification  of  the  island  to  an  insular 
parliament.  But,  as  this  parliament  was  not  to  meet  until 
the  4th  of  May,  the  Spanish  government  intimated  that  it 
would  not  find  it  inconvenient  to  accept  at  once  a  suspen- 
sion of  hostilities  if  the  insurgents  should  request  it  from 
the  Spanish  commander-in-chief,  wnth  whom  it  would  rest 
to  determine  the  duration  and  conditions  of  the  suspension. 
On  this  basis  the  Spanish  government  sought  to  secure  de- 
lay in  the  transmission  by  the  President  to  Congress  of  a 
message  which  he  had  prepared  on  the  Cuban  situation. 
Great  impatience  had  already  l>een  manifested  in  Congress 
and  elsewhere  at  the  delays  that  had  taken  place  in  the  sub- 
mission of  the  President's  message.  It  was  at  length  sent 
in  on  April  11,  1898. 

In  this  message,  President  McKinley,  after  reviewing 
historically  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Spain  in 
regard  to  Cuba,  discussed  the  various  expedients  which 
had  been  suggested  as  a  means  of  solving  the  problem 
with  which  he  was  confronted.     Discussing,  first,  the  ques- 


441  ]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  I -5 

tioii  01  recognizing  the  indepaidence  of  the  insurgent 
government  in  Cuba,  he  invoked  as  a  precedent  the  message 
of  President  Jackson  to  Congress  of  Decembef  21,  1836, 
on  the  question  of  recognizing  the  independence  of  Texas, 
and  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  the  so-called  Cuban  Republic  would  be  un- 
justified on  grounds  of  law  and  would  also  be  inexpedient. 
There  remained  for  consideration,  said  President  McKinley. 
the  alternative  fonns  of  inter\'ention  to  end  the  Nvar, 
either  by  imposing  a  rational  compromise  between  the  con- 
testants, or  by  becoming  the  active  ally  of  the  one  party  or 
the  other.  The  latter  alternative  he  rejected.  Of  the 
former,  he  stated  that  the  grounds  for  such  intervention 
might  be  summarized  as  follows : 

First :  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to  the 
barbarities,  bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  miseries  now 
existing  there,  and  which  the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  either 
unable  or  unwilling  to  stop  or  mitigate.  It  is  no  answer  to  say 
this  is  all  in  another  country,  belonging  to  another  nation,  and 
is  therefore  none  of  our  business.  It  is  specially  our  duty, 
for  it  is  right  at  our  door. 

Second :  We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  aftord  them  that 
protection  and  indemnity  for  life  and  property  which  no  gov- 
ernment there  can  or  will  afford,  and  to  that  end  to  terminate 
the  conditions  that  deprive  them  of  legal  protection. 

Third:  The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the  very 
serious  injury  to  the  commerce,  trade,  and  business  of  our 
people,  and  by  the  wanton  destruction  of  property  and  devas- 
tation of  the  island. 

Fourth,  and  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance:  The  pres- 
ent condition  of  aflFairs  in  Cuba  is  a  constant  menace  to  our 
peace,  and  entails  upon  this  government  an  enormous  expense. 
With  such  a  conflict  waged  for  years  in  an  island  so  near  us 
and  with  which  our  people  have  such  trade  and  business  rela- 
tions ;  when  the  lives  and  liberty  of  our  citizens  are  in  constant 


156         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [442 

danger  and  their  property  destroyed  and  themselves  ruined; 
where  our  trading  vessels  are  liable  to  seizure  and  are  seized 
at  our  very  door  by  war  ships  of  a  foreign  nation,  the  expedi- 
tions of  filibustering  that  we  are  powerless  to  prevent  alto- 
gether, and  the  irritating  questions  and  entanglements  thus 
arising — all  these  and  others  that  I  need  not  mention,  with 
the  resulting  strained  relations,  are  a  constant  menace  to  our 
peace,  and  compel  us  to  keep  on  a  semi-war  footing  with  a 
nation  with  which  we  are  at  peace. 

On  a  view  of  all  the  facts  and  considerations,  Presi- 
dent McKinley  requested  from  Congress  authority  to  take 
measures  to  bring  about  the  final  termination  of  hostilities 
between  the  government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba, 
and  to  secure  in  the  island  the  establishment  of  a  stable 
government,  \vith  power  to  make  such  use  of  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  as  might  be  necessary 
for  those  purposes.  He  declared  that,  having  exhausted 
every  effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable  condition  of  affairs 
that  had  so  long  existed,  he  was  prepared  to  execute  every 
obligation  imposed  upon  him  by  the  constitution  and  the 
law.  In  conclusion,  however,  he  stated  that  since  his  mes- 
sage was  prepared,  he  had  received  official  information  that 
the  latest  decree  of  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain  directed 
General  Blanco,  in  order  to  facilitate  peace,  to  proclaim  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  the  duration  and  details  of  which 
had  not  yet  been  communicated  to  the  United  States. 
President  McKinley  commended  this  communication  to  the 
consideration  of  Congress  in  the  solemn  deliberations  011 
which  it  was  about  to  enter. 

On  April  19,  1898,  Congress  passed  the  following  joint 
resolution  for  intervention : 

Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for 
more  than  three  years  in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own 
borders,  have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the 


443]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  1 57 

United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace  to  Christian  civiHzation, 
culminating,  as  they  have,  in  the  destruction  of  a  United 
States  battleship,  with  two  hundred  and  sixty-five  of  its  offi- 
cers and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of 
Havana,  and  cannot  longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to  Con- 
gress of  April  eleventh,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 
upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited :  Therefore, 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled.  First.  That 
the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be, 
free  and  independent. 

Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand, 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand, 
that  the  Government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority 
and  government  in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land 
and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the 
actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several 
states,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these 
resolutions  into  effect. 

Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  dis- 
position.or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or 
control  over  said  Island,  except  for  the  pacification  thereof, 
and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to 
leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  Island  to  its  people.' 

This  resolution,  with  the  approval  of  the  President,  be- 
came a  law  on  April  20.  On  the  same  day.  Mr.  Sherman, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  telegraphed  the  text  of  the  resolution 
to  General  Woodford,  at  Madrid,  with  instructions  to  pre- 
sent it  to  the  Spanish  government  and  formally  to  demand 
that  Spain  at  once  relinquish  her  authority  and  government 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  763. 


1^8         7"//£  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [444 

in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  her  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters.^  Any  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  to  exercise  jurisdiction,  control 
or  sovereignty  over  the  island  was  disclaimed.  Unless  a 
satisfactory  response  to  these  demands  should  be  received 
by  Saturday  noon,  April  23,  it  was  stated  that  the  President 
would  without  further  notice  execute  the  provisions  of  the 
joint  resolution  in  order  to  end  the  conflict  in  Cuba.  Senor 
Polo  de  Bernabe,  who  had  succeeded  Sehor  Dupuy  de  Lome 
as  Spanish  Minister  at  Washington,  asked  for  his  pass- 
ports 051  April  20.  On  April  21,  the  Spanish  minister  of 
state  in  a  note  to  General  Woodford,  declared  that  the  joint 
resolution,  since  it  denied  the  legitimate  interests  of  Spain  in 
Cuba  aiid  threatened  armed  intervention,  was  equivalent 
to  an  evident  declaration  of  war,  and  that  consequently 
diplomatic  relations  between  the  countries  were  broken. 
On  April  22,  President  McKinley  proclaimed  a  blockade 
of  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  including  ports  between 
Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  and  of  the  port  of  Cienfuegos 
on  the  south  coast;  and  on  April  23rd  he  called  for  volun- 
teers tc  execute  the  purpose  of  the  joint  resolution.  In  a 
special  message  to  Congress  on  April  25th,  he  recommended 
a  formal  declaration  of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain.  This  recommendation 
was  immediately  accepted  and  on  the  same  day  an  act  was 
passed  b}'  Congress  and  was  approved  by  the  President, 
declaring  the  existence  of  the  state  of  war  from  and  in- 
cluding April  21. 

It  is  beyond  my  purpose  to  follow  the  military  events  of 
the  Spanish-American  war;  nor  is  it  pertinent  here  to  dis- 
cuss the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  the  eventual  grant  of 
independence  to  the  island,  or  the  interventions  that  have 
since  taken   place  under  the  treaties  between   the  United 

^  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  pp.  762-763. 


445]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  1 59 

States  and  Cuba.  President  McKinley,  in  his  annual  mes- 
sage of  December  5,  1898.  declaned  that,  after  the  pacifica- 
tion of  the  island,  aid  and  protection  should  be  given  to  the 
Cubans  in  forming  a  government  of  their  own,  and  that 
military  occupation  by  the  United  States  would  continue 
only  until  complete  tranquility  and  a  stable  government  had 
been  established.  The  independence  of  Cuba  was  estab- 
lished and  its  political  relations  to  the  United  States  were 
determined  by  the  treaty  of  March  22,  1903,  which  em- 
bodied the  so-called  Piatt  amendment  to  the  act  of  Congress 
of  March  21,  1901,  making  appropriations  for  the  support 
of  the  United  States  Army.  This  amendment  was,  by  its 
terms,  declared  to  be  intended  to  fulfill  the  purpose  de- 
clared in  the  joint  resolution  of  April  20,  1898,  to  leave  the 
government  and  control  of  Cuba  to  its  people,  after  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Spanish  authorities.  To  this  end  the  Presi- 
dent was  authorized  to  leave  the  government  and  control 
of  the  island  to  its  people  so  soon  as  a  government  should 
have  been  established  under  a  constitution  which  should 
define  the  future  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Cuba, 
in  conformity  with  the  conditions  which  the  amendment 
prescribed.  These  conditions  were,  in  substance,  ( i )  that 
the  Cuban  government  should  never  enter  into  any  engage- 
ment with  any  foreign  power  which  would  impair  or  tend 
to  impair  the  independence  of  the  island,  nor  permit  any 
such  power  to  obtain  a  lodgment  in  or  control  over  any 
part  of  the  island;  (2)  that  the  Cuban  government  should 
not  assume  or  contract  any  public  debt  for  which  the  ordin- 
ary revenues  of  the  island,  after  defraying  current  expenses, 
were  inadequate;  (3)  that  the  United  States  might  in- 
tervene for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  hidependence.  the 
maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for  the  protection 
of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  for  the  dis- 
charge of  the  obligations  which  the  I/nited  States  had  as- 


l6o         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [446 

Slimed  on  the  part  of  Cuba  under  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
Spain;  (4)  that  all  acts  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  dur- 
ing its  military  occupancy  should  be  treated  as  valid,  and 
that  all  lawful  rights  acquired  thereunder  should  be  main- 
tained and  protected ;  ( 5 )  that  the  government  of  Cuba 
should  execute  plans  for  the  sanitation  of  the  cities  of  the 
island  in  order  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  epidemic  and 
infectious  diseases,  and  to  assure  protection  to  the  people 
and  commerce  of  Cuba  as  well  as  to  the  commerce  of  the 
southern  ports  of  the  United  States  and  their  inhabitants; 
(6)  that  the  Isle  of  Pines  should  be  omitted  from  the  pro- 
posed constitutional  boundaries  of  Cuba,  the  title  to  the 
island  to  be  left  to  future  adjustment  by  treaty;  (7)  that, 
in  order  to  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba,  and  protect  its  people  as  well  as  to  pro- 
vide for  its  own  defense,  the  government  of  Cuba  should 
sell  or  lease  to  the  United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling 
or  naval  stations  at  specified  points,  to  be  agreed  upon  with 
the  President  of  the  United  States;  (8)  that  by  way  of 
further  assurance,  the  government  of  Cuba  should  embody 
the  foregoing  conditions  in  a  permanent  treaty  with  the 
United  States. 

These  conditions  were  incorporated  into  an  ordinance 
appended  to  the  Cuban  constitution.  They  were  also  em- 
bodied in  a  permanent  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Cuba,  signed  at  Havana  on  May  22,  1903,  the  ratifications 
of  which  were  exchanged  at  Washington  on  July  i.  1904. 
By  a  treaty  concluded  July  2,  1903,  Cuba  leased  to  the 
United  States  certain  areas  of  land  and  water  at  Guan- 
tanamo  and  Bahia  Honda  for  naval  or  coaling  stations. 

President  Roosevelt,  in  his  annual  message  to  Con- 
gress of  December  3,  1901,  announced  that  before  the  ses- 
sion of  Congress  closed,  the  putting  of  the  independent 
government  of  Cuba  on  a  firm  footing  would  be  an  ac- 


447]  INTERVENTION  IN  CUBA  l6r 

compHshed  fact.  The  first  president  of  the  Republic  of 
Cuba  was  inaugurated  on  May  20,  1902.  Thus,  iii  the 
most  striking  instance  of  intervention  to  be  found  in  its 
history,  the  United  States.  fulfilHng  the  pledee  which  it 
had  given  to  the  world,  kept  faith  with  the  object  of  its  solici- 
tude by  relinquishing  to  the  people  of  Cuba  the  govern- 
ment and  control  of  the  island,  subject  only  to  such  con- 
ditions as  were  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  its  indepen- 
dence and  the  exercise  of  orderly  self-rule. 


CHAPTER  IV 
Intervention  in  the  Revolution  at  Panama^  1903 

With  the  express  exception  of  the  case  of  Cuba,  the 
outstanding  instance  of  American  interventicyn  is  that  of 
the  United  States  in  the  revolution  at  Panama  in  1903,  re- 
sulting in  the  establishment  of  the  republic  of  Panama. 
This  interv'ention,  and  the  controversy  with  Colombia 
which  followed,  has  a  distinct  relation  to  the  treaty  of  1846 
between  the  United  States  and  the  republic  of  New  Granada, 
article  35  of  which  provides  that  "  the  United  States 
guarantee,  positively  and  efficaciously,  to  New  Granada, 
by  the  present  stipulation,  the  perfect  neutrality  of  the  be- 
fore-mentioned Isthmus,  with  the  view  that  the  free  transit 
from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be  interrupted  or 
embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while  this  treaty  exists ;  and, 
in  conseques-ice,  the  United  States  also  guarantee,  in  the 
saime  manner,  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  which 
New  Granada  has  and  possesses  over  the  said  territory."^ 
President  Polk,  in  a  message  to  the  Senate^  February  10, 
1847,  transmitting  the  treaty  of  1846  to  that  body,  ob- 
served that  the  conditions  inducing  him  to  lay  the  document 
before  the  Senate  were:  (i)  that  the  treaty  did  not  pro- 
pose to  guarantee  a  territory  to  a  foreign  nation  in  which 
the  United  States  should  have  no  common  interest  with 
that  nation;  (2)  that  the  guarantee  was  confined  to  the 
single  province  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  did  not  ex- 
tend to  the  New  Granadan  territories  generally;  (3)   that 

'  Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  312. 
162  [448 


449]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  1 63 

it  would  constitute  no  alliance  for  any  political  object,  but 
for  a  purely  commercial  one.  which  would  command  the  in- 
terest of  all  maritime  nations;  and  (4)  that  in  entering  into 
the  mutual  guarantees  proposed  in  Article  35  of  the  treaty,, 
neither  of  the  parties  had  entertained  any  narrow  or  ex- 
clusive views,  but  were  moved  "  to  secure  to  all  nations  the 
free  and  equal  right  of  passage  over  the  Isthmus."  ^  More- 
over, he  contended  that  such  a  guarantee  was  necessary  to 
secure  for  the  world  this  passage,  independent  of  wars  and 
re\-olutions  which  might  arise  among  different  nations,  and 
was  indispensable  to  effect  its  cc^istruction,  either  by 
sovereign  states  or  by  private  enterprise. 

The  treaty  of  1846,  therefore,  embraces  a  guarantee  of 
the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  with  a  view  to 
maintaining  a  free  and  open  transit,  and  a  guarantee  of 
New  Granadan  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  over 
the  territory.  The  guarantee  of  neutrality  and  sovereignty 
has  in  several  instances  been  defined  and  interpreted  by  the 
United  States  under  circumstances  which  seemed  to  justify 
it.  We  have  taken  the  position  that  the  United  States  could 
tender  to  New  Granada,  unsought,'  such  advice  as  was 
necessary,  in  her  relation  with  other  powers,  to  protect  the 
Isthmus  under  the  treaty.  The  Peruvian  government  in- 
quired as  to  the  measures  which  the  United  States  might 
take  in  case  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  should  be 
threatened,  and  suggested  that  New  Granada  might  make 
the  Isthmus  a  seat  of  hostile  preparations  against  Peru,, 
and  thus  make  of  the  guarantee  of  neutrality  in  effect  a 
defensive  alliance  between  New  Granada  a":Kl  the  United 
States.*  Mr  Everett,  as  Secretary  of  State,  replied  that  the 
action  taken    would    be   controlled    by    the    magnitude  of 

'Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  iv,  pp.  512-513. 
*  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  iii,  p.  24. 
3  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  p.  25. 


l64         7"H£  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [450 

American  interests,  and  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between 
Peru  and  New  Granada,  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States  would  be  offered  to  prevent  it. 

It  was  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State, 
that  the  United  States  was  under  no  duty  to  explain  to 
Colombia  the  means  which  it  might  take  to  effect  thei 
guarantee  of  Colombian  sovereignty.^  The  action  of  both 
governments,  he  observed,  should  be  regulated  by  the  treaty 
and  the  law  of  nations,  should  the  emergency  arise.  Mr. 
Fish,  as  Secretary  of  State,  declared  that  "  a  principal  ob- 
ject "  of  New  Granada  in  signing  the  treaty  of  1846  was 
to  maintain  her  sovereignty  over  the  Isthmus  against  any 
attack  from  abroad.-  Secretary  of  State  Evarts  expressed 
the  view  that  the  American  guarantee  of  neutrality  did  not 
extend  to  the  duty  of  restraining  the  transportation  of 
munitions  of  war  to  belligerents  in  a  war  during  which  the 
United  States  was  neutral.^  He  directed  Mr.  Dichman, 
American  minister  to  Colombia,  that  the  neutrality  of  the 
Isthmus,  as  guaranteed  by  the  United  States,  should  in  no 
sense  be  confused  with  the  rules  which  Colombia  should 
be  called  upon  to  enforce  within  her  territorial  jurisdic- 
tion as  a  sovereign  state,  as  towards  all  belligerent  states. 
The  construction  of  the  American  guarantee  was  reserved 
for  a  situation  which  might  require  it. 

In  a  convention  between  the  republics  of  Colombia  and 
Costa  Rica,  it  was  agreed  to  refer  certain  boundary  dif- 
ferences which  affected  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State  of 
Panama  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  in  case  of  his 
declination,  successively  to  the  King  of  Spain  and  the 
President  of  the  Argentine  Republic*     Mr.  Blaine,  Secre- 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  26-27. 

'Foreign  Relations,  1871.  pp.  247,  248. 

'  Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  vol.  iii,  p.  27. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  29-32. 


45l]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  165 

tary  of  State,  declared  that  the  United  States  would  not  be 
bound  by  any  arbitration  where  its  rights  or  interests  were 
concerned,  and  where  it  had  not  been  consulted  as  to  the  sub- 
ject or  method  of  the  arbitration,  or  as  to  the  choice  of  the 
arbitrator.  This  position  w^as  substantially  reaffirmed  by 
Secretaries  of  State  Frelinghuysen  and  Bayard.  By  a 
supplementary  convention  between  Colombia  and  Costa 
Rica,  concluded  January  20,  1886,  it  was  stipulated  that 
the  judgment  of  the  arbitration  should  be  confined  to  ter- 
ritorial limits  as  set  forth  in  the  supplementary  convention, 
and  it  was  further  provided  that  the  judgment  should  not 
affect  the  rights  which  any  third  party,  not  having  partici- 
pated in  the  convention,  might  claim  to  the  "  ownership  " 
of  the  territory  in  question.  This  formal  assurance  was 
accepted  by  the  United  States,  with  the  understanding  that 
the  term  "  ownership  "  was  used  in  no  restrictive  sense,  but 
included  all  jx>ssessory  or  usufructuary  rights,  easements, 
or  privileges  which  the  United  States  or  its  citizens  may 
possess  in  the  territory  under  dispute,  both  as  regards  the 
relation  of  the  United  States  to  the  contracting  parties, 
and  its  relation  and  that  of  its  citizens  to  any  third  govern- 
ment not  a  party  to  the  arbitration. 

The  guarantee  of  a  free  and  open  transit,  in  its  relation 
to  domestic  disturbances  which  have  taken  place  on  the 
Isthmus,  is  equal  in  importance  to  the  guarantee  of  neutral- 
ity and  sovereignty.  The  Isthmus  became  in  due  course 
an  imiportant  highway  of  commerce  and  transportation. 
In  the  celebrated  Panama  riot  of  1856,  resulting  in  the  loss 
of  life  and  the  destruction  of  property,  the  government  of 
New  Granada,  by  a  convention  concluded  at  Washington. 
September  10,  1857,  agreed  to  adjust  all  claims  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  against  that  government  preseiited  before  a 
certain  date,  and  especially  such  claims  as  were  caused  by 
the  riot  of  1856.^     By  this  convention.  New  Granada  rec- 

1  Moore,  op.  (it.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  34-35- 


l66         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [452 

ognized  her  "  obligation  to  preserve  peace  and  good  order 
along  the  transit  route."  The  Department  of  State,  in 
1866,  with  respect  to  a  rumor  that  the  state  of  Panama 
would  attempt  to  secure  her  independence,  announced  that 
the  United  States  had  made  a  uniform  practice  of  absten- 
tion from  any  connection  with  questions  of  internal  revolu- 
tion in  the  state  of  Panama  or  any  other  Colombian  state, 
•  and  would  continue  to  be  neutral  in  such  domestic  distur- 
bances/ However,  in  the  event  of  interference  with  the 
transit  trade  due  to  foreign  or  domestic  invasions  in  the 
state  of  Panama,  measures  of  protection  would  be  taken. 
Mr.  Fish,  Secretary  of  State,  significantly  observed  that  the 
United  States  had,  under  the  treaty  of  1846,  undertaken  to 
protect  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama."  In  ad- 
dition, he  said :  "  This  engagement,  however,  has  never  been 
acknowledged  to  embrace  the  duty  of  protecting  the  road 
across  it  from  the  violence  of  local  factions;  but  it  is  re- 
garded as  the  undoubted  duty  of  the  Colombian  government 
to  protect  it  against  attacks  from  local  insurgents."  Dur- 
ing the  insurrection  of  1884- 188 5,  and  at  other  times,  the 
United  States  had  employed  its  armed  forces  to  protect 
American  citizens  and  their  property  along  the  transit 
route.  In  most  instances,  these  steps  were  taken  with  the 
assent  of  the  Colombian  goverament.  In  regard  to  these 
measures,  Mr.  Bayard,  Secretary-  of  State,  declared  that  the 
United  States  had  always  recognized  the  sovereignty  of 
Colombia  and  had  never  acknowledged,  but  had  expressly 
disclaimed,  the  duty  of  protecting  the  line  of  transit  against 
domestic  disturbance.  Due  to  interference  with  the  line  of 
railway  by  the  Liberals,  American  forces  were  landed  at 
Panama,  November  4,  1901.  A  degree  of  American  inter- 
vention continued  during  the  period  of  revolution,  which  was 

^  Moore,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  38. 
2  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  p.  38. 


453]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  167 

brought  to  a  close  when  peace  was  conchided  on  November 
21,  1902,  between  the  Colombian  government  and  the  re- 
volutionary forces  in  the  cabin  of  Rear-Admiral  Casey's 
flagship. 

The  incident  which  led  to  our  intervention  to  establish  the 
republic  of  Panama  was  the  revolution  of  1903.  On 
November  3,  1903,  the  commanders  of  the  Boston,  Nash- 
ville and  Dixie  were  instructed  as  follows : 

Maintain  a  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interruption 
threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line  of  railroad.  Pre- 
vent landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile  intent,  either  gov- 
ernment or  insurgent,  at  any  point  within  50  miles  of  Panama. 
Government  force  reported  approaching  Isthmus  in  vessels. 
Prevent  their  landing  if,  in  your  judgment,  the  landing  would 
precipitate  a  conflict.^ 

The  revolution  followed  the  next  day,  and  the  independence 
of  the  republic  was  declared  a  day  later.  Mr.  Hay,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  instructed  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  at  Panama  to  enter  into  relations  with  the  new  govern- 
ment when  he  was  satisfied  that  "  a  de  facto  government, 
republican  in  form,  and  without  substantial  opposition  from 
its  own  people  "  had  been  established."  He  was  also  dir- 
ected to  look  to  tliat  government  tor  the  protection  of 
American  citizens  and  their  property,  and  for  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  as  regards  Isthmian  transit.  On 
November  13,  Mr.  Bunau-Varilla  was  received  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  as  minister  of  Panama  to  the  United  States.^ 
The  Hay-Bunau-Varilla  treaty  was  concluded  between 
the  United  States  and  Panama  on  November  18,  1903. 
Under  its  provisions,  the  United  States  agreed  to  guarantee 
and  maintain  the  independence  of  the  republic  of  Panama.* 

'  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  p.  267. 

*Ibid.,  1903,  p.  22,3- 

*Ibid.,  1903,  pp.  245,  246. 

*  Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1349,  ct  scq. 


l68         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [454 

On  her  part,  Panama  relinquished  to  the  United  States  the 
control  of  sanitation  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order 
within  the  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama.  The  United  States 
was  given  the  right  to  employ  measures  to  protect  the 
canal,  and  no  alterations  in  government,  laws  or  treaties 
affecting  the  rights  of  the  United  States  could  be  made 
without  her  consent.  Panama  granted  to  the  United  States 
in  perpetuity  a  zone  ten  miles  wide  for  purposes  of  a  canal, 
American  control  of  which  was  to  be  virtually  sovereign. 
President  Roosevelt  discussed  the  provisions  of  the  Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla  treaty  in  his  annual  message  of  December  7, 
1903.^  He  cited  declarations  of  policy  of  earlier  statesmen 
in  regard  to  the  canal  question,  gave  a  list  of  revolutions  and 
other  outbreaks  which  had  occurred  on  the  Isthmus  since 
the  treaty  of  1846.  and  pointed  out  that  American  interests 
under  the  treaty  would  be  best  served  by  entering  into  re- 
lations with  the  republic  of  Panama.  He  also  condemned 
Colombia  for  her  "  contemptuous  refusal  "  to  ratify  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty,  which  the  Colombian  Congress  de- 
clined to  approve  on  the  ground  that  it  infringed  national 
sovereignty  and  was  not  in  accord  with  the  national  con- 
stitution and  laws. 

Colombia  immediately  protested,  invoking  article  35  of 
the  treaty  of  1846,  and  the  two  governments  entered  upon 
a  controversy  which  is  still  unsettled.  The  question  was 
whether  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  in  extending  re- 
cognition at  so  early  a  stage  of  the  revolution  constituted 
an  act  of  intervention.  General  Reyes  was  sent  on  a 
special  mission  to  the  United  States  to  present  the  Colomi- 
bian  case.  A  capital  complaint  which  he  made  was  that 
the  United  States  had  inter\'ened  in  a  conflict  between 
Colombia  and  a  rebellious  province,  and  had  aided  in  the 
dismemberment  of  a  portion  of  Colombia's  territory.     He 

^Foreign  Relations,  1903,  p.  xxxii. 


455]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  169 

denied  that  the  principle  of  secession  was  recognized  by 
the  internal  law  of  Colombia,  and  described  what  he  re- 
garded as  the  proper  conditions  of  recognition  in  the  fol- 
lowing terms : 

If  the  people  of  Panama,  animated  by  the  noble  sentiments 
which  induced  men  of  action  to  seek  quicker  and  more  rapid 
progress,  had  proclaimed  their  independence  and,  without  for- 
eign aid,  been  victorious  in  battle  waged  against  the  armies 
of  the  mother  country,  had  organized  a  government,  drawn  up 
laws,  and  proved  to  the  world  that  it  could  govern  itself  by 
itself  and  be  responsible  to  other  nations  for  its  conduct,  with- 
out doubt  it  would  have  become  entitled  to  recognition  by  all 
the  powers.^ 

He  held,  however,  that  none  of  these  things  had  oc- 
curred, and  observed  that  the  conduct  of  the  United  States 
was  difficult  to  comprehend  in  the  light  of  prior  American 
practice.  His  three  main  points  of  complaint  included  the 
aid  rendered  by  the  United  States  to  the  Panama  insurrec- 
tion, the  premature  recognition  of  the  republic  of  Panama, 
and  the  alleged  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1846 
between  the  United  States  and  New  Granada.  Mr.  Hay, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  replied  that  eighteen  governments  had 
recognized  the  revolution  as  an  "  avowed  object  ....  to 
secure  the  construction  of  the  interoceanic  canal."  "  It 
w^as  inspired,  he  said,  by  the  desire  of  the  people  to  safe- 
guard their  own  interests  and  at  the  same  time  to  secure 
the  canal  to  its  providential  uses.  Any  recognition  was  due 
to  the  conviction  that  interests  of  utmost  importance  to  the 
civilized  world  would  be  endangered.  As  to  the  American 
guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus,  and  of  the 
sovereignty  and  property  of  Colombia  over  it.  such  a  step 

^Foreign  Relations,  1903,  p.  292. 
'Ibid.,  1903,  pp.  302-303. 


170         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [456 

had  been  taken  in  the  interests  of  an  interoceanic  communi- 
cation and  of  an  uninterrupted  tratisit  from  sea  to  sea. 
Responsibility  was  laid  upon  Colombia,  and  a  vigorous  ex- 
change of  notes  followed. 

In  a  special  nuessage  to  Congress,  Januarys  4,  1904,  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  set  forth,  in  clear  and  explicit  terms,  definite 
reasons  for  the  policy  of  his  administration  in  dealing  with 
the  situation  in  Panama.^  At  the  outset,  he  quoted  the 
position  enunciated  by  Secretary  of  State  Cass  in  1858, 
which  was  in  effect  that  sovereignty  has  its  duties  as  well 
as  rights,  and  that  the  administration  of  the  states  in  Central 
America  should  not  be  allowed  to  close  the  doors  of  in- 
tercourse to  the  world.  Under  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty, 
he  said,  the  United  States,  in  engaging  to  control  and  police 
the  canal,  and  to  keep  it  open  for  the  vessels  of  all  nations 
on  equal  terms,  "  assumed  the  position  of  guarantor  of  the 
canal  and  of  its  peaceful  use  by  all  the  world."  At  the 
time  of  the  submission  to  Colombia  of  the  Hay-Herrani 
treaty,  three  things,  Mr.  Roosevelt  observed,  were  settled. 
One  was  that  the  canal  should  be  built,  and  that  the  time 
of  allowing  impediments  to  delay  its-  construction  was  past. 
A  second  was  that  the  United  States  would  deal  in  a  fair 
and  generous  way  with  the  people  through  whose  land  the 
canal  might  be  built.  The  Hay-Herran  treaty,  it  was  de- 
clared, fulfilled  these  conditions,  in  that  it  acknowledged, 
confirmed  and  preserved  Colombian  sovereignty  over  the 
strip.  No  nation  could  undertake  to  build  a  canal  with  a 
less  degree  of  control  than  was  provided  for  in  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty,  and  a  refusal  to  grant  it  was  a  refusal  to 
enter  into  any  practicable  treaty,  with  the  result  that 
Colombia  would  hold  up  the  world's  traffic  across  the  Isth- 
mus. Finally,  Congress  had  settled  that  the  canal  \\2lS  to  be 
built. 

^Foreign  Relations,  1903.  pp.  260-278. 


457]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  iji 

With  the  refusal  of  the  Colombian  legislature  to  ratify 
the  treaty,  three  possibilities,  said  President  Roosevelt,  were 
open  to  the  United  States.  One  possibility,  that  Colombia 
might  eventually  see  the  unwisdom  of  her  course,  failed,  in 
spite  of  warnings  from  the  United  States  as  to  the  con- 
sequences which  would  ensue.  A  second  was  the  utilization 
of  the  Nicaragua  route.  A  third  was  that  the  people  of  the 
Istlunus  might,  in  their  desire  to  see  the  canal  built,  de- 
clare their  independence,  and  make  its  construction  possible. 
This  course  was  taken. 

President  Roosevelt  defended  the  conduct  of  the  Unitei 
States  in  the  following  terms :  "  We,  in  effect,  policed  the 
Isthmus  in  the  interests  of  its  inhabitants  and  of  our  own 
national  needs,  and  for  the  good  of  the  entire  civilized 
world."  He  then  gave  the  following  defense  of  the  act  of 
recognition : 

Their  recognition  by  this  government  was  based  upon  a  state 
of  facts  in  no  way  dependent  for  its  justifications  upon  our 
action  in  ordinary  cases.  I  have  not  denied,  nor  do  I  wisii 
to  deny,  either  the  validity  or  the  propriety  of  the  general  rule 
that  a  new  state  should  not  be  recognized  as  independent  till 
it  has  shown  its  ability  to  maintain  its  independence.  This 
rule  is  derived  from  the  principle  of  non-intervention,  and  as 
a  corollary  of  that  principle  has  generally  been  observed  by 
the  United  States.  But,  like  the  principle  from  which  it  is  de- 
duced, the  rule  is  subject  to  exceptions ;  and  there  are  in  my 
opinion  clear  and  imperative  reasons  why  a  departure  from  it 
was  justified  and  even  required  in  the  present  instance. 

The  reasons  for  depanure  in  this  instance,  observed 
President  Roosevelt,  embraced  our  treaty  rights,  our  national 
interests  and  safety,  and  the  interests  of  collective  civiliza- 
tion. As  to  treaty  rights,  he  held  that  the  American 
guarantee  of  New  Granadan  sovereignty  over  the  Isthmus 
was   not  a  guarantee  against   domestic   insurrection;  and 


172         THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INTERVENTION       [458, 

where  the  intervention  had  taken  place  under  article  35  of 
the  treaty  of  1846,  it  was  only  with  the  larger  end  in  view 
of  free  Isthmian  transit.  Colombia,  he  claimed,  did  not 
reciprocate  with  the  grant  of  reasonable  concessions  which 
the  United  States  had  a  right  to  expect.  National  in- 
terests and  safety,  he  thought,  would  be  endangered  by 
further  delay  in  constructing  the  long-contemplated  inter- 
oceanic  canal.  The  third  justification  for  the  rapid  recogni- 
tion of  Panama  was  found  in  the  mandate  which  the  United 
States  had  received  from  civilization  to  build  the  canal. 

A  striking  analogy  was  made  by  President  Roosevelt  be- 
tween American  action  in  Panama,  and  the  intervention  in 
Cuba.  The  Cuban  case  was  even  more  extreme,  he  said, 
as  "we  intervened  even  by  force  on  general  grounds  of 
national  interests  and  duty."  He  referred  to  prophecies 
made  at  the  time  of  the  Cuban  intervention,  that  the  United 
States  would  retain  Cuba  permanently  and  subordinate  it  to 
American  interests,  but  he  pointed  out  that  the  action  of  the 
United  States  had  been  otherwise.  "  The  people  of  Cuba," 
he  said,  "  have  been  immeasurably  benefited  by  our  inter- 
ference in  their  behalf,  and  our  own  gain  has  been  great. 
So  will  it  be  in  Panama.  The  people  of  the  Isthmus,  and 
as  I  firmly  believe  of  the  adjacent  parts  of  Central  and 
South  America,  will  be  greatly  benefited  by  the  building  of 
the  canal  and  the  guarantee  of  peace  and  order  along  its. 
line;  and  hand  in  hand  with  the  benefit  to  them  will  go 
>the  benefit  to  us  and  to  mankind." 

Our  early  recognition  of  the  republic  of  Panama  was 
clearly  an  act  of  intervention,  and  a  distinct  departure,  as 
indicated  by  President  Roosevelt,  from  the  principles  of 
non-intervention  and  the  de  facto  recognition  of  states.  As 
such,  its  justification  must  rest  upon  the  merits  of  the  case, 
which  are  clearly  set  forth,  including  the  reasons  there- 
for, in  the  President's  message  of  January  4,  1904.     He 


459]  INTERVENTION  AT  PANAMA  173 

openly  avowed  the  recognition  of  Panama  as  an  extraordin- 
ary procedure,  justified  by  sufficient  reasons  to  require  a 
departure  from  tlie  rule  requiring  a  demonstration  of 
governmental  competency  before  according  recognition. 
While  the  principle  of  non-intervention  and  the  de  facto 
principle  of  recognition  were  recognized  as  general  rules  of 
American  policy  which  had  ordinarily  been  observed,  yet 
he  regarded  both  as  subject  to  exceptions,  and  the  Panama 
situation  as  one  constituting  such  an  exception.  In  the 
second  capital  instance  of  departure  from  ordinary  Ameri- 
can policy,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Cuban  intervention,  we 
have  been  satisfied  with  such  a  degree  of  interference  as- 
will  protect  our  interests,  and  preserve  to  the  world,  un- 
impaired, the  use  of  the  waterway  which  we,  as  the  "  man- 
datory- of  civilization,"  have  constructed.  It  appears,  there- 
fore, that  the  United  States  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any 
less  degree  of  control  over  any  zone  and  country  where 
our  interests  are  so  great. 


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